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Critical discourse in juvenile justice particularly where a child is in conflict with 
the law is only just beginning to find its voice in Malaysia. This is in part due to the 
interwoven elements of politics, penal policies and socio-cultural norms. Hence, 
although Malaysia has taken steps to comply with aspects of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC), there are gaps in the expectations of the CRC and the 
actual working of the criminal justice system as far as the child in conflict with the 
law is concerned. This is not surprising considering the fact that while there are 
general expressions of the CRC, State parties have a level of discretion to decide on 
the exact nature and content of the measures for dealing with children in conflict with 
the law. Further given Malaysia’s reservations to a number of the CRC Articles and 
given the punitive culture existent, the issue of a child rights-based approach to 
diversion that sets out to realise all children’s rights relevant to diversion (as set out in 
the CRC and other instruments) merits analysis.  
Thus, this research involves a qualitative analysis of the state of the law and 
policies governing children in conflict with the law with a particular focus on the 
rights of the child as far as diversion within the juvenile justice framework in 
Malaysia is concerned.  This research involves an empirical analysis of a range of 
international conventions, standards, treaties, rules and decided cases and 
contextualising these with conversations with principal stakeholders and boys in the 
Henry Gurney School, which, taken together, seeks to establish whether there is a 
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‘Ralph wept for the end of innocence, the darkness of man’s heart, and the fall 














1. Introduction  
On May 30, 2002, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, a boy stabbed a girl twenty times 
with a sharp object, after being taunted by the victim, who repeatedly called him 
“fatty.” The boy was aged 12 and the victim, Mei Fong, was aged 11. As it so often 
happens with the loss of innocence and the awareness of the ‘darkness of man’s heart’ 
(Golding, 1954:216), the offending boy, WK, was then brought into contact with the 
Malaysian juvenile justice system. The ensuing series of cases1 brought the newly 
minted Child Act 2001 and its impact on children in conflict with the law2 to life. 
Society’s perceptions of crime and offending often forms the basis in which it 
responds to the notion of children in conflict with the law. This response manifests 
itself in the administration of the juvenile justice system.  Yet this response is often a 
wilful manifestation of legislative schizophrenia – to endeavour to support children on 
the one hand and the desire to regulate and control the lives of young people on the 
other. Policy makers and those involved in the administration of justice, particularly 
those that deal directly with children, are often at conflict as to the best way forward.  
There is evidence across the globe of various jurisdictions facing the ebb and flow 
of policy challenges in the implementation of youth justice policies. It therefore comes 
as no surprise that globally, there has been a wave of contrasting theoretical 
assumptions underlying juvenile justice approaches, shifting from medical models to 
opportunity theories to labelling to deterrence, from paternalism to legalism to 
mitigating social processes to just deserts and ultimate policy engagements between 
liberal approaches with that of conservatives (Klein, 2001). Until very recently, 
Malaysia remained largely unaffected by these varied theoretical assumptions as the 
juvenile justice system remained in the main, constant in its philosophical 
underpinnings with evidence of high levels of punitiveness. This position is 
                                                 
1 Kok Wah Kuan v Public Prosecutor [2004] 5 MLJ 193, Kok Wah Kuan v Public Prosecutor 
[2007] 5 MLJ 174 and Public Prosecutor v Kok Wah Kuan [2008] 1 MLJ 1. 
2 The term ‘children in conflict with the law’ refers to anyone under 18 who comes into contact with 
the justice system as a result of being suspected or accused of committing an offence. 
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exacerbated by the lack of research informed policy decision making owing to a long 
history of disengagement with critical issues impacting juvenile justice. 
Critical discourse in the area of juvenile justice particularly where a child is in 
conflict with the law is only just beginning to find its voice in Malaysia and some of 
these issues will be explored in this study. The lack of critical analysis in Malaysia is 
in part due to the interwoven elements of penal policy and politics. Therefore, this 
study aims to create critical academic discourse to influence policy makers. The view 
is that the critical criminologist plays a pivotal role in not just combating knowledge 
but to combat the power of knowledge (Sim, 2009 quoting Cohen, 1979:49-50) 
particularly where the power of knowledge is in the hands of those in power.  
An empirical analysis of a range of international conventions, standards, treaties, 
rules, legislative provisions and judicial pronouncements and contextualising these 
with conversations with principal stakeholders and with incarcerated boys in the 
Henry Gurney School, which, taken together, aim to establish whether a strong rights-
based argument for the introduction for diversion in the juvenile justice system in 
Malaysia is possible. It is also hoped that a critical analysis of the underlying norms 
and the context of culture in Malaysia would present a unique view of the Malaysian 
child in conflict with the law. Where appropriate, reference to jurisdictions that share 
a similar tradition of the common law are explored with a view to establish points of 
convergence or divergence. 
 The aim therefore is to generate critical, robust, credible and persuasive arguments 
that might help shape a ‘principled youth justice informed by international human 








2. Fundamental research questions  
 In seeking to pursue critical discourse in the area of juvenile justice, particularly 
where a child is in conflict with the law, this research endeavours to explore the 
following fundamental research questions: 
1. What is (are) the underlying philosophical approach (es) in Malaysia in dealing 
with rights of children in conflict with the law?  
2. Is there an obfuscation of the rights of the child and are children merely treated 
as objects of concern? If so why. 
3. What are the points of convergence/divergence in these policies with that of 
other jurisdictions and its impact on diversion strategies? 
3. The context of this study and the approach taken 
The impetus for this study was drawn from a personal engagement with issues 
impacting children in conflict with the law. This was through membership of two 
committees involved in dealing with broader issues of rights and crime, namely, the 
Constitutional Law Committee of the Malaysian Bar and the Malaysian Crime 
Prevention Foundation. Involvement in these Committees, resulted in a realisation that 
many Malaysians, especially children and particularly children in conflict with the 
law, are not aware of their rights. The experiences in these committees also yielded a 
desire to find deeper meaning to the complexities of how children are socially 
constructed in Malaysia. In developing the framework of the study, it also became 
clear that history, politics and societal norms have a direct bearing on the child in 
conflict with the law. These norms in turn, impinge on the implementation and 
realisation of obligations arising from the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC).  
Plans to introduce the broad concept of diversion in Malaysia emerged as an 
important aspect following the ratification of the CRC in Malaysia. However, it 
appears that Malaysia has encountered challenges in implementing specific diversion 
practices. The intersection between meeting treaty aspirations and political reality 
were therefore constituent elements that also fuelled the basis for this study. 
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In exploring these matters, this study seeks to draw the reader through the complex 
relationship between the theoretical framework and the empirical data in a fluid and 
explorative manner. This introductory Chapter, explores the background and 
motivation for this study and is followed by five substantive Chapters.  
Chapter 2, traces the development of the Malaysian juvenile justice system in 
Malaysia. This affords an understanding of the impact of her colonial past on the 
overarching juvenile justice system. The impact of the various international treaties on 
the juvenile justice system are also evaluated.  
Drawing from these elements, Chapter 3 explores the attitudes, beliefs and 
sentiments of the collective history of the Malaysian political system and how these 
elements impact the juvenile justice system. These underlying norms in turn, have 
direct bearing on the concept of rights. The Chapter then probes the theoretical and 
philosophical foundations of diversion practices.  
Chapter 4, establishes the approaches taken in designing this research which serves 
as the conduit to bridge the theoretical foundations with the empirical data. The 
approach taken in this study is to use a broader, less restrictive concept of ‘research 
design’ and this allows greater engagement with the phenomena being explored, in 
this case, the rights of the child in conflict with the law.  
The application of this is seen through the various conversations with stakeholders 
and boys in Chapter 5.  In keeping with the reflexive inductive approach of this study, 
appropriate conclusions about a rights-based perspective are established in Chapter 6. 
4. A review of relevant prior research 
 A review of relevant prior research involving issues of children in conflict with the 
law and their rights serves two fundamental purposes. Firstly, to develop the 
justification for this study and secondly it serves to inform this study as to the choices 
made about the methods used. 
From a Malaysian perspective, issues affecting children in conflict with the law, 
has generated legal scholarship and interest although the body of work is rather 
limited. Mustaffa’s (2006) comparative study of the Family and Community Group 
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Conferencing (FCGC) in Thailand and rehabilitation aid hostels or halfway houses in 
Japan formed the basis of suggesting these approaches be applied in Malaysia 
(2006:88). There was no reference to diversion and nor issues of child rights and 
neither was there any reference to the CRC. The approaches reviewed by Mustaffa did 
not find its way into the juvenile justice system in Malaysia. 
Ahmad’s (2013) mixed method study of children in pre-trial processes in the 
Malaysian juvenile justice system highlighted worrying patterns. One hundred and 
sixty-four respondents from secure approved schools and those detained in prison 
were surveyed and this was then supplemented with interviews with stakeholders and 
one child from each of the institutions. Ahmad reports that among others: 
 (69.7%) agreed that the arrest process left a negative impact on them;  
 (70%) felt that they were not treated with respect by the enforcement 
officers;  
 (53%) were not brought to the court within twenty-four hours upon arrest;  
 (55.9%) were handcuffed upon arrest;  
 (72%) were not granted access to contact family or a solicitor;  
 (62.8%) reported that they were mistreated while being detained;  
 (53.1%) reported that they were detained together with the adult offenders 
while under remand and  
 (63.4%) reported that they did not feel satisfied with the court proceedings.  
These findings illustrate the gaps in the provisions of the Child Act 2001 and actual 
practice and indicates a very high disregard of a range of child rights. However, 
whether the children were aware of their rights is not evident given that the statistical 
data are merely indicative of the responses to the questions posed. Thus, as 
illuminating as the findings are, the deeper meaning to these issues could not be fully 
explored as the paper subsequently went on to consider the broader issues of crime 
prevention among youth. 
Mustaffa in his recent doctrinal study on the need for the introduction of diversion 
in Malaysia concluded ‘that the process of implementation of diversion may not be 
straightforward as it requires an integrated approach which combines drastic 
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amendment of laws and policies, improvement of logistics, recruitment of manpower 
and enormous investment of financial resources’ (Mustaffa, 2016:152). The paper 
however did not explore issues of cultural and political embeddedness nor did it seek 
to explore views of stakeholders or children themselves. It also did it view the issue of 
diversion from the child rights perspective.  
The most comprehensive study conducted in relation to children in conflict with 
the law was the collaborative project undertaken by UNICEF and the Ministry of 
Women, Family and Community Development Malaysia of the juvenile justice system 
in Malaysia (UNICEF, 2013).  This study represents a significant and valuable 
contribution to the body of knowledge in focus as it provides a broad account of the 
various issues impacting juvenile justice applying document analysis, the use of 
quantitative analysis and triangulating these with interviews with children as well as 
stakeholders.  
Given that the study sought to evaluate the entire juvenile justice framework, it did 
not address the issues of child rights (emphasis added) through the lenses of the 
children themselves. Similar studies drawn from UN agencies and non-governmental 
organisations discussed in the study, also provided analyses and views on child rights 
from the perspective of application of the law although these studies did not directly 
seek the views of the children themselves. 
Other works include Dusuki’s discussion of child rights and the provisions of 
Article 12 (2006) as well as child rights in the context of human rights and Islam 
(2012).  These contributions to legal scholarship involve traditional doctrinal analysis 
of the state of the law and provide detailed discussions on the development of the law 
as well as challenges faced in implementing the CRC.  
An interesting perspective on child rights is Nalasami et al (2015) and their study 
of the implementation of the CRC in the Children Homes under the Social Welfare 
Department in Malaysia. Data was collected from 402 registered children who were 
staying in six Children Homes across the country and employed self-report surveys 
including face-to-face structured interviews, key informant interviews, and 
documentation survey. The study identified gaps between the child protection rights 
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proposed by the CRC and the rights practised in Children Homes and concluded that a 
rights-based approach is an influential empowerment tool for children to control their 
own lives, to choose suitable services, and to make decisions about quality of the care 
and services they receive (2015: 243). While the focus of this research was directly on 
child rights in relation to children in homes, it did not specifically address the issue of 
children in conflict with the law or the issue of diversion. It did not attempt to suggest 
how the gap could be reduced. 
There is evidence of global discourse on issues of children in conflict with the law, 
their rights and issues of diversion. (See for example, Freeman, (2000); Goldson 
(2000); Polk (2003); Denov (2004); Muncie (2009a); Hollingsworth (2013) or 
Richards (2014) among others). These discussions suggest that issues of child rights 
and diversion appear to have resonance irrespective of the diversity in jurisdictions. 
There have been several studies that applied an empirical analysis of child rights 
and the CRC from an international perspective. For example, Lundy et al (2102) and 
their study of the legal implementation of the CRC in 12 European countries 
concluded that ‘successful implementation of the CRC is key to realising children’s 
rights’ (2012:99). There has not been a similar study done in Malaysia. 
Given that at the time of writing, there have not been studies in Malaysia that seek 
to apply a qualitative approach in understanding the rights of the child in conflict with 
the law in relation to diversion, this study aims to enhance the legal scholarship in the 
area, particularly in seeking the views of the incarcerated boys as live actors and not 
as objects of research. It seeks to do so in a clear manner applying academic standards 
of research elucidated in this study.  
While there are perceived limitations in pursuing qualitative approaches, the choice 
of the approach is reliant on finding the approach that best provides the richness and 
context that the researcher seeks to explore. This allows the researcher to find issues 
that are often missed through other approaches. These include exploring subtleties and 
complexities, and evaluating possible relationships, causes, effects and dynamic 
processes involved in the context of the study. Further as this study uses a more 
descriptive, narrative style, it is hoped that this research might be of benefit to 
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practitioners and policy makers by providing a nuanced view of the Malaysian 
context. 
To ensure that the methodological and analytical steps produce reliable and robust 
outcomes, a number of safeguards will be addressed in this study including 
triangulation of data, establishing a data trail, acknowledging researcher subjectivity, 
participant review, and adequate consideration of disconfirming evidence and 
contradictory interpretations. These matters are considered in Chapter 4. 
5.  Reflections 
As suggested above, this study seeks to weave together an empirical analysis of a 
range of documents and contextualising these with conversations with principal 
stakeholders and incarcerated boys. The principal objective is to establish an original 
analysis of a rights-based argument for the introduction for diversion in the juvenile 
justice system in Malaysia. Given that this study did not have pre-determined well-
worked-out hypotheses, the study was not context bound and so concepts and ideas 
evolved as the study progressed, being context sensitive and reflexive. This level of 
reflexivity operated throughout every stage of this study, particularly where 
conversations with the stakeholders and boys were concerned. Thus, in the course of 
this study, a number of pertinent matters emerged. 
Firstly, at the onset of the study, diversion was developed as a central concept 
warranting analysis. In Chapter 3, reference is made to the notion that this study was 
essentially concerned with those practices that divert young people early in the justice 
process, particularly prior to formal court intervention and those strategies that aim to 
avoid custodial sentencing post-trial. (Emphasis added). 
However, as the study progressed, it became evident that the interviewees treated 
the practice of diversion as an amalgam of both these types of diversionary practices. 
This blurring of concepts, is indicative of the fact that stakeholders themselves view 
diversion as a very broad concept. Further, there is also some level of uncertainty 
about how diversion works or is to be implemented. The lack of specifics in 
determining the scope of diversion are also a reflection of the ambiguity in finding a 
strong philosophical underpinning that is necessary to graft the concept of diversion  
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within the Malaysian juvenile justice system. Thus, references to diversion as 
discussed in the latter parts of this study acknowledge the blurring of pre-trial and 
post-trial diversion and as such, a broad all-encompassing phrase ‘diversion’ is 
applied. 
Secondly, it became apparent in the course of this study, that while diversion is an 
important facet in the juvenile justice system, it cannot be viewed in isolation from the 
broader notion of the rights of the child. Thus, this study establishes the premise that 
the rights of the child and how it is contextualised in Malaysia is a condition precedent 
to the successful implementation of any plans for diversion. A child in conflict has a 
right to diversion (emphasis added) and this presents a fresh perspective on how the 
rights of the child in conflict with the law is perceived, understood and realised. This 
fact suggests that the choice of which concept of diversion is to be considered 
becomes a secondary issue and this matter fades out of focus as the primary issue of 
the rights-based argument assumes a greater level of importance in the study. In some 
ways, the issue of diversion cannot be fully realised without resolving the broader 
philosophical context of rights and it is this conundrum that emerges as a significant 
factor in the Malaysian juvenile justice system. 
Thirdly, this study highlights that advocating child rights in Malaysia, represents 
the challenge of establishing universal rights in a culturally diverse world. The 
embedded culture of politics and punitiveness and the deeply entrenched culture of 
childhood mean that a rights-based argument for diversion faces challenges in its 
implementation. Thus, the complexities of the multi-dimensional element of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and its application in Malaysia are a 

















The Malaysian context of juvenile justice 
‘Children begin by loving their parents; as they grow older they judge them; 
sometimes they forgive them.’ 











1.  Introduction 
One week after stabbing Mei Fong aged 11, twenty times, the young boy, WK, 
aged 12, accused of the offence appeared before a Magistrates Court in Malaysia, in a 
sleeveless T-shirt, track bottoms, slippers3 and handcuffs4 to answer to the charges 
proffered against him (Idrus, 2002). As this was a murder charge, the case was then 
transferred to the High Court. A year later, the High Court found the boy guilty of 
murder, a capital offence.  
Following a series of appeals and cross appeals, the finality of the Federal Court 
decision delivered in 2008 (Public Prosecutor v Kok Wah Kuan [2008] 1 MLJ 1)) 
affirmed a guilty verdict. WK (by then aged 17) was to be detained for an indefinite 
duration in prison ‘during the pleasure of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong’ (the Ruler). 
This was in accordance with section 97(2) of the Child Act 2001; a provision that had 
been grafted from the Juvenile Courts Act 1947, which in turn had drawn judiciously 
from the United Kingdom’s Children and Young Persons Act 1933.5  
The case highlighted the complex application of the CRC where a child is in 
conflict with the law especially where a child has killed another child. The case also 
brought to the fore the context of how children in conflict with the law come into 
contact with the juvenile justice system. The Malaysian juvenile justice system owes 
much of its heritage to its colonial past and is thus inextricably intertwined with that 
historical context. 
2. A brief overview of the Malaysian legal system 
Malaysia is a parliamentary democracy based on the traditions of the Westminster 
model and is a constitutional monarchy. It is a Federation of 13 states with a strong 
central government. The written Federal Constitution (Article 3) recognises Islam as 
                                                 
3 Colloquialism that refers to rubber flip-flops/sandals commonly used in Malaysia. 
4 The Child (Amendment) Act 2016 prohibits the use of handcuffs save in exceptional circumstances. 
5 See section 53 (1) which states that a sentence of death shall not be pronounced on or recorded 
against a person under the age of eighteen years, but in lieu thereof the court shall sentence him to be 
detained during His Majesty’s pleasure. Once so sentenced, he shall, notwithstanding anything in the 
other provisions of this Act, be liable to be detained in such place and under such conditions as the 
Secretary of State may direct. 
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the religion of the Federation with provisions that allow other faiths to be practised 
without impediment so long as no attempt is made to propagate such other faiths to 
those that profess the Muslim faith. That it is defined in these terms is a consequence 
of the evolution of its rich socio-political development.  
As part of the Commonwealth, Malaysia’s legal framework and system owes much 
of its heritage to the British administration of Malaysia. As far as the administration of 
justice in relation to children, it is unsurprising that the laws and policies that were 
introduced by the British during this period of colonisation from 1824-1957 remained 
the basis for the underlying philosophical position on children in conflict with the law.  
Prior to the arrival of the British, documentary evidence of a functioning legal 
system and the administration of justice in Malaysia were scarce. This situation arose 
because ‘Malay laws were never committed to writing’ (Wilkinson, 1970:6) but there 
is evidence to suggest Malay adat law (Malay customary law) was the dominant 
personal civil law being applied.  This was applied in conjunction with Islamic law 
and thus the Sultan or ruler performed his role as arbitrator and judge in most 
proceedings (Wilkinson, 1970). There is little evidence to suggest the presence of a 
hierarchy of courts or judicial personnel or the application of the notion of separation 
of powers or the application of judicial precedents during this period in time (Ahmad, 
2007). 
The 15th and 16th century saw the emergence of a rudimentary legal system albeit a 
system built largely upon customary laws, with a corresponding administration of 
justice. This period also saw the emergence of codified laws or written laws for 
example the Undang-undang Melaka and the Undang-undang Laut Melaka (Laws of 
Malacca and the Maritime Laws of Malacca). These were laws enacted in the state of 
Malacca, an important trading port in the south-west of Malaysia. The Undang-
undang Melaka has forty-four chapters and covers a wide range of matters including 
among others, the responsibilities of the ruler and his chiefs, criminal and civil 
offences and even includes rules governing bankruptcy (Liaw, 1976).  
The laws of the indigenous people of Malaysia (the indigenous people of Malaysia 
consist of a number of tribes spread out across the country and are distinct from the 
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majority Malay populace and the Indian and Chinese ethnic minorities) was described 
as being consistent with other primitive societies where ‘all laws are based on the 
principle of tribal interest and self-preservation’ (Buss-Tjen, 1958:252).   
In so far as the Malay population was concerned, Buss-Tjen’s work also identifies 
that there is some evidence of restorative justice in the adat perpateh (a category of 
Malay customary law) and that ‘the adat perpateh aims at restitution and 
compensation of the injured rather than punishment of and revenge on the culprit’ 
(Buss-Tjen, 1958:261) The following example, stylised in the form of a poem found 
in Buss-Tjen (1958: 261) best illustrates this philosophy: 
Yang menchinchang yang memapas, (Who wounds must heal), 
Yang membunoh, membangunkan, (Who slays must replace), 
Yang menjual, memberi balas. (Who sells must restore). 
In the adat temenggong however, (a further category of Malay customary law) 
there is evidence of a system of laws that are more retaliatory in nature. There is also 
evidence to indicate that Malay customary law also has in its development the 
influence of Hindu principles although this was eventually displaced by the infusion 
of Islam. Hence, there were variances in the manner and form of laws and nuances 
that were established over time following the spread of the Hindu faith and then that 
of the spread of Islam (Winstedt, 1953). In the initial stages, the arrival of the British 
did not have much of an effect on the manner in which the various peoples of Malaya 
(Malaysia as it was then described) administered their legal affairs but over time, this 
changed.  
The British first arrived in Penang (an island port in the north-west of Malaysia) in 
1786, not to govern but primarily because of the lucrative spice trade and to establish 
a naval presence in the region but by 1875, that tentative first step had already become 
less so. The Privy Council in the case of Ong Cheng Neo v Yeap Cheah Neo and Ors 
(1875) LR 6 PC 281 declared that, ‘the law of England must… be taken to be the law 
of Penang so far as it is applicable to the circumstances of the place, and modified in 
its application by these circumstances.’ 
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The sphere of British expansion eventually led to British rule exercised over 
Malaya. It was the period of British rule, leading up to the independence of the 
Federation in 1957 that witnessed the emergence of what is commonly accepted as a 
functioning legal system replete with the attributes commonly associated with legal 
systems; through the establishment of courts, structures and personnel to manage the 
system.  
The infusion of aspects of the English legal system was tempered with the prior 
experience of introducing similar laws in India. This period of development was not 
without challenges as the application of English laws and western jurisprudential 
concepts were tested against the customary and Islamic laws prevailing at that time 
particularly those relating to personal laws or those relating to land matters. However, 
eventually, customary laws were relegated to being merely a category of laws with a 
very limited scope of application. 
The Japanese occupation of Malaya brought a temporary suspension of this system 
and after the war; the push to independence brought with it the basis for the present 
constitutional structure in Malaysia.  
3. The development of legislation concerning juveniles 
One of the earliest pieces of legislation concerning juveniles in Malaya was the 
Children Enactment 1922, No. 1 of 1922, F.M.S. (Cap 158), which among others dealt 
with penalties for cruelty to children by assault, ill- treatment, abandonment, or 
exposure and restricted child labour and the employment of children.  
Following the Japanese occupation of Malaya, the Juveniles Court Act of 1947 (Act 
90)6 was introduced amidst concerns that the war had resulted in disruption to the life 
of the juvenile and as such, juveniles required the ambit of the law to protect them 
from abuse and neglect. There were also concerns expressed that juvenile delinquency 
was on the rise as a consequence of the war. A Juvenile Delinquency and Juvenile 
Welfare Committee was formed to advise the government as to suitable measures that 
                                                 
6 The 1947 Act was only repealed recently by the Child Act 2001. The Child Act also repealed the 
Women and Girls Protection Act 1973 (Act 106) and the Children Protection Act 1991(Act 468). 
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might be adopted to address these issues as well as to where possible, make 
recommendations for promoting juvenile welfare in post-war Malaya. The Report of 
the Juvenile Delinquency and Juvenile Welfare Committee (1947) identified the 
underlying philosophical principles that support the mechanisms to control and 
regulate the issue of juvenile delinquency. 
The fundamental features of the 1947 Act were inter alia the creation of a separate 
Juvenile Court (Section 2) for offences involving children (a child is one who is under 
the age of 14) and young persons (aged between 14-17) as well as the creation of a 
structured system for the probation of offenders. Part V of the Act also provided for 
children to be sent to approved schools for a period of three years or until they reached 
14 years of age (whichever was longer). 
The underlying philosophy in dealing with children in conflict with the law was 
that of reform by means of education and discipline. This was based on the United 
Kingdom’s Prevention of Crime Act 19087 and the equivalent provisions therein that 
deal with Borstal Institutions of that period or similar provisions in the United 
Kingdom’s Children and Young Persons Act 1933. This position in Malaysia 
remained notwithstanding the emergence of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
as adopted by the United Nations in 1989. 
4. Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
In 1995, some six years after the emergence of the Convention, Malaysia ratified 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) as an indication of its commitment to 
the protection and welfare of children. Thus, Malaysia like the other 195 countries that 
have since ratified the CRC as part of their national law, placed itself under an 
international doctrine that endeavoured to create minimum standards with which it 
was hoped a shared model of justice could exist (Junger-Tas 1994; Doek 1994; 
Muncie 2004). 
                                                 
7 The Preamble to the Prevention of Crime Act 1908 declares, ‘[a]n Act to make better provision for 
the prevention of crime and for that purpose to provide for the reformation of Young Offenders…’ 
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However, despite ratification of the CRC, Malaysia had reservations8 to eight 
articles and these include among others:  
a. Article 2 (the non-discrimination clause): Malaysia’s reservation to this 
provision was on the basis that there were enshrined Constitutional provisions that 
facilitate affirmative action for a specific ethnic group.9 The Malaysian Constitution is 
also silent on matters of sexual orientation. A further challenge is the issue of child 
marriages10 that are discriminatory against the girl child. 
b. Article 7 (the right to a name and nationality): Malaysia’s reservation to 
this provision was because of unresolved issues involving undocumented children. 
Malaysia is not a State party to the Refugee Convention 1951 and its 1967 Protocol. 
Malaysia has also not acceded to the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons 1954 and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 1961. Asylum-
seekers and refugees are not issued any documents by the Malaysian authorities, 
which would allow them to be properly identified as having a special protected status. 
Thus, non-Malaysian children born in Malaysia, such as asylum seeking and 
refugee children as well as children of undocumented migrant workers are at risk of 
not being registered at birth.  
c. Article 14 (the freedom of religion clause): Malaysia’s reservation to this 
Article was on the basis that Islam as practiced in Malaysia, does not facilitate the 
freedom to depart from the faith. Further, Article 12(4) of the Malaysian Federal 
Constitution declares that the religion of a person under the age of eighteen years shall 
be decided by his parent or guardian. This provision in the constitution has also been 
                                                 
8 The International Law Commission defines a reservation as inter alia, a unilateral statement, 
however phrased or named, made by a State, whereby the State purports to exclude or to modify the 
legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application (The International Law Commission, 
2011). 
9 Article 153 (1) of the Federal Constitution states inter alia that it shall be the responsibility of the 
Agong (Ruler) to safeguard the special position of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah 
and Sarawak. 
10 In Malaysia, the marrying age is 16 for Muslim girls and 18 for Muslim boys. However, they can 
marry before, if permission is obtained from their parents and the Syariah courts. For non-Muslims, the 




the source of problems associated with cases of unilateral conversion of a child by one 
parent who has converted to Islam.11  
d. Article 28 1(a) (the right to education): This states that primary education 
should be free for all children. Refugee children of school age are unable to attend 
school in Malaysia as pursuant to the Education Act 1996 only children who have a 
birth certificate may enrol in educational institutions. This requirement precludes 
refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless children, children of legal or illegal migrant 
workers or street children  
e. Article 37 (the prohibition against cruel treatment or punishment): The 
reservation to this was primarily on the basis that children can be subject to caning or 
whipping in Malaysia and that Malaysia still maintains the death penalty. Some of 
these issues have been addressed in the recent amendments to the Child Act in 2016 
but notwithstanding this; the reservations are still in place at the time of writing. 
At the time of ratification, these reservations were made on the basis that the 
Articles were said to be inconsistent with the Constitution, national laws, including 
Syariah laws and national policies, as indicated above (UNICEF, Malaysia, 2014).  
Thus, while there was a quick response to ratify the treaty, the reality on the ground 
was that many of Malaysia’s existing laws and norms as well as its administration of 
juvenile justice were not in line with the expectations of its perceived treaty 
obligations and more importantly, there were matters of culture and ideology that 
were unresolved. 
In recent years, the Malaysian government has withdrawn some of its initial 
reservations to the CRC. Thus in 2010, it lifted reservations to Article 1 (defining the 
age of a child); Article 13 (regarding the freedom of expression); and Article 15 
(regarding the freedom of assembly and participation). In 2011, the government also 
                                                 
11 For an example on this complicated matter, see the issues raised in the saga of Pathmanathan a/l 
Krishnan v. Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho [2016] 4 MLJ 455, Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho v Patmanathan a/l 
Krishnan (anyone having and control over Prasana Diksa) [2015] 7 MLJ 153 and Indira Gandhi a/p 
Mutho v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors [2013] 5 MLJ 552. 
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signed two of three Optional Protocols to the CRC, which deal with the sale of 
children, child prostitution and child pornography, and on children in armed conflict. 
Despite these withdrawals, the juvenile justice system in Malaysia remained static 
with the institution-based detention and rehabilitation model inherited from the 
British, notwithstanding the fact that such a model had long since been abandoned in 
the United Kingdom. Institutions for children in Malaysia tend to be large; with the 
primary rehabilitation strategy adopted steeped in the traditional standardised regime 
of discipline, religious instruction and vocational training (UNICEF, 2013).   
5. The Child Act 2001 
Some six years after Malaysia’s ratification of the CRC, the Child Act 2001 was 
enacted. The Act consolidated and repealed three pieces of legislation in existence12 
with a view to ensure that the developmental needs of children would be recognised. 
The preamble to the Act declares that it is an Act ‘to consolidate and amend the 
laws relating to the care, protection and rehabilitation of children and to provide for 
matters connected therewith and incidental thereto.’ Notwithstanding the introduction 
of the Act in 2001 and the changes it introduced, the Malaysian perspective on 
children in conflict with the law and in particular, policies that shape the rights of the 
child has remained in the main largely unchanged. Hence, Malaysia’s approach to 
children in conflict with the law is still primarily grounded in formal police and court-
based interventions and institution-based rehabilitation based on drill, training and 
education both formal and religious (Child Rights Coalition Malaysia, 2013). 
The obligations to the treaty did not yield fundamental changes in the manner 
Malaysia treats children in conflict with the law. The reservations in place also meant 
that the broad aspirational goals of the treaty in acknowledging the rights of the child 
were not fully met. Such a response to an international organisation and the transfer of 
its policies be it forced or voluntary is well documented (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). 
                                                 
12 These were, the Juvenile Courts Act 1947, the Women and Girls Protection Act 1973 and the 




As in many instances of policy transfers, there can be challenges in implementing an 
international model of youth justice in a particular jurisdiction, whether those 
following the common law tradition or even those following the continental systems 
(Molina and Alberola, 2005).  
Hence, while there was a response to the CRC and there was an attempt to 
implement it in Malaysia through the Child Act 2001, there were areas of non-
congruence or ‘policy failures’ perhaps caused by an uninformed policy transfer 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000:17). An uninformed policy transfer process led to a failure 
to consider the need to ensure changes in other areas of the administration of juvenile 
justice in Malaysia. These policy failures are also perhaps a reflection of a common 
problem of government rhetoric in the realm of international politics being the 
dominant discourse while the inconsistencies in implementation of the policy on the 
ground remain unresolved. This matter is considered below. 
At another level, the decision to ratify the treaty and adopt some principles while 
being unable to fully implement others demonstrate the challenges associated with 
‘cherry picking’ or ‘butterfly collecting’ (Crawford, 2002:111) policies without regard 
to the cultural and societal context in the jurisdiction in question. As is therefore the 
case in many instances of policy transfers, there is an absence of any consideration of 
‘culture, ideology and discourse’ (Muncie 2001:33) in the adoption of the CRC into 
the Malaysian context. The basis for Malaysia’s treaty obligations will be considered 
in Chapter 3. 
6. The Malaysian juvenile justice system 
A report of Parliamentary proceedings indicates that 4,730 criminal cases have 
been brought to the Court for Children since 2011 with 4,021 (85%) prosecutions. The 
Deputy Minister, (of the Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development), 
suggested that the high prosecution rates were indicative of strong prosecution 
evidence leading to successful prosecutions. For the years 2011-2013, the rates were 









2015 (As at Sep) 861 
Table 1: Cases brought to the Court for Children. Source: Hansard, 3 Nov 2015, col 1040-1050, 
2011-2015. Available at http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/hindex/pdf/DR-03112015.pdf. 
No reasons were proffered for this increase and there was no indication of the types 
of crimes involved or the subsequent sentencing imposed. There was also no 
indication of how many cases did not lead to prosecution (Hansard, 3 November 2015, 
col 1040-1050).  
A recent report suggests that the most children were involved in property-related 
crimes at 36.0 % in 2015. This was followed by drug related crimes at 29.7% and 
offences against persons at 13.4% (The Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2016). 
A plausible reason for this is that Malaysia does not currently have any formal 
diversion programmes or processes for resolving minor offences through mediation or 
through other restorative approaches. Thus ‘in the majority of cases, regardless of how 
minor, the police conduct a full investigation and submit investigation papers to DPP 
for a determination of whether charges are appropriate’ (sic) (UNICEF, 2013:52). 
While there is some measure of discretion used by the police and prosecutors to 
dispose of minor child offences, there is no legislative or policy directive or set of 
guidelines to encourage diversion of children. This results in a lack of empirical data 
to compare the exercise of this discretion with the rate of prosecution but it is clear 
that the rate of prosecution has increased and appears to be on the rise. 
In the United Kingdom, children are reportedly committing fewer crimes. The 
number of proven offences has been decreasing; it has fallen by 9% from the year 
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ending March 2015 and by 74% since the year ending March 2016 (Youth Justice 
Board/Ministry of Justice, 2017:8). It has been suggested that the fall in youth custody 
in England and Wales can be attributed to ‘increased diversion and a depoliticization 
of youth crime’ which in turn it is argued, has contributed to ‘a more tolerant decision 
making within the court arena’ (Bateman, 2012:36). The matter is also subject to, 
among other reasons, the ‘wider influences in the form of economically driven 
pragmatism’ (Smith, 2014:109). Indeed, it has been suggested that the fall may more 
commonly be explained on the basis of political or financial concerns, (Goldson, 
2010; Bateman, 2015) determined by a perceived need for austerity (Bateman, 2014). 
Such a position is not evident in Malaysia as economic pragmatism has not been a 
primary motivation to consider alternatives to youth custody. 
Procedurally, if a child in Malaysia is not released on bail, the matter will be 
decided by a Magistrate in the Court for Children. The child will either be sent to a 
facility managed and operated by the Department of Social Welfare13 (subject to the 
availability of space) or alternatively to the Prison Department where a child may end 
up in prison or alternatively be sent to the Henry Gurney School.   
UNICEF suggests that, ‘there is no written guidance with respect to how this 
discretion is exercised and statistics show no consistency in decision-making based on 
the nature or gravity of the offence’ (UNICEF, 2013:45). An overview of the 
Malaysian juvenile justice system is represented below (Figure1):
                                                 
13 The Department was established in 1946 and currently functions as a department within the 
Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development providing services to children, senior 




Figure 1: Source: The Malaysian Juvenile Justice System, (Ministry of Women, Family and 
Community Development and UNICEF Malaysia, 2013:21)  
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Four different types of institutions for child offenders, with varying degrees of 
security have been established under the provisions of the Child Act 2001 namely: 
 Probation Hostels,  
 Approved schools: Sekolah Tunas Bakti (The Tunas Bakti Schools) 
 Henry Gurney Schools and  
 Prisons – where children are kept in separate facilities from adults. 
The Child Act 2001 identifies circumstances in which children are not subject to 
institutional control. Thus: 
 A child under the age of 10 years shall not be sent to an Approved School.  
 A child under the age of 10 years cannot be made to reside in a Probation 
Hostel and 
 An offender below the age of 14 years cannot be sent to a Henry Gurney 
School. 
UNICEF in its comprehensive report states that these institutions and schools are:  
[G]overned by relatively dated regulations that contain provisions that are 
not in accordance with the CRC and international standards. Children in 
Juvenile Correctional Centres are governed by the Prison Act and Rules, which 
have very limited special provision for young prisoners. Current practices with 
respect to limitations on private family visits and disciplinary practices are of 
particular concern. While discipline is generally based on a system of rewards 
and loss of privileges, there are some practices that are contrary to the CRC 
and international standards, including the use of solitary confinement, corporal 
punishment, reduction in diet, stress positions, and restriction of family visits 
(2013:118). 
Teh reports that ‘desirable behaviour is encouraged through a book system which is 
tied up with rewards and privileges. This system focuses on specific behaviour 
modification through deprival of privileges’ (Teh, 2002:209). This is the residue of 
approaches introduced through British colonisation for more than a century; still 
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maintained and now appearing to be seamlessly part of what constitutes the Malaysian 
juvenile justice system.  
The consequence for the child in conflict with the law is the probability of being 
detained in some form of institutional set-up. Sentences of detention are commonly 
given, rather than being as a last resort (Child Rights Coalition Malaysia, 2012). The 
UNICEF study in 2013 found that a significant number of children are held on remand 
for very minor offences and that a high percentage of children in prisons are those 
who have not yet been found guilty of a crime. Hence, 52.7% of children on remand 
were accused of minor property related offences and only 20% were charged with 
serious offences involving violence (UNICEF, 2013). Approximately 2.2% of the total 
prison population of 49,200 held in 47 institutions are juveniles, minors or young 
offenders (Ministry of Home Affairs, Malaysia, 2015). 
The large numbers in detention would of course result in a significant investment in 
the maintenance of the system. In 2013, the Deputy Home Affairs Minister reported 
that for the period 2010-2012, the Malaysian government spent RM665, 000, 096 to 
manage the entire prison system including the correctional schools (Hansard, 24 
October 2013, col 1040-1050). Despite the cost and the global trends in moving away 
from this model, (Bateman, 2014), there is still a reliance on detention and 
incarceration as a means to deal with offending.  
The Henry Gurney School was established by the Henry Gurney School 
Regulations in 1949 pursuant to the Juvenile Courts Act 1947. It is a closed secure 
institution for the detention of children and juveniles aged between 14 to 21 years 
pursuant to Section 74 of the Child Act 2001. There are five (four for boys and one for 
girls) Henry Gurney Schools as at August 2017. In 2013, there were 839 children and 
juveniles in the three Henry Gurney Schools existing at that time (Prisons Department, 
Malaysia, n.d.).   
There are currently nine Tunas Bakti Schools nationwide, with a total capacity for 
1,200 children. Malaysia has one fully separate Juvenile Correctional Centre, as well 
as six Juvenile Correctional Centres co-located with adult prisons. The co-located 
facilities are fully separate from adult facilities, with their own programmes for young 
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prisoners under the Integrity School system. The Prison Act 1995 and Prison 
Regulations 2000, which have very limited special provision for young prisoners, 
govern children in Juvenile Correctional Centres. (UNICEF, 2013). The issue of 
detention in these settings will be considered in subsequent Chapters. 
In considering the juvenile justice system in Malaysia, some other ancillary matters 
require consideration. 
6.1 Definition of ‘child’ and ‘children in conflict’ 
Despite lifting the reservation to Article 1, inconsistencies in the definition of the 
child in Malaysia remain, with multiple, contradictory definitions of the child under 
both civil and Syariah law.  Consequently, there is no specific use of the term “child” 
in the administration of justice. Malaysia has several different statutory provisions that 
refer to young people in differing ways. The following table (Table 2) adapted from 
Kassim (2006) identifies some of the common interpretations used: 
STATUTORY PROVISION DEFINITION USED 
Prison Act 1995 a juvenile or a young offender is defined as “a prisoner who is 
under the age of 21 years” 
Child Protection Act 1991 a child is “a person under the age of 18 years and below 
Children and Young Persons   
Employment Act 196614 
a child as a person aged between 10 and 14 years, and a young 
person as one aged between 14 and 16 years 
Child Act 200115 a child as a person under the age of 18 years and below 
Table 2: Statutory provisions and definitions used. Source: Kassim, W. (2006). ‘Juveniles on remand: 
trends and practices in Malaysia’, Proceedings of the 129th International Senior Seminar Participant’s 
Paper. Available at: <http://www.unafei.or.jp> [10 June 2014]. 
The term commonly used is that of a “child” or at times “juvenile”. It is also 
common to use the terms interchangeably. The CRC of which Malaysia is a signatory 
                                                 
14 This was amended by the Children and Young Persons (Employment) (Amendment) Act 2010.  
15 The Child (Amendment) Act 2016 retains this definition. 
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defines a child to be any person below 18. Dusuki (2006) is of the view that the 
framers of the Child Act 2001 intended that there should no longer be any reference to 
the word “juvenile” or “young offender”, both implying negative connotations. 
However, these terms continue to be used particularly when describing the overall 
structure of the system and when the media reports the occurrence of youth offending. 
The approach taken in Malaysia was therefore to have the Child Act 2001 as the 
principal Act governing the protection of children. As noted above, the 2001 Act 
consolidated three former Acts and thus children in Malaysia; regardless of age, 
(whether they are victims or offenders) are governed by a single Act. The lack of a 
precise definition to deal with the respective age groups can hinder the development 
of a comprehensive strategy in dealing with children who are exposed to the justice 
system. For purposes of this study, the definition of “child” in Article 1 of the CRC 
will be used. Thus, a “child” is a person below the age of 18.  
Ancillary to the difficulties in identifying a specific definition where age is 
concerned there are problems in describing the child who comes into conflict with the 
law. Media representation or society’s views of such a child is varied and common 
terms used include “juvenile delinquents”, “street urchins”, “gangsters”, “young 
criminals”, “abandoned children”, and such labels often remain through the life of that 
child and add to the stigmatization of the child into his/her adult life. Such 
descriptions often represent ‘images of dangerousness’ and there is ample evidence of 
such demonization in the British press (Muncie, 2008).  
The risk of demonization of children in the United Kingdom and the corresponding 
overly tough law and order responses, were clearly illustrated in the events that 
occurred following the killing of 2-year-old James Bulger by two 10 year olds 
(Muncie, 2009a). This is not to say that there are global variances in dealing with 
children who kill for example Smith and Sueda’s (2008) comparative examination of 
this phenomena in the United Kingdom and Japan illustrate such differences. 
Perhaps being mindful of the potential for negative stigmatization, the specific 
words articulated in Article 37 of the CRC refer to the rights of children alleged as, 
accused of, or recognized as ‘having infringed the penal law.’ However, this phrase 
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has been construed to also refer to as ‘children in conflict with the law’ and this is 
evidenced by the use of the phrase in various UN or UNICEF documents (United 
Nations, 2007b). Thus, the term ‘children in conflict with the law’ refers to anyone 
under 18 who comes into contact with the justice system as a result of being suspected 
or accused of committing an offence.16  
Malaysia, in applying the principles of the CRC has as far as its response to the 
UN, maintained the use of the phrase ‘children in conflict with the law’ (UNICEF, 
2013). The Malaysian Child Act 2001, in defining “child” adopts principles of Article 
37. Thus, Section 2 of the Act defines a “child” as a person under the age of eighteen 
years; and in relation to criminal proceedings, a person who has attained the age of 
criminal responsibility as prescribed in section 82 of the Penal Code. 
However, while there is a general understanding of the need to maintain a neutral 
phrase, media representation of children in conflict with the law does not accord with 
this approach and it is common to find references to negative descriptors being used.  
6.2 The age of criminal responsibility in Malaysia 
The Malaysian Penal Code stipulates 10 to be the age of attainment of criminal 
responsibility. The code includes a doli incapax presumption, which states that 
children between 10 and below 12 who have not shown sufficient maturity may be 
absolved from criminality as well (Section 82 and 83 of the Malaysian Penal Code). A 
further presumption of law enshrined in section 113 of the Evidence Act 1950 states 
that a boy under the age of thirteen years is incapable of committing rape.17 
While the CRC does not prescribe a specific age for criminal liability, the United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice 1985 
(otherwise commonly referred to as the Beijing Rules) state that the beginning of that 
                                                 
16 The phrase is to be distinguished from the broader notion of children in armed conflict. Violations 
against children in armed conflict include killing or maiming of children, recruitment or use of children 
as soldiers, attacks against schools or hospitals, denial of humanitarian access for children, abduction of 
children, rape and other grave sexual abuse of children (United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1612).  
17 A similar presumption of sexual incapacity was abolished in the United Kingdom by virtue of the 




age shall not be fixed at too low an age, and should be based on children’s emotional, 
mental and intellectual maturity.  However, the UN Committee has also been critical 
of the practice of the doli incapax principle (United Nations, 2007b).  
The debate on raising the age of criminal responsibility in the United Kingdom 
following the enactment of The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the abolition of the 
principle of doli incapax represents a microcosm of the broader global discussion on 
the issue. Thus, in the United Kingdom it has been argued that the politicization of 
juvenile crime and the failure to embrace the application of knowledge and evidence 
to raise the minimum age is argued to be the reasons for the ‘adultifying of children 
aged 10 years’ and this is then argued to be a ‘mutation of justice’ (Goldson, 
2013:126). The Age of Criminal Responsibility Bill 2017-2019, sponsored by Lord 
Dholakia, which aims to raise the age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales 
to 12 years old reached its second reading as at September 2017 and represents the 
most recent attempt to raise the age of criminal responsibility.  
Hence, there is a general move towards a higher age of criminal 
liability/responsibility, which is assessed, not purely from a legal perspective but even 
from a medico-legal perspective. Delmage for example argues for a ‘rebuttable 
presumption for those above the specified age of criminal responsibility (whatever 
that might be), the presumption being that the individual lacks the 
competence/capacity/developmental maturity to commit an offence until proven 
otherwise’ and that this ‘development continuum’ (2013:107) ought to be explored 
through the development of neuroscience. Criminal responsibility should not be 
determined by an arbitrary age.  
The issue of the age of criminal responsibility cannot be determined by a singular 
test of capacity in which the child is assessed on his/her knowledge of the difference 
between right and wrong but should involve a variety of complex issues. These 
include cognizance of the child’s stage of psychological development and his or her 
lived experience (Mc Diarmid, 2013). This matter will be considered in further detail 
in Chapter 3. 
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In Malaysia, the issue of the age of criminal responsibility is further muddled by 
the application of Islamic law. Malaysia’s legal system facilitates the application of 
Islamic law or Syariah law and Article 3 of the Federal Constitution declares Islam as 
the religion of the Federation. As a Federation, Syariah laws are administered by the 
respective states of the Federation. Syariah courts have jurisdiction only over persons 
professing the religion of Islam and in respect only of any of the matters included in 
the Constitution in particular as indicated in Item 1, List II of the State List.  Owing to 
the coexistence of the Civil Courts and the Syariah Courts within the legal system 
jurisdictional conflicts often arise and this can be evidenced as far as the interpretation 
of “child” is concerned.  
For example, in the Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997, 
liability for criminal acts is attributed to the act of a person who has attained baligh 
(having attained the age of puberty per Islamic law), and is of sound mind and of free 
will. A Muslim child is not held responsible for any criminal act (as determined by the 
Islamic Laws) until the child reaches the age of puberty. Thus, as far as a Muslim 
child is concerned, where there is criminal offence committed under Islamic law, the 
child’s criminal liability is not determined by the minimum age requirement but is 
dependent on the attainment of his or her puberty. Puberty is determined by physical 
and sexual maturity.  
Generally, under the Syariah law, the sign of puberty for a male is determined by 
the ejaculation of sperm and for a female by the first menses, she experiences. In the 
absence of these signs, puberty of a person will be determined according to his or her 
age. Muslim scholars however have different views in determining the appropriate age 
of puberty and evidence of how this is resolved is not well documented in Malaysia. 
These matters are considered in Chapter 3. 
Malaysia submitted its first report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child in 
2006 (United Nations, 2006) some nine years after the prescribed date for submission. 
In its concluding observations in response to Malaysia’s first country report, the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (United Nations, 2007a) noted with concern the 
low minimum age of criminal responsibility and recommended that Malaysia raise the 
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age to at least 12. It also recommended that Malaysia review its dual legal system 
(Civil and Syariah) as some domestic laws are obstacles to the realisation of the CRC 
in Malaysia. However, these recommendations have not yet crystallised into 
corresponding legislative amendments. The age of criminal responsibility remains at 
10 and given Malaysia’s socio-religious and political context, it appears that the 
duality of laws will remain. 
 6.3 Official statistics 
Malaysia has a current population of slightly more than 32.3 million (Department 
of Statistics, 2017). 29.4 per cent of the population (approximately 9.4 million) are 
children aged below 18 years of age (Department of Statistics, 2017). This is a 
significant proportion of the population and it is undeniable that issues affecting 
children in conflict with the law require attention.  
However, despite the significant proportion of children in the population, obtaining 
credible published data on the rate of youth offending can be a challenge. In a recent 
report on the state of the Malaysian Juvenile Justice System, it was stated:  
[A]ssessing patterns of offending is difficult due to gaps in data collection and 
inconsistencies in statistics collected by the different agencies. It is also difficult to 
measure the extent to which changes in child crime statistics reflect an actual 
change in rates of child offending, or merely changes in policing and data 
collection practices (UNICEF, 2013:16). 
The lack of official statistical information is ameliorated to some extent by the 
national media although these are anecdotal statements that indicate to some extent the 
level of children in conflict with the law. For example, in June 2012 it was reported 
that there were 2,500 ‘juvenile delinquents’ (emphasis added) serving time in 
Malaysian prisons, most them for minor offences (Chen, 2012). In 2014, it was 
reported that based on police statistics, juveniles involved in crime had more than 
doubled from 3,700 cases in 2012 to 7,816 cases in 2013. The year 2013 saw a 47% 
jump in nationwide violent crime among minors, aged between 12 and 17, with some 
even involved in murder and rape.  
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Cases of violent crime went up from 368 in 2012 to 542 in 2013 among 
schoolchildren, while cases involving non-school going children saw a 137% jump 
with 2,011 cases reported in 2013 as compared to 849 cases in 2012 (Lee, 2014).  The 
number of ‘juvenile offenders’ in 2015 was at 4,569 cases. It was also reported that of 
these, 36% were property-related crimes with 29.7% involving drug related offences 
and crimes against persons at 13.4% (Department of Statistics, Malaysia, 2016). 
These statistics are not generally available to the public but are made public 
through media reporting of police statements as illustrated by the reports indicated 
above or made public through legislative scrutiny of the executive in Parliament. 
Owing to the restricted access to these data, there is great difficulty in ascertaining 
whether there are differences in methodological or sampling approaches and 
correspondingly there is difficulty in assessing the impact of such differences in the 
statistical data represented. In most instances, a final figure is revealed but the precise 
research design and methodological approaches adopted remain hidden from scrutiny. 
This then leads to the uncertainty as to the veracity and reliability of such data. 
This is particularly the case with police recorded crime statistics. Police recorded 
crime statistics represent a measure of the amount of crime that is reported to and 
recorded by the police in the approximately 837 police stations across Malaysia.  The 
recorded crime statistics do not include crimes that have not been reported to the 
police or that the police decide not to record. These recorded crime statistics are then 
quantified via index crime reports, which are statistics that are considered 
representative of the most serious crimes or those that are reported with sufficient 
regularity and with sufficient significance to be meaningful as an index to the crime 
situation (Singh, 2005). Such an approach is neither unique nor peculiar to Malaysia 
and is the approach adopted by many countries. For example, in the United States, 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation collates and collects crime statistics through its 
Uniform Crime Reporting Program.  
As with the experience in other jurisdictions, police data is subject to a number of 
limitations. Firstly, police data only provides information on those criminal offences 
that have come to the attention of police. Not all crimes committed are detected by the 
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police (or, necessarily, the victims). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, not all 
crimes committed are reported to the police. For example, (Sims and Myhill, 2001) 
report that only 39% of all crime incidents in the 2000 British Crime Survey were 
reported. This represents the ‘dark figure’ of crime and as in other jurisdictions across 
the globe is a matter of concern in Malaysia (Singh, 2005). 
Thirdly, not all crimes reported to police are recorded by police. Police discretion 
determines whether a crime is considered to have been committed or whether the 
matter is best left with a civil insurance claim and thus whether it merits recording. 
Thus, as suggested by Patrick (2011) police-recorded crime data can still be 
influenced by the police. 
Malaysia does not conduct a nationally representative, household victimisation 
survey equivalent to the Crime Survey for England and Wales (formerly the British 
Crime Survey). However, the Malaysian government through its Government 
Transformation Programme has instituted a ‘Fear of Crime Survey’, an independent 
survey commissioned twice a year to measure the fear of crime across Malaysia. In 
2011, it was reported that Malaysians’ fear of crime index improved from 52% (for 
the period November 2010 to January 2011) to 48.9% (for the period March to May, 
2011) (PEMANDU, 2011b). In 2016, the Index Crime rate fell by 2.8% and the 
Perception of Crime Indicator (PCI) for the capital city of Kuala Lumpur registered a 
decline from 80% to 61% (PEMANDU, 2016:47). 
As with the experience in other jurisdictions there is a certain amount of mistrust in 
police recorded crime statistics or those revealed by the Ministry responsible.  The 
experience in the United Kingdom suggests that such mistrust to stems from 
‘perceived potential for police or ministerial interference in the production and 
presentation of the statistics’ (Home Department, 2006: iii). That view has also been 
expressed in Malaysia with critics of the government claiming an obfuscation of crime 
statistics (Fuller, 2013). 
Criminologists argue that official crime statistics are socially constructed and are 
frequently ‘tinkered with’ to suit policy expediency (Maguire, 2012: 239). Thus, crime 
is impossible to measure as a notion of truthfulness. Crime statistics are argued to be 
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an ‘amalgam of what parliament dictates and how the public responds’ (Jenkins, 
2013). The complexities and weaknesses in measuring the overall crime statistics in 
Malaysia are therefore also prevalent in those statistics that deal with children in 
conflict with the law. Government rhetoric and political machinations can and does 
influence the representation of crime among children and this is a tendency in almost 
all jurisdictions. This is then further complicated by the failure to create an 
overarching policy on juvenile justice among the various agencies and Ministries 
involved. 
The lack of consistency in data collected by the various Ministries and the 
difficulty in getting the requisite permission to conduct independent data collection 
presents challenges in developing a true understanding of the complexity of issues that 
surround children in conflict with the law. The lack of data ‘impacts on the 
effectiveness of government policy making and reflects a poor recognition of the need 
for the on-going review of the delivery of equitable justice system services’ 
(Coverdale, 2010:72). But if the figures above and those reported below in Figure 2, 
are representative of the general state of the system presently in place, then there is a 
concern as to whether the existing policies, laws and procedures are best suited to 
meet the issue of children in conflict with the law. 
 
Figure 2: Number of Children arrested for a criminal offence by age (2003-2008). Source: The 
Malaysian Juvenile Justice System: A Study of Mechanisms for Handling Children in Conflict with the 
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 6.4 Sentencing policies 
This concern is further expressed in the sentencing policies that impinge upon the 
child in conflict with the law. Malaysia entered a reservation to Article 37 of the CRC 
primarily owing to her existing approaches in dealing with children in conflict with 
the law. This is particularly the case in certain criminal offences. Thus, 
notwithstanding the principles of doli incapax, children above 12 years of age are 
treated as adults for the purposes of criminal liability, regardless of the nature of the 
crime. This presents problems for example, when the crime concerned is an offence 
that mandates the death sentence.   
A stark representation of the problems in the application of the law can be seen in 
(Lim Hang Seoh v PP [1977] 1 MLJ 68), a case decided before the enactment of the 
Child Act 2001.  A 14-year-old was tried for the possession of firearms, an offence 
under section 57 of the Internal Security Act 1960 which is also a security offence by 
Regulation 2, Essential (Security Cases) Regulations 1975 (ESCAR). The offence 
carries the mandatory death sentence. 
Regulation 3(3) of ESCAR expressly excludes the application of the then Juvenile 
Courts Act 1947 in instances where juveniles are charged with security offences. 
Consequently, the court, left with no other alternative, sentenced the boy to death and 
the Federal Court subsequently affirmed that decision. However, a final appeal to the 
Ruler18 was lodged and his death sentence was commuted to detention at a secure 
school until he was to be 21. 
A child can be detained at the pleasure of the Ruler as seen in Public Prosecutor v 
Kok Wah Kuan [2008] 1 MLJ 1.19 As discussed above, the respondent who was 12 
                                                 
18 Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy. Hence, the Ruler (or in the Malay language Yang Di-
Pertuan Agong) is the Head of State of the Federation but is subject to Westminster-style conventions. 
The Ruler has constitutional powers of pardon as stated in Article 42 of the constitution as well as a 
prerogative power of mercy and clemency.  
19 For examples of similar instances of an indeterminate sentence see Duruvendran a/l Sakajaven v 
Public Prosecutor [2016] 5 MLJ 281, Public Prosecutor v Ramayah a/l Ramalu and another appeal 
[2016] 5 MLJ 355, Public Prosecutor v Maznah bt Abdussomad & Anor [2015] 7 MLJ 518, Asri bin 
Beddu v Public Prosecutor [2013] 3 MLJ 893, Public Prosecutor v Low Kian Boon & Anor [2011] 5 
MLJ 595, Public Prosecutor v Khairul Al Sidek bin Lurin & Anor [2010] 8 MLJ 1, Mohd Haikal bin 
Mohd Khatib Saddaly & Ors v Public Prosecutor [2009] 4 MLJ 305. 
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years and 9 months old at the time of the commission of the offence was charged in 
the High Court for the offence of murder punishable under section 302 of the Penal 
Code. He was convicted and ordered to be detained at the pleasure of the Ruler 
pursuant to section 97(2) of the Child Act 2001.  On appeal, the Court of Appeal 
upheld the conviction but set aside the sentence imposed on him. The Court released 
him from custody on the sole ground that section 97(2) of the Child Act was 
unconstitutional as it infringed the principles of separation of powers by consigning to 
the Executive (in this case the Ruler) the judicial power to determine the measure of 
the sentence to be served by the appellant.  
On appeal to the Federal Court, the child, was ordered to be detained in prison 
albeit isolated from adult inmates thereby setting aside the order of the Court of 
Appeal, reaffirming the High Court’s decision, and ultimately concluding that the 
concept of separation of powers was not an integral part of the Malaysian constitution. 
The court arrived at this decision by applying the law in a narrow and literal approach 
and curiously, while reference was made at the Federal Court to the provisions of the 
CRC it was more to highlight failings in the Child Act particularly in making clear the 
ambit of sentencing in the law. 
The Malaysian government does not publish statistics on death sentences or 
executions and while there are media reported statistics on death row inmates, there is 
no available data on how many children have been sentenced to death and have had 
their sentences commuted other than those mentioned in law reports or media 
reporting of such instances. For example, as at February 2017, media reports suggest 
that more than 1,100 people have been convicted and sentenced to death by the courts 
(Rahim, 2017). 
The Child Act 2001, pursuant to section 91, provides that the Court for Children 
shall have power to inter alia: 
 admonish and discharge the child; 
 discharge the child upon his executing a bond to be of good behaviour and to 
comply with such conditions as may be imposed by the Court;  
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 make a probation order under section 98; order the child to be sent to an 
approved school or a Henry Gurney School; 
 order the child, if a male, to be whipped with not more than ten strokes of a 
light cane;  
 impose on the child, if he is aged fourteen years and above and the offence is 
punishable with imprisonment and subject to subsection 96(2), any term of 
imprisonment which could be awarded by a Sessions Court.  
It is to be noted that the section makes a clear distinction that only male children 
are subject to whipping. Whipping and its socio-cultural implications and the changes 
introduced in legislative amendments introduced in 2016, will be considered in 
Chapter 3.  
Section 90(12) and (13) makes it mandatory for the Court for Children to consider 
a probation report before making an order against the child and to consider the opinion 
of the Court Advisers. The Act states that probation reports must be prepared by a 
probation officer and must contain information with respect to the child’s general 
conduct, home surroundings, school record, and medical history. The Court may also 
request a report from a social welfare officer, registered medical practitioner, or any 
other person whom the Court for Children thinks fit. 
It is important to note that the Act does not make any reference to general 
principles or criteria for making decisions about sentencing and neither does it include 
an explicit statement that deprivation of liberty be used only as a measure of last 
resort. Further, there are no clear limitations on the types of offences for which a 
custodial order may be used. Thus, for example, there is no direct exclusion of the 
provisions of Regulation 3 ESCAR 1957 which could mean that the complications of 
the decisions of Lim Hang Seoh v PP [1978] 1 MLJ 68 or that of Public Prosecutor v 
Kok Wah Kuan [2008] 1 MLJ 1) may well be repeated. This is as section 11(5) of the 
Act states that the Court for Children does not have jurisdiction over children charged 
with an offence punishable with death.  
It has been argued that in cases involving children, the tendency is to be more 
punitive rather than reformative. While there is some evidence of the best interest of 
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the child being acknowledged, the primacy remains on the perceived need to protect 
the public with tougher sentences (UNICEF, 2013). Unlike the experience of other 
jurisdictions, particularly in Western Europe and the United States, in which there 
were perceivable ‘punitive turns’ in youth justice systems (Muncie, 2008:108) in 
Malaysia, the focus has always been on punishment and control rather than placing the 
rights of the child in conflict with law on a higher level of importance. As suggested 
by Gray, ‘the over-riding theme of serving the ‘best interests of the child’ can be used 
to cloak intensifying control over young people’s behaviour’ (Gray, 1996:301-302). 
Some of these broader aspects of control are also seen in the manner on which 
children in conflict with the law are treated in Malaysia. 
Thus, Malaysia’s treatment of young offenders does not fall within the acceptable 
international standards and as such ‘punitive values associated with retribution, 
incapacitation, individual responsibility, and offender accountability have achieved a 
political legitimacy to the detriment of traditional principles of juvenile protection and 
support’ (Muncie, 2008:110). 
Arguably, the Malaysian context in which youth justice functions is a reflection of 
its socio-political background. Malaysia has only had a single political party in power 
since its independence in 195720 and until very recently the Executive had always 
enjoyed complete dominance of Parliament. Executive dominance over the legislature 
also meant that there was for many years a singular political view on youth justice. A 
strong paternalistic government also meant that the role of civil society engagement in 
matters pertaining to children in conflict with the law has been weak for the greater 
part of the political development in the country.  
While the discourse on youth justice and the corresponding arguments on rights 
have begun evolving, much of the state of the youth justice system remained 
dominated by a singular political view. Civil society is only just beginning to find a 
voice in this space. Much of this evolution is attributable to the influence of 
international agencies like the United Nations and the expectations expressed through 
                                                 
20 The recent elections in May 2018 saw for the first time, an ouster of this political party in favour 
of a new coalition. This will be considered in Chapter 6. 
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the CRC that mandate a greater engagement with civil society and to engender child 
participation in that process. 
Mustaffa (2006) argues that there appears to be a lack of alternate sentencing 
policies including for example the basic application of community work.21 The 
sentencing policy in Malaysia is rather narrow and traditional in its approach. In most 
cases, the approach is towards institutionalized rehabilitation, which often do not 
adequately respond to the age of the child concerned (UNAFEI: 2000). 
The Malaysian Human Rights Commission suggests that, ‘the Government must 
institute alternatives to punishment for juvenile offenders, especially for petty 
crimes.22 Imprisonment for petty crimes should no longer be acceptable. Instead a 
rehabilitative or restorative system, such as a community service and restitution, must 
be introduced’ (SUHAKAM, 2009:12). 
Similarly, the United Nations, in its Human Rights Council Working Group on the 
Universal Periodic Review report noted that ‘there was no specialized response to 
children in conflict with the law’ and that ‘principles of proportionality and detention 
as a last resort were not always followed’ (United Nations, 2013:7). 
Unsurprisingly a rather critical view of the issue was reported by a coalition of 
non-governmental groups working to respect and uphold the rights of children in 
Malaysia. In its Status Report on Children’s Rights in Malaysia, it noted with concern 
that, ‘Malaysia currently does not have any legislative or policy directive to encourage 
restorative justice programs, including diversion, for children’ and that sentences of 
detention are the commonly given as opposed to being the last resort (Child Rights 
Coalition Malaysia, 2013:28). 
In recent years, critical discourse from the various human rights agencies and non-
governmental organisations in Malaysia indicate that there is a need to be sensitive to 
the needs of the child and to review approaches taken in relation to children in 
                                                 
21 Community service orders were introduced in 2016 through the Child (Amendment) Act. 
22 The Commission did not venture to identify what constitutes ‘petty crimes’. 
50 
 
conflict. For example, in relation to the detention orders that permit a child to be 
detained without trial under statutory provisions.  
So as suggested by Dusuki (2006), the rights of a child in conflict with the law 
must be fully respected in accordance with international norms, particularly 
internationally recognized practices such as restorative justice and diversions.  
The Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development have 
acknowledged the lack of holistic approaches in dealing with children in conflict with 
the law. At the Beijing High Level Meeting in 2010, Malaysia acknowledged that its 
legal and policy framework needed strengthening. This would include exploring the 
introduction of new global strategies, such as diversion and other community-based 
responses (UNICEF, 2010). 
      7. The move towards reform 
Subsequently, the government embarked on an assessment of the juvenile justice 
system in Malaysia commissioned through a joint collaboration between the Ministry 
of Women, Family and Community Development and UNICEF, Malaysia. A 
comprehensive report entitled The Malaysian Juvenile Justice System: A Study of 
Mechanisms for Handling Children in Conflict with the Law was published in 
November 2013.  
The project represented a unique inter-agency partnership between the Government 
and UNICEF within the broader policy transfer agenda. It represented a fulfilment of 
assurances made in Beijing through the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for 
the Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules) 1985 for the setting up of a 
high-level, inter-agency Child Justice Working Group that will develop an integrated 
national juvenile justice reform strategy and plan of action.  
The forward suggests that key findings and recommendations from the report will 
enable the Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development to develop a 
more holistic solution in addressing matters relating to children in conflict with the 
law including among others the issue of diversion, restorative justice, and alternatives 
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to custodial sentencing. An examination of the recommendations pertaining to 
diversion will be considered in a separate section.  
Given the move towards reform, amendments to the Child Act were scheduled to 
be tabled before Parliament in June 2014 but the proposed amendments were not 
made public. A closed briefing session was held in March 2014 with representatives 
from the opposition political parties as well as selected NGOs in attendance. The 
obvious concern here is that there is a perceived move away from civil society 
engagement in the process of legislative amendments. The proposed amendments 
were finally introduced late in 2016. 
Clearly, what is needed is more than merely piecemeal reforms, but rather a 
fundamental shift in the conceptual approach to children in conflict with the law. 
Primarily that conceptual approach involves the need to separate the concept of 
children in conflict with the law and children in need of protection in order to avoid 
the obfuscation of the rights of the child. Evidence of this paradox is seen in the 
provisions of the existing Child Act 2001.  
The preamble provides that every child is entitled to protection and assistance in all 
circumstances without regard to distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, social origin or physical, mental or emotional disabilities or any 
status. It has extensive provisions dealing with a child in need of protection but at the 
same time also describes in section 92 the manner in which whipping of a child is to 
be carried out. The application of the death penalty in relation to certain offences once 
again illustrates the paradoxical position of child rights in Malaysia. These issues 
represent the reasons (among others) for Malaysia’s reservation to Article 37 of the 
CRC. 
It is also to be noted that child participation in this process is extremely weak and 
as argued by (Dusuki, 2006) there is a marked absence of express statutory provisions 
mandating for such participation in all aspects generally and particularly, within their 
involvement in juvenile justice system. This as Scraton (2008) argues, reflects the 
position that children in conflict with the law are excluded from processes of 
consultation and decision making that determines their destinies.  
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Thus, although Malaysia has introduced the National Plan of Action for Child 
Protection 2009, which contains provisions for the increased participation of children, 
little has been done formally to encourage child participation particularly in matters of 
juvenile justice. Much of the elements of child participation are essentially limited to 
participating in the various workshops creating awareness of the CRC. It has been 
suggested that this position stems from the perception of children not as individual 
rights-bearers, but as ‘objects of concern’ and this is directly a consequential result 
from ‘unresolved conflicts of a philosophical nature’ that impinge on the concept of 
the rights of the child in Malaysia (Child Rights Coalition Malaysia 2013:10). Given 
these criticisms, recent amendments to the Act sought to remedy some of these 
concerns. 
8. The current legislative regime 
After much delay and uncertainty, the Child (Amendment) Act 2016 was passed, 
introducing new provisions that sought to address several observations and 
recommendations made by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child after 
Malaysia’s first report23 to the Committee in 2007. The approach taken was not to 
enact a new Act but to make substantial amendments to the existing principal Act, the 
Child Act 2001. Thus, the opportunity to revisit the purpose and philosophy of the Act 
was missed. The original Preamble as enacted in 2001 remains, with no direct 
(emphasis added) reference to the issue of child rights.  
This matter notwithstanding, in relation to children in conflict with the law, the 
following principal amendments have been introduced:  
a. That a child who is arrested will not be handcuffed save in exceptional 
circumstances. The child shall also have the right to be informed of the grounds for 
arrest as well as the right to be provided by counsel and to have family members be 
informed (section 62 of the Child (Amendment) Act 2016, which inserts a new 
section 83A in the principal Act). 
                                                 
23 As at 2018, the second report is now, well past due. 
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b. The abolishment of whipping as a form of punishment for children found 
guilty of criminal offences (Section 67 of the Child (Amendment) Act 2016 
abolishes section 92 of the Child Act 2001). Caning in schools however, was not 
abolished and the provision has no application as far as offences committed in 
breach of Islamic law. This will be considered in the subsequent Chapter. 
 
c. The introduction of community service (By virtue of an amendment to section 
33 through section 331 of the amending Act 2016). 
 
d. The creation of a “National Council for Children” with overarching duties and 
responsibilities on all matters including among others to ‘develop programmes and 
strategies’ educating society of the ‘rights and dignity of a child’ (Section 3 of the 
Child (Amendment) Act 2016). The Council aims to have two children appointed 
although how this is to be done is not prescribed. 
 
e. The creation of “Child Welfare Teams” to coordinate locally based services if 
among others, a child is found guilty of any offence (Section 7A). 
However, there are several areas that remain unresolved and there is a need to 
consider what further aspects require attention (UNICEF, 2015a). Thus, at the time of 
writing, the reservations to the CRC remain, the duality of laws in relation to Syariah 
law remain, the minimum age of criminal responsibility remains and the overarching 
norms that determine ‘culture, ideology and discourse’ (Muncie 2001:33) in relation 
to children in conflict with the law, appear to be in the main, undisturbed and 
disconnected from these amendments. The newly minted Child (Amendment) Act 
2016, although introducing the concept of community service, is disconcertingly silent 
on the issue of diversion.24 Some of these matters will be considered in Chapters 5 and 
6. 
                                                 
24 While the Act did not include Diversion, UNICEF supported the mission of two representatives 
from the England and Wales Youth Justice Board to share experiences with relevant stakeholders and 
provided technical advice in relation to the drafting of an enabling provision on diversion for the Child 
Bill (UNICEF, 2015b). These provisions did not materialise in the Child (Amendment) Act 2016. 
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9.    Reflections 
The discussion above encapsulates the historical context of the Malaysian juvenile 
justice system. Her colonial past has had a strong influence on the development of 
laws and systems that impact on a child in conflict with the law. The deeper 
philosophical abstractions that were part of the early evolution of the juvenile justice 
system have become seamlessly embedded in the post-colonial Malaysian system.  
The Malaysian juvenile justice system, has, mirrored the evolution of international 
perspectives on child rights. In the era where children held no fundamental rights 
under the law, the Malaysian justice system did not have a separate system of justice 
for juveniles. At the time when children were considered a separate and special class 
of immature persons in need of State protection, these welfare principles were echoed 
in the Children Enactment 1922 and the subsequently enacted Juveniles Court Act of 
1947.  However, subsequent global developments in child rights did not find its way 
into Malaysia. From a philosophical perspective, the Malaysian juvenile justice 
system placed less emphasis on children’s rights, and instead focused on 
accountability and principles of punishment. 
The CRC has become a constituent part of the juvenile justice system following 
Malaysia’s ratification in 1989 and the passing of the Child Act 2001. However, as 
considered above, the text and subtext of how child rights are manifest, reflect the 
varied contradictions in espousing universal rights in a culturally diverse world. Thus, 
while recent changes were introduced through the Child (Amendment) Act 2016, a 
number of inconsistencies remain, particularly where a child is in conflict with the 
law.  As noted above, diversion was not introduced in the amended Act and this is 
considered in Chapter 5 and 6. The challenge in advocating the broader philosophical 
aspirations of the treaty are best understood by considering the impact that the 













 The underlying norms in Malaysia 
‘See if you can take [the handkerchief] out, without my feeling it: as you saw them 
do, when we were at play this morning.… You’re a clever boy, my dear…. I never saw 
a sharper lad. Here’s a shilling for you. If you go on, in this way, you’ll be the 
greatest man of the time.’ 













Following the Federal Court’s verdict of guilt, WK, the young boy charged with 
murder described in previous Chapters, was incarcerated for an indeterminate period, 
harbouring aspirations of reading law while in custody (Habibu, 2010) still handcuffed 
to the crime as he was at his very first appearance in court many years ago.  He was 
finally released in 2016 after spending most of his formative years incarcerated. The 
preamble to the Child Act 2001 acknowledges that ‘a child, by reason of his physical, 
mental and emotional immaturity, is in need of special safeguards, care and 
assistance’ and that ‘every child is entitled to protection and assistance in all 
circumstances.’25 The paradox is that while a child is deemed lacking in his or her 
physical, mental and emotional immaturity, that very child is most vulnerable when he 
or she is in the criminal justice system apparently designed to protect him or her. 
In this case, the crime was a violent one with the Court of Appeal, per Gopal Sri 
Ram declaring that ‘this was a gruesome murder’ (Koh Wah Koon v PP [2004] 5 MLJ 
174 at p183) and clearly the loss to Mei Fong’s family was immense and 
irreplaceable.26 A child has killed another child in a violent manner and there are 
difficult choices to be made, a balancing of conflicting views and emotions and 
values. In the words of Hoffman LJ citing Isaiah Berlin, ‘the world that we encounter 
in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends 
equally ultimate and claims equally absolute. The realisation of some of which must 
inevitably involve the sacrifice of others’ (Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] WLR 
316 at 355C-D). The debate is a well-argued one, with notions of retribution for a 
horrific crime competing with the need to recognise that the offender was a child at 
the time of the offence. 
Malaysia did not experience the similar well-documented media frenzy associated 
with the Bulger case (Muncie, 2008) and neither was there the same intensity in 
                                                 
25 The genesis for this is in the preamble to the UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child 1959, 
which is replicated in the preamble to the Child Act 2001. 
26 The mother of the victim is reported as stating, “Whatever I feel is meaningless now because it 
cannot bring my daughter back. Let the court do its work. Let the system take its course. I feel sorry for 




seeking tougher laws for children as that experienced in the United Kingdom (Munice, 
2009a). While there were calls to tighten the law or to have better provisions or 
introduce clarity in the law (Hah, 2007), these views arose primarily from the decision 
of the Court of Appeal setting aside the sentence. This was based on the view that a 
sentencing function (essentially a judicial function) administered by the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong (the Ruler, who is a member of the Executive) is incongruent with the 
tenets of the doctrine of separation of powers and hence the provision; section 97(2) 
was deemed unconstitutional.  
Public opinion on the matter was muted with a balanced view between the decision 
to seek retribution or to find a better solution. The level of ‘moral panic’ (Cohen, 
1973:9) that followed was mild in comparison to that associated with the Bulger case. 
A plausible explanation for this is the variance in media reporting cultures between 
both jurisdictions.  
The Court of Appeal however was clear in its views that, while the sentencing of 
the child was a problem, the conviction was safe and the presiding judge is reported to 
have said that he ‘wants to keep the boy away from society as long as possible’ 
(Mageswari, 2007). Paradoxically while the Preston Crown Court expressed similar 
thoughts in the Bulger case, the sentence imposed on Venables and Thompson had a 
tariff.27 However, in the Malaysian case, there are no direct equivalent provisions for 
such a tariff. Further, in the Malaysian context, such a function was accepted through 
the decision of the Federal Court, as within a wider interpretation of the separation of 
powers.  
Malaysia has recently introduced changes to its Child Act 2001 by virtue of the 
Child (Amendment) Act 2016 and there are plans to reform and modernise its juvenile 
justice system. However, in that discourse, the limitation is that Malaysia would 
‘ensure the rights of the child under the Articles 2, 7, 14, 28(1) (a) and 37 of the CRC 
                                                 
27 Although the manner in which this was administered proved to be a point of dispute, with 
equivalent challenges on the executive performing judicial functions see Secretary of State for the 
Home Department ex parte Venables and Thompson, R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
Ex Parte Thompson [1997] UKHL 25; V v United Kingdom Application no. 24888/94 and T v United 
Kingdom Application 24724/94. 
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are preserved as long as they are not against the provisions of the Federal 
Constitution, laws and national policies’ (emphasis added) (ASEAN Inter-
Parliamentary Assembly, 2011). The Tokyo Rules 1990 appear to accept this, allowing 
member States to take into account ‘the political, economic, social and cultural 
conditions of each country and the aims and objectives of its criminal justice system.’ 
The use of the caveat is not very comforting. It makes the declaration to ensure that 
the rights of the child are preserved, as merely illusory. It also suggests that national 
laws will trump the rights of the child in conflict with the law. It has been suggested 
that the Malaysian position of considering the amendments to domestic laws as a 
condition precedent before a withdrawal of any reservation was ‘putting the cart 
before the horse.’ The better approach is to withdraw these reservations first to serve 
as a catalyst for ensuring immediate changes to the laws (SUHAKAM, 2008). Thus 
far, this approach has not been considered and as such, the reservations remain. 
Perhaps the plausible argument for the perceived ‘dragging of feet’ is that there are 
greater complexities involved that are drawn from the underlying philosophical 
approaches that have been subsumed in the criminal justice system.  
These norms in the political culture and penal policies then impinge on issues of a 
rights-based argument for diversionary approaches of a child in conflict with the law. 
These approaches have themselves become the voice of the “tough on crime” rhetoric 
of political elites, which in turn create in the minds of the public, concern about crime 
(Beckett, 2000). This cycle of reinforced views creates the context in which the 
Malaysian juvenile justice system operates.  
2. The context of culture 
As suggested in the preceding chapter, Malaysia’s juvenile justice system has not 
experienced the varied theoretical assumptions that have formed the basis for 
corresponding changes in penal policies affecting children as other jurisdictions have. 
In fact, the overall penal policy is one that is highly punitive in nature particularly 
where, for example, sentences of whipping or death by hanging are available for 
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certain offences.28 From the discussion above it is also possible for sentences of an 
indeterminate detention period. It is also possible for an individual to be detained 
without trial for up to two years, which was introduced through the Prevention of 
Crime (Amendment) Act 2017. The Act does not apply directly to children, but if a 
child (from the age of 17 onwards) has been convicted on at least three occasions of 
offences involving dishonesty or violence, these convictions may form the basis to 
order detention without trial once the child attains the age of 21. The amendments 
empower a five-person government-appointed panel to impose up to two years’ 
preventive detention on certain criminal suspects. These decisions are not subject to 
judicial review except on procedural grounds i.e. challenges based on remedies 
available under administrative law.  
The historical evolution of Malaysia’s penal policies, rooted in the British penal 
policies of early 19th and 20th century, has led to an embedded philosophical approach 
underlying its penal policy. These matters were considered in Chapter 2. As the 
country gained independence and evolved over the period of 61 years, that 
philosophical approach took on a defined pattern and with a predominantly state 
controlled media, a dominant one-party political system and a strong central 
government, Malaysia’s penal policy has been defined by assumptions fixed in that 
mould.  Thus, the attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments that form the collective history of 
the Malaysian political system and the life histories of the individual actors of the 
system, set the foundation for the ‘political culture’ underlying its existing political 
system, which in turn, it is argued, influences the juvenile justice system. 
The term ‘political culture’ is primarily associated with the work of the American 
political scientist Gabriel Almond. Almond defined political culture as ‘the 
specifically political orientations – attitudes toward the political system and its various 
parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system’ (Almond and Verba, 
1963: 12). Thus, the political culture of a nation is ‘the particular distribution of 
                                                 
28 These are found in the Malaysian Penal Code (Act 574) which owes its genesis to the Indian 
Penal Code 1836. The Indian Penal Code is ‘the longest serving criminal code in the common law 
world’ (Chan, Wright and Yeo, 2011). 
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patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation’ 
(1963:13). 
Almond and Verba refer to the three major kinds of beliefs that influence the 
character and policy outcomes of political systems namely ‘the cognitive, the 
affective, and the evaluational’ approaches. These belief structures provide the context 
of coherency in which the political system and its actors function. Thus, those that 
advocate notions of political culture argue for the meaningful understanding of what 
motivates the thoughts of the political actors as opposed to merely studying the social 
class or occupation or other institutional structures that surround the individual 
(1963:14). 
Almond and Verba’s Civic Culture, used public opinion surveys in five countries to 
identify a cluster of attitudes that the authors believed to be most advantageous for a 
stable democracy. Methodological deficiencies set the grounds for strong criticisms 
much of which appear to be justified (Verba,1980) but the work set the pace for 
further insights and approaches in this area.   
An alternative approach in developing an understanding of political cultures is the 
anthropological view. Clifford Geertz (1973), for example argues that culture is a 
property of a whole society, or subgroups within society, but in any case, not of 
individuals (Elkins and Simeon, 1979). The vast range of theoretical views that have 
developed in the study of culture have interspersed a wide range of disciplines. While 
there are those who argue that ‘political culture remains a suggestive rather than a 
scientific concept’ (Chilton, 1988:420) the application of cultural studies engendered 
‘cultural criminology’ studies that sought to ‘integrate the fields of criminology and 
cultural studies or, put differently, to import the insights of cultural studies into 
contemporary criminology’ (Ferrell, 1999:396). 
The foundations for the study of culture in the United Kingdom emerged from what 
has been described as ‘the Birmingham version of British Cultural Studies’ (Agger, 
2014:75). Owing to its attribute as being interdisciplinary its approach, the application 
of cultural studies has been applied in those intervening years, in the study of deviant 
and criminal subcultures, to the importance of symbolism and style in shaping 
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subcultural meaning and identity or in establishing a feminist critique of sub cultures,  
or in facilitating our understanding of the role of mass media in shaping criminal 
behaviour and deviance (Hebdige 1979, 1988, Hall & Jefferson 1976, Clarke 1976, 
McRobbie 1990, Cohen 1973, Cohen & Young 1973). 
The emphasis is on understanding social action in terms of the deep reading of 
culture or cultures in which the social action is viewed.  In interpreting this role, 
Geertz considers that ‘man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself 
has spun, I take culture to be these webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an 
experimental science in search of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning’ 
(Geertz, 1973:5). The basis for this is to challenge the conventional quantitative 
research ‘which wantonly imposes survey category and Lickert Scale upon its 
subjects’ (Hayward and Young, 2004:268). Hayward and Young further suggest that 
the rational choice theory and positivistic approaches to crime that dominate 
contemporary sociological theory ‘have very simple rational/instrumental narratives’ 
(Hayward and Young, 2004:263). 
That cultural criminology sets out as an emerging orientation has been challenged 
with O’Brien for example arguing that there is a ‘fundamental confusion about what 
culture represents in relation to different levels of analysis’ (2005:600). At another 
level, cultural criminologists are accused of ‘theoretical gerrymandering’ and failing 
‘to adequately adhere to the theoretical perspectives they rely on’ (Spencer, 2011:209-
210). However, as suggested by Bevier, ‘cultural criminology brings together 
disciplinary distinct but logically related research principles and practices to form a 
cultural methodology suited for the late modern world’ (2015:44).  
In the context of this study, an analysis of the philosophical underpinnings of the 
child in conflict with the law in this context will attempt to ‘bridge the gap between 
researcher and researched subject and capture the lived experiences and realities’ of 
the Malaysian context of youth justice. This is drawn from Weber’s verstehen 
embodied in many aspects of qualitative research, for example by Ferrell’s (1998) 
‘Criminological Verstehen’ although for present purposes it is not in the commonly 
associated model of the researcher being absorbed in the criminal activity that is 
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subject to scrutiny. Coupling this with the anthropological thick description approach 
will facilitate a deep and rich account of the issue of the rights of the child in conflict 
with the law.  The theoretical framework for this argument is explored in Chapter 4. 
3.  Penal policies and the culture of politics  
Post-colonial Malaysia’s, penal policy evolved much in the same direction as its 
neighbour Singapore. Until its independence in 1965, Singapore was part of Malaysia 
and shared a considerable common political and cultural history. In a comprehensive 
study of Singapore’s penal history, Pieris suggests that Singapore has often been 
represented as a ‘punitive city’ owing to its ‘pervasive apparatus of surveillance, the 
policing of political opposition and continued use of corporal punishment and the 
death penalty’ (2009:217). 
These descriptors arguably are equally applicable to the political culture in 
Malaysia. Post-colonial Malaysia maintained laws introduced by the British that were 
designed to subvert political dissent against the colonial power and the threat of the 
spread of communism. Both Malaysia and Singapore have a shared historical 
evolution as far as British intervention was concerned. Thus, Malaysia, like Singapore 
had preventative detention laws and various measures introduced that were 
incongruous with many human rights principles. Penal policies of the 19th century, 
reliant on the penal philosophies of the time, were soon embedded in the system.  
These draconian security laws, such as the now repealed, Internal Security Act 
(ISA), were sometimes used to jail government critics or muzzle political dissent. The 
state of the political culture has been defined by the development of a strong central 
government acting in a paternalistic manner. The discourse established was one that 
convinced the citizens that punitive laws were necessary to maintain peace and 
harmony among the various ethnic groups in Malaysia and that chaos would ensue if 
not for the rigour of the law. For many years, this discourse and the rhetoric that 
followed were accepted but owing to a greater awareness of civil rights, that view 
began to change over the last decade. 
In the 2013 Malaysian general elections, the ruling political party won 60% of the 
222 parliamentary seats although only securing 47.38% of the popular vote (Hing and 
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Pong, 2014). Following what was perceived as a less-than-successful performance, the 
government pushed a moderate agenda to appease growing disenchantment with the 
application of harsh laws by repealing some of these laws. However, within a short 
time, there was a reversal of direction with plans to toughen a range of other laws. 
Amendments to the Prevention of Crime Act 1959 (in 2014 and 2017) justified as 
necessary to battle a rise in violent crime reflect this about turn and similar views were 
raised to argue for the reinstatement of the earlier-abolished Emergency Ordinance 
which allows for detention without trial. Perhaps it was more about the dominant 
political party in the ruling coalition seeking to appease party expectations, fretting 
over perceived growing opposition to the government.  
Garland’s (2001) description of the culture of crime control has elicited much 
debate as to the fundamental factors that determine penal policy in the realm of 
criminology. Garland himself describes these criticisms and debates as ‘part of a 
collective project that has been rapidly unfolding in the sociology of punishment over 
the past several years’ (Garland, 2001:160). 
  From a Malaysian perspective, the ruling party’s playing to the gallery does have 
a resonance with Bottoms’ (1995:40) descriptive of ‘populist punitiveness’ or Pratt’s 
‘penal populism’ (2007). However, perhaps the reality is the view suggested by Tonry 
that, ‘[i]n countries in which most or some penal policies have become more severe, 
the reasons are not rising crime rates, increased awareness of risk, globalization, or the 
conditions of late modernity, but rather distinctive cultural, historical, constitutional, 
and political conditions’ (2007:1).  
Perhaps the only distinction from a Malaysian perspective is that Malaysia did not 
move from a less severe penal policy to that of one that is more severe. If anything, it 
has always been punitive and while there was a momentary move towards moderation 
leading up to the 2013 election, order was quickly restored and it remains thus.  
Further, there is very little evidence to suggest that such ‘populist punitiveness’ in 
Malaysia can be empirically proven. 
Applying Lijphart’s descript (1999: 301), Malaysia appears to be in the tradition of 
a ‘majoritarian’ or ‘conflict’ democracy where, as suggested by Lappi-Seppälä (2008), 
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there is a jostling between competing political parties, an environment antithesis to 
that of consensus-style democracies.  The distinction from a Malaysian perspective is 
that it has always had one political party in power since its independence in 1957 with 
opposition parties fulfilling the role of merely providing opposition. It is only until 
very recently has there been some measure of a collective opposition in the form of a 
coalition that is attempting to provide an alternative political entity with a view to 
create a two-party environment.  
In his comparative analysis of children who kill children, Green (2008) establishes 
the premise that political culture forms a significant part of the explanation for the 
very different reactions to the killing of young children by other children in Norway 
and England. Hamilton (2013) however, is of the view that Green’s analysis with 
Lijphart’s demarcation as the base, affords a definition of political culture that 
‘appears thin and unduly narrow, without reference to underlying cultural values’ 
(1999:157). From a Malaysian perspective, culture and politics are an interwoven 
experience. 
Malaysia’s structure of politics has been divided according to racial and ethnic 
patterns and this has engendered a lack of class-consciousness with Judith Nagata 
suggesting that ‘Malaysians show little awareness in class distinctions in the western 
sense of the term’ (1975:117). Thus, the Malaysian penal policy has been shaped by 
historical events, culture and religion and its institutional structures and the narrow 
approach of demarcation alluded to by Green’s analysis perhaps does not adequately 
capture the broader and deeper aspects that are peculiar to it. These factors provide the 
underlying philosophical argument that underpin Malaysia’s juvenile justice system 
and this determines its measure of punitiveness with regard to children in conflict with 
the law as well as the treatment of the rights of the child in conflict with the law.   
A further factor is the lack of awareness of class-consciousness over a long period 
which has resulted in a society that had very little to offer by means of welfarism 
(Garland, 2001) and hence the concept of rights has remained muted. As suggested by 
Lappi-Seppälä punitive policies that make more use of imprisonment are to be found 
in countries that lack a ‘consensual and corporatist political culture’, that do not have 
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high levels of ‘social trust and political legitimacy’, and are lacking in notions of a 
welfare state (2011:321). 
A small part of this landscape is evolving today with a greater awareness of the 
class divide and the issue of rights that transcend that of race and religion. However, 
there is, at this point, uncertainty as to whether the prospect of class-consciousness 
would eventually lead to a civilizing process (Elias, 2000) that might form the basis 
for a less punitive penal policy. The plans to introduce diversion, in so far as children 
in conflict of the law is concerned, appears to indicate at the very least, a tentative 
engagement with these issues but the concern is how that change will fit in the broader 
punitive penal policies that have been in existence for more than 60 years. Further and 
perhaps more importantly, how will the various stakeholders involved in the 
administration of justice, accustomed to the punitive penal policies, deal with 
approaches that require an almost immediate change in attitude where non-custodial 
approaches are concerned. These elements are also deeply embedded in the socio-
cultural norms that define Malaysian cultural attitudes towards children. 
While the immediate post war penal policy and political culture in England headed 
in the direction of the abolition of corporal and capital punishment (Ryan, 2003), the 
political culture in post-colonial Malaysia remained static. Legislative reforms and 
policy considerations that peppered the criminal justice system particularly those that 
affected children in conflict with the law, in England over the six decades did not take 
root in Malaysia. It is certainly interesting to consider whether had Malaysia remained 
a colony, whether the changes that occurred in England would find its way into 
Malaysia or conversely, what the position would have been if Malaysia had not been 
subject to British intervention. 
The combination of a perceived increase in crime rates and political rhetoric have 
led to the present punitive attitudes in penal policy. Malaysia has never had a broad 
nation-wide analysis of public opinion on the measure of punitiveness nor has there 
been a large-scale analysis of social attitudes on sentencing.  
A recent endeavour in analysing public opinion on the death sentence in Malaysia 
yielded interesting results (Hood, 2013). Malaysia is neither a party to the 
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International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 1966 nor its Second Optional 
Protocol aiming at the abolition of the death penalty. 
 The views of a representative sample of 1,535 Malaysian citizens on the 
mandatory death sentence indicated that a large majority were in favour of the death 
penalty, whether mandatory or discretionary with 91% expressing that support for 
murder, 74 to 80% for drug trafficking depending on the drug concerned, and 83% for 
firearms offences. In so far as the mandatory death penalty, 56% were in favour of it 
for murder, but only between 25% and 44% for drug trafficking and 45% for firearms 
offences. However, these views changed when respondents were given specific 
scenarios in which the sentences were applicable resulting in a large gap between the 
level of support ‘in theory’ and the level of support when faced with the ‘reality’. 
The report then concluded that ‘the level and strength of support among the 
Malaysian public for the death penalty for murder is lower than is perhaps commonly 
supposed. This suggests that public opinion ought not to be regarded as a definite 
barrier to abolition of the death penalty for murder’ (Hood, 2013: xiv). Even though 
the study was the first and thus far, the only attempt to assess public opinion on the 
death penalty, it is difficult to gauge for certain societal attitudes on sentencing 
policies in Malaysia.  
The previous political party was in power since Malaysia’s independence in 1957 
and had in place a punitive approach in its sentencing policies and a ‘tough on crime’ 
stance. That they have secured electoral success suggests that the electorate supported 
this approach even if they failed to secure the popular vote in 2013 and lost in 2018. 
Further, there has not been, to date, any views expressed by the collective opposition 
on their own approaches on the current penal policy. At best, there is opposition to the 
use of preventative detention laws primarily because it is suggested that these laws 
have been used to stifle opposition to the government. Thus, the penal policies in 
place have been determined by discourse controlled and managed by those in power.  





3.1 Judicial attitudes and the child in conflict with the law 
There is evidence to suggest that courts are keen to punish particularly where the 
child in conflict is involved in serious offences or where public interests are at stake. 
For example, in a case decided before the CRC, Sharma J in Tan Bok Yeng v Public 
Prosecutor [1972] 1 MLJ 214 said:  
It is not merely the correction of the offender which is the prime object of the 
punishment. The considerations of public interest have also to be borne in mind. In 
certain types of offences, a sentence has got to be deterrent so that others who are 
like-minded may be restrained from becoming a menace to society ([1972] 1 MLJ 
215). 
Some 34 years later, not much had changed. This notwithstanding that the Child 
Act 2001 was in force. In Public Prosecutor v Low Kian Boon & Ors [2006] 6 MLJ 
25429, the first accused aged 18 and the second accused, a 17-year-old boy were 
jointly charged with the murder of the victim in the early hours of November 12, 
2003. The victim’s right hand was almost severed and he had 23 slash wounds, which 
eventually led to his death.   
In finding the accused and his accomplice guilty of manslaughter, the High Court 
imposed a 10-year jail term. The court was of the view that:  
Serious crimes committed by youth seems to be on the rise and wrong signals 
would be sent to youths and the public at large into believing that the courts would 
be ever so indulgent to treat them with kid gloves, should they ever be convicted of 
such crimes, if deterrent sentences are not meted out to impress upon these youths 
and like-minded offenders that crime does not pay ([2006] 6 MLJ at 295). 
After a series of appeals and cross appeals the Federal Court in upholding the Court 
of Appeal decision, substituted the 10-year sentence on Low Kian Boon, the first 
accused, who was already aged 24 at the time, with the death penalty after finding him 
                                                 
29 The victim’s stepdaughters (aged 16 and 14 at the time of the incident) were also charged in 
connection with the offence but were acquitted and discharged by the Shah Alam High Court on Feb 6, 
2006, without their defence being called. 
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guilty of murder. His accomplice, the second accused, who was already aged 23, was 
ordered to be further detained in prison for an indeterminate period at the pleasure of 
the Sultan (Low Kian Boon & Anor v Public Prosecutor [2010] 4 MLJ 42). 
Similarly, in Public Prosecutor v Mohd Turmizy bin Mahdzir [2007] 6 MLJ 642, 
both the accused were under the age of 18 at the date of commission of the offence for 
the possession of 419.4g Cannabis pursuant to the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. 
However, owing to an alternative charge tendered after they had attained the age of 
18,30 the case was heard by the High Court and not the Court for Children. (Emphasis 
added). In sentencing both the accused to 10 years’ imprisonment and 10 strokes 
whipping31, the court had this to say:  
 It is important to stress that child or youth cannot be used as a ‘cloak of 
convenience’ in order to shelter from accepting proper responsibility for criminal 
behaviour ... It is important to stress that where young offenders conduct 
themselves like adults and commit serious or grave crimes; they may attract less 
leniency in sentencing than their age might otherwise demand… (6 MLJ 642 at 
655). 
In none of the instances above, particularly cases decided after the Child Act 2001, 
was there any reference to the CRC or of the rights of the child. No arguments were 
presented on the promotion of the child’s sense of dignity and worth, or of the child’s 
reintegration into society. Judicial interpretation appears to be confined to the strict 
legal interpretations of the law. In fact, in Public Prosecutor v Mohd Turmizy bin 
Mahdzir the court was of the view that:  
    [T]he reformative theory, especially for children is certainly important but too 
much stress or emphasis cannot be laid on it to such an extent the tenets of 
punishment provided by law is altogether vanished (6 MLJ 642 at 653). 
                                                 
30 Counsel for the accused is on record for suggesting that there was a delay in framing the 
alternative charge. 
31 Sections 286–291 of the Criminal Procedure Code govern the procedures involved and has its 
origins in the Straits Settlements Penal Code Ordinance IV 1871 introduced by the British. 
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A different approach however was adopted for example, by the court in Public 
Prosecutor v Low Hai Voon [2010] 8 MLJ 582 where a child of 14 years and 9 
months was charged with culpable homicide not amounting to murder following a 
fight involving helmets. The court accepted the guilty plea, recorded the probation 
report and took cognizance of issues raised in mitigation and considered the 
desirability and benefit of keeping young, first offenders out of prison. The court in 
applying section 91(1) (f) of the Child Act 2001, sentenced the child to be held at the 
Henry Gurney school until he attains 21 years of age. 
In the case of Kok Foo Seng, the accused was found guilty of drug trafficking, a 
capital offence which ordinarily mandated the death penalty. However, as the accused 
was a child at the time of the offence, he was imprisoned at the age of 14, only to be 
released 13 years later after being pardoned by the Sultan of Pahang (the Ruler of the 
State) following constant efforts by the boy’s family to pursue the case for a pardon 
(Cheah, 2007). It is to be noted that in many instances, recourse to the indeterminate 
detention sentence, is most often used in cases that involve drug trafficking, murder, 
or kidnaping.32 
In response to the application of section 97(2) in Malaysia, The United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed its concern stating that such sentences 
cause ‘problems in terms of the development of the child, including her/his recovery 
and social integration’ (United Nations, 2007:25). 
The basis for this view is in Article 40(1), which urges countries to recognize the 
right of the child in conflict to be treated in a manner which promotes the child’s sense 
of dignity and worth taking into account the child’s age and the desirability of 
promoting the child’s reintegration and the child’s assuming a constructive role in 
society.  
Article 40 therefore sets the basis for the overall aim of child justice systems that it 
amongst other things, should encourage children to take responsibility for their actions 
and that the justice systems should emphasise the reintegration of the child into 
                                                 
32 For a range of cases, see n 19 above. 
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society. Diversion and alternatives are highly compatible with these aims and should 
therefore be preferred over the detention of children that come into conflict with the 
law.33 
This view is further supported by the explanatory guidelines issued that encourage 
State parties to take measures for dealing with children in conflict with the law 
without resorting to judicial proceedings and making these measures an integral part 
of their juvenile justice system. Further, State parties are encouraged to ensure that 
children’s human rights and legal safeguards are thereby fully respected and protected 
as per the provisions of Article 40 (3) (b) (United Nations, 2007b: para 24).  
Clearly, the emphasis is to encourage the promotion of the use of child rights-based 
diversion, implemented with appropriate legal safeguards, as an integral part of child 
justice systems. This emphasis in turn is on the basis that most child offenders commit 
only minor offences (although in the opinion of the Committee, such measures should 
not be limited only to children who commit minor offences but should be applied 
across the range of circumstances) (United Nations, 2007b: para 25). Thus, the 
application of diversion through the CRC rests on the underlying philosophical 
foundation of rights.  
While it may still be possible to establish diversionary processes without this 
foundation, the danger is that such a direction may result in cosmetic changes to the 
existing laws to facilitate diversion merely to fulfil international obligations. This then 
may result in further ‘unresolved conflicts of a philosophical nature’ that impinge on 
the concept of the rights of the child in Malaysia (Beijing Rules, 2010) particularly 
where the child is in conflict with the law. 
 
 
                                                 
33 In 1990, the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures (The Tokyo 
Rules) had established among other principles, a set of basic principles to promote the use of 





3.2 Incarceration in Malaysia 
 
Table 3: Imprisonment rates, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. (Adapted from: The World Prison 
Brief, The Institute for Criminal Policy Research).   Available at: <http:// 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/> [17 May 2018]. 
According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Malaysia, the general prison 
population as at October 2016 stands at 51 602 held in 47 institutions34 (Table 3 
above) spread across the country with an occupancy level (based on the official 
capacity) of 113.9% (as at October 2016). This is the highest it has been over the past 
15 years. The prison population rate (per 100,000 of national population) is at 167 
based on an estimated national population of 30.8 million at October 2016. This 
however, is not the highest among Malaysia’s immediate neighbours, with Singapore 
at 201 and Thailand at 466.35  
The issue of incarceration rates and its impact on punitiveness (if any) will be 
considered below but it bears noting that of the total prison population, approximately 
2.2% are juveniles, minors or young offenders as defined by the differing provisions 
of Malaysian law alluded to in the preceding Chapter. (For example, the Prison Act 
1995 defines a juvenile or a young offender as “a prisoner who is under the age of 21 
years” whilst the Child Act 2001 and the Child (Amendment) Act 2016 defines a 
‘child’ as “a person under the age of 18 years and below”).36 
                                                 
34 This consists of 35 prisons, 4 reformatory centres, 5 special recovery centres and 5 Henry Gurney 
centres. 
35 Statistics for Singapore are as at 31 December 2017 and as for Thailand, it is at 1 March 2018. 
36 These figures do not include 912 children detained under immigration laws in 2015(there were 
5,648 asylum-seekers and 2,282 refugees in detention centres throughout the country) (UNCHR, 2016). 
Country/Area Total General 
Population 
Imprisonment rate (per 
100000 population) 
Malaysia 51 602 30.8 million 167 
Singapore 11 691 5.83 million 201 
Thailand 334 279 69.14 million 483 
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In the United States, law enforcement agencies made 1.6 million arrests of persons 
under the age of 18 in 2010 and larceny-theft, simple assault, drug abuse violations, 
and disorderly conduct offences accounted for half of all juvenile arrests in 2010 
(Sickmund and Puzzanchera, 2014). Similarly, in 2008, of the over 2 million youth 
under the age of 18 arrested, about 95% had not been accused of violent crimes, such 
as murder, rape, or aggravated assault (Puzzanchera, 2009). In 2010, of the nearly 
100,000 youth under the age of 18 who were serving time in a juvenile residential 
placement facility, 26% had been convicted of property crimes only, such as burglary, 
arson, or theft (Sedlak and Bruce, 2010).  
In the United Kingdom, for the year ending March 2015 there were 43,148 
defendants (aged 10-17) proceeded against in the courts of which 30,960 were 
sentenced for their offences. The vast majority of these defendants (21,203) were 
sentenced to community sentences while 1,834 were sentenced to immediate custody 
(Ministry of Justice, 2016). 
As noted above, most children on remand are accused of minor property related 
offences (theft, theft of motor vehicle, possession of stolen property, housebreaking) 
and that only 20% were charged with serious offences involving violence (causing 
injury, robbery, rape and other sexual offences, murder). Further, it was suggested that 
a three-year period of institution-based rehabilitation is effectively “over treatment” 
for the vast majority of Tunas Bakti Schools and probation hostel residents, most of 
whom have committed very minor property-related offences (UNICEF, 2013). Gray’s 
observation of the situation in residential institutions in Hong Kong in the late 1990’s 
suggests that such juveniles are ‘not hardened criminals and have had exceedingly 
short criminal careers’ (1996:314).  
Six years earlier, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child in 
assessing the implementation of the CRC had already identified that, ‘many States 
Parties still have a long way to go (emphasis added) in achieving full compliance with 
the CRC’ (United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2007b:1). Thus, 
notwithstanding the passing of the Child Act 2001, Malaysia like many other State 
parties had “a long way to go.” 
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This is not a malady peculiar to Malaysia. Muncie’s (2009b) analysis of the 
‘concluding observations’ for 15 western European countries found the common 
thread of a failure to recognize the fundamental issues of the distinctive needs, 
dignity, humane treatment of children as central to the realisation of children’s rights. 
The theoretical basis for the dangers of incarceration and detention of children in 
conflict with the law is well documented. (For example, Kashani et al (1980); Forrest 
et al (2000), Hayes (2009) among others) From a Malaysian perspective, UNICEF 
(2013:73) argues that: 
[T]he placement of children in approved schools, hostels and other educational 
or rehabilitative institutions, while preferable to imprisonment, also constitutes 
deprivation of liberty and should be used only as a measure of last resort for 
children who commit violent crimes, or persist in committing other serious 
offences. 
Notably missing in the 2013 UNICEF report was any discussion on the emotional 
and psychological impact of incarceration on children. There has not been any 
empirical analysis of suicides, mental health issues or sexual assaults because of 
incarceration of children in Malaysia. However, there are examples in other 
jurisdictions. 
National data in the United States suggest that incarcerated youth are at particularly 
greater risk for suicide; the prevalence rates of completed suicide for this group are 
between two and four times higher than those for youth in the general population 
(Gallagher and Dobrin, 2006).  In the United Kingdom, the Prison Reform Trust has 
reported that 11% of young people in state custody have previously attempted suicide. 
The rate of suicide in boys aged 15–17 who have been sentenced and remanded in 
custody in England and Wales is suggested to be 18 times higher compared with the 
general population (Prison Reform Trust and INQUEST, 2012). The subsequent 
impact on adulthood can be severe. In the United States, a recent study analysing data 
from 14, 344 adult participants in the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to 
Adult Health, ‘suggest that incarceration during adolescence and early adulthood is 
independently associated with worse physical and mental health outcomes during 
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adulthood’ (Barnett et al 2017:7). Children are therefore particularly vulnerable to 
mental health issues and the mental health issues that exist within broader adolescent 
population has been investigated in a number of jurisdictions.  
Hagell’s (2002) analysis of international literature review concludes that rates of 
mental health problems are at least three times higher among children in the youth 
justice system than within the general population of children. In the United Kingdom, 
a 2004 study found that one in ten children aged between five and 16 years has a 
clinically diagnosable mental health problem. Just over half of these children and 
young people (5.8 per cent) have a conduct disorder; 3.7 per cent an emotional 
disorder (anxiety, depression) and one to two per cent have severe attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (Office for National Statistics, 2004). A recent 
evaluation of the Youth Justice Liaison and Diversion pilot scheme in the United 
Kingdom, found that 80% of young people had between one and five vulnerabilities, 
which range from mental health issues, behavioural issues, and social problems 
(Haines, A. et al. 2012). 
In 2015, one in eight Malaysian children aged 10 to 15 reported symptoms of 
mental ill health in 2011 to 2012, as measured by a high or very high total difficulties 
score (Office for National Statistics, 2015).  Further, findings from the National 
Health and Morbidity Survey37 (NHMS, 2017) in Malaysia found that anxiety was the 
most common mental health problem among Malaysian adolescents aged 13 to 17 
years followed by depression and stress. The lack of available information on the 
mental health of a child in conflict with the law in the various detention facilities 
precludes any valuable assessment on the matter in Malaysia but such concerns are far 
from misplaced. A further element is the impact of psychosocial factors. 
For example, Baur et al’s (2011) study on the psychosocial backgrounds of 
‘delinquent adolescents’ among ethnic groups (Turkish, former-Yugoslavian and 
Austrian) in Austria, found ‘high rates of psychosocial adversities: broken homes, 
                                                 
37 The National Health & Morbidity Survey: Adolescent Mental Health 2017 was aimed at assessing 
the prevalence of depression, anxiety and stress including comorbidity and associated factors among 
27,497 secondary school students in Malaysia using self-administered anonymous questionnaires 
adapted from the Malaysian Global School Health Survey (GSHS) 2012.  
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psychiatric morbidity within the family, parental criminality, trauma and difficulties 
with conduct and performance at school’ (2011:195). 
Other than the dangers of incarceration, a further view is that institutional treatment 
of children in conflict with the law particularly for minor offences or those that do not 
involve murder should be used a measure of last resort because of the rights of the 
child and on the recognition of the status of the child.  
Although Malaysia has taken steps to comply with some aspects the CRC with the 
various measures alluded to above, there are gaps in the expectations of the CRC and 
the actual working of the criminal justice system as far as the child in conflict with the 
law is concerned. This is not surprising considering the fact that while there are 
general expressions of the CRC, States parties have a level of discretion to decide on 
the exact nature and content of the measures for dealing with children in conflict with 
the law.  
Further given Malaysia’s reservations to several CRC Articles and given the 
punitive culture existent, as discussed above, the issue of a child rights-based 
approach to diversion that sets out to realise all children’s rights relevant to diversion 
(as set out in the CRC and other instruments) merits analysis. More importantly the 
CRC is not part of Malaysian law save where the provisions in the Convention have 
been validly incorporated into the domestic law by statute, which it has not done 
except in so far as some aspects of the CRC, incorporated through the Child Act 2001.  
Thus, Malaysian courts are not bound to enforce the articles found in the 
Convention except the limited provisions of the CRC as enshrined in the Child Act 
2001. This approach was recently affirmed in Pathmanathan a/l Krishnan v. Indira 
Gandhi a/p Mutho [2016] 4 MLJ 455 and affirms the dualist approach in the 
incorporation of international law in municipal or domestic law (Crawford, 2012). On 
the issue of the impact of the treaty, the court stated ‘international treaties do not form 




An illustration of an alternative broader interpretation of the application of the 
CRC can be found in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995]128 
ALR 353. The High Court of Australia, while recognizing that the Convention was not 
part of the domestic law declared that ‘ratification of a Convention is a positive 
statement by the Executive Government to the world and to the Australian people that 
the Executive, Government and its agencies will act in accordance with the 
Convention’ (1995:365).  
In the United Kingdom, like Malaysia, incorporation and inclusion is dependent on 
the enactment of a specific law. However, there have been instances where a broader 
view has been adopted. For example, in the Supreme Court case of ZH (Tanzania) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4,  Lady Hale noted that 
Article 3 of the CRC was ‘a binding obligation in international law’ on the basis that 
‘the spirit, if not the precise language’ of Article 3 had also been translated into 
domestic law. However, Malaysian courts have not adopted such a wider 
interpretation of the law and neither have there been attempts to interpret the 
Constitution in light of any obligations arising from the CRC.  
3.3 Corporal Punishment 
As stated above, section 91 of the Child Act 2001 permits light caning.  Thus, for 
example a 17-year-old youth was sentenced to be whipped 10 times with a light cane 
for two counts of robbery and instilling fear in his victim (The Star, 2012). Whipping 
can be executed in open court as in the case of three youths who were whipped as 
punishment for committing armed robbery administered pursuant to Section 293 of 
the Criminal Procedure Code (The Star, 2013) and where a 19-year-old youth was 
caned for rape (Tariq, 2014).  
While there are legitimate concerns over the use of whipping as punishment and 
more recently criticisms on the whipping of children in open court (Nadirah, 2014), 
the sentence has long been accepted in the legal and regulatory framework38 and more 
                                                 
38 The Home Minister informed the Dewan Rakyat (Parliament) that 8,481 prisoners, most of them 
foreigners, were caned in 2013 as punishment for criminal offences (Carvalho et al, 2014). 
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importantly within the socio-religious environment. Thus, the caning of a child by 
his/her parents appears to draw legitimacy from Article 89 of the Penal Code where 
such an act ‘is done in good faith for the benefit of a person under twelve years of 
age.’39  
This is in pari materia with the now repealed40 section 1(7) of the United 
Kingdom’s Children and Young Persons Act 1933 which provides the common-law 
defence for ‘any parent, teacher, or other person having the lawful control or charge of 
a child or young person to administer punishment to him.’ 
Corporal punishment of boys in Malaysia is regulated by the Education 
Regulations (Student Discipline) 2006 under the Education Act 1996 and Article 350 
of the Penal Code affirms that caning of a student by a head teacher does not amount 
to criminal force.  
Corporal punishment of male and female children in the home is lawful, and 
appears to be a culturally accepted norm. Kumaraswamy et al (2011) suggest that 
culture has a prevailing hold on how Malaysian parents discipline their child citing a 
Malay proverb, ‘sayangkan tanak tangankan’41 which the writers interpret to mean ‘if 
you love the child, then you should use your hands (i.e. physically beating etc.) to 
teach them a lesson’(sic) (2011:27).  In their study, the writers found that most of the 
196 medical students surveyed, had a favourable attitude to receiving corporal 
punishment believing it to be ‘one of many ways to teach them a lesson in life’ 
(2011:27). Interestingly, the study did not seek to ask participants of their awareness 
of the CRC or explore the notion that cultural values aside, the CRC prohibits corporal 
punishment. Neither did it explore the respondents’ views on their rights. 
Corporal punishment contradicts the CRC but as mentioned above, there is no 
prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the Federal 
                                                 
39 The same cannot be said if a Malaysian parent was to cane a child while in another country as 
illustrated in the case of Malaysian parents who were jailed in Sweden for doing so (Pak, 2014). 
40 Section 1(7) has been repealed by the Children Act 2005. 
41 The equivalent being spare the rod and spoil the child. The issue of religious freedom and caning 
in the UK was considered for example in R. (on the application of Williamson) v Secretary of State for 
Education and Employment UKHL 15 [2005] 2 A.C. 246. 
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Constitution. Malaysia has also not ratified the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR aiming at 
the abolition of the death penalty, the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, or the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights.  
Similar challenges emerge when considering the use of capital punishment in 
Malaysia. Amnesty International Malaysia (AIM) reports that Malaysia was ranked 
10th in the use of the death penalty among 23 countries where executions were 
recorded (Amnesty International, 2016).   
In the second cycle of the Universal Periodic Review in 2013, it was recommended 
(by Belgium) that Malaysia should eliminate all forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatments, particularly judicial beatings that should immediately be subjected to a 
moratorium. The response from the Malaysian government in the Report of the 
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review was to state: 
Malaysia rejects the assertion that seeks to equate torture, inhuman, cruel or 
degrading treatment or punishment with corporal punishment including whipping 
and other forms of punishment as prescribed under existing laws which are carried 
out only upon direction by the Courts and which remain valid and legal forms of 
punishment in the country (United Nations 2014a:3). 
The caveat entered was not to exclude the possibility of ‘revisiting those 
recommendations as appropriate’ (2014:2) and that it (Malaysia) ‘remains committed 
to take progressive steps in improving Malaysia’s compliance with international 
human rights standards’ (2014:5).  
As indicated above, with the passing of the Child (Amendment) Act 2016, whipping 
as a form of punishment for children found guilty of criminal offences has been 
abolished. The path to abolishing the provision was not without debate with some 
confusion as to whether the proposed amendment to the Child Act would abolish 
caning completely and seek to punish parents if they caned their children. 
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Nevertheless, as it stands, caning carried out in open court has been abolished. 
However, as noted, caning of children by parents and teachers42 remains unaffected.  
This appears to draw legitimacy from Article 89 of the Penal Code and by the 
Education Regulations (Student Discipline) 2006 under the Education Act 1996 and 
Article 350 of the Penal Code, which affirms that caning of a student by a head 
teacher does not amount to criminal force. Further, corporal punishment remains a 
lawful sentence under Islamic law for males and females. For example, the Syariah 
Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997 identifies the punishment of 
whipping of up to six strokes for the offences of false doctrine, incest, prostitution, 
homosexual acts and other sex offences. This is considered below. 
The current position therefore remains the same. Child rights, be it under the 
relevant Islamic legislative pronouncements or those under the existing provisions of 
law refer to the need to protect the child but paradoxically there are discernible 
contradictions in expressing that intent. (Emphasis added). 
4.  Measuring punitiveness 
Attitudes towards punishment are often hard to define or locate within a given 
society. Kury and Obergfell-Fuchsm as cited in Adriaenssen and Aertsen (2015:92) 
suggest that ‘punitivity is a broadly used and vague concept.’  It has been suggested 
that people’s perception of crime and punishment generally represent a central aspect 
of normative culture and more specifically represent a form of formal social control 
(Stylianou, 2003).  It has also been suggested that measuring public opinion through 
surveys or polls provide a useful ‘social barometer to measure satisfaction with 
important government services’ and they reflect ‘the public’s mood and priorities for 
criminal justice reform’ (Flanagan, 1996: 5).   
                                                 
42 Corporal punishment was outlawed in state schools in the United Kingdom in 1986 and in all 
schools eventually in 1988. Section 58 of the Children Act 2004 limited the use of the defence of 
reasonable punishment. Thus, it could no longer be used when people are charged with offences against 
a child, such as causing actual bodily harm or cruelty to a child. This debate is likely to continue when 
the Scottish government confirmed its support for a ban on smacking children in October 2017. 
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The challenge is of course defining what it is that is being measured and how best 
to do so. In their analysis of the various empirical approaches in determining the 
measure of punitiveness, Adriaenssen and Aertsen concluded that there were four 
main recurring elements to measure punitive attitudes. These four elements were 
where respondents were asked their opinions about ‘the goals of punishment, about 
specific forms of penal sanctions and their intensity or about specific sentencing 
policies.’ As such, they suggest ‘a multidimensional operationalization of punitive 
attitudes’ from which they argue that a punitivity index can be developed (2014:4). A 
departure from this approach is to consider the levels of public knowledge on matters 
of sentencing or more specifically public opinion as a function of knowledge (Hough 
and Roberts, 1999). 
As has been considered above, there has not been, as yet, a similar endeavour to 
measure the Malaysian public’s opinions or attitudes on sentencing, save for the 
endeavour to gauge public support (or not) for the death penalty. The approach taken 
in this instance is not entirely new or novel and there is ample evidence of similar 
approaches taken in assessing views over issues connected with the death penalty, (for 
example Bohm and Vogel (2004); Ramirez (2013)). The findings in Malaysia show 
that, in these circumstances, the majority of the public surveyed did not support the 
mandatory death penalty, and this should be the basis to remove the assumption that 
public opinion is a barrier to abolition of the death penalty. That said, the death 
penalty remains in Malaysia. The Cabinet in August 2017 however, has agreed to 
review the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 to allow judges to use their discretion in 
sentencing offenders instead of imposing the mandatory death sentence 
(Kanyakumari, 2017). 
There has also never been an attempt to understand sentencing trends and 
evaluating public knowledge and public opinion on these issues. As has been alluded 
to, Malaysia does not conduct a nationally representative, household victimisation 
survey equivalent to the Crime Survey for England and Wales (formerly the British 
Crime Survey). This lack of information on data coupled with a less than critical 
media results in an environment that has a State-led top-down approach to the 
administration of criminal justice at a broader level. Consequently, there is less 
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engagement with public opinion or sentiment. Malaysia did not share the post-war 
British experience where an inclusive social democracy facilitated social equality and 
security provided by the welfare state (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006). 
Punitiveness in Malaysia is therefore difficult to measure. The United Nations 
Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations Criminal Justice Systems (commonly 
referred to as the UN CTS) collects basic information on the recorded crime and on 
resources of the criminal justice systems in member states. In its analysis of the 
punitivity of criminal justice systems (UNODC, 2010), there was an attempt to 
measure systemic punitivity estimated by the rate of total persons incarcerated per 
total persons convicted noting that Malaysia had a 52% increase in prison population 
between 1997-2007, placing it in the top 12 Asian nations with the largest increase. 
Further, it appears that the largest increases of adults convicted can be seen in 
Malaysia (24.4% in the whole period 1996 – 2006) and interestingly, England and 
Wales (20.2% in 1996 – 2006) and Northern Ireland (37.6% in the period 2001 – 
2006) (UNODC, 2010). 
While incarceration rates are not the best measure of punitiveness, there is some 
indication of Malaysia’s penal policy based on the available data. This coupled with 
the use of the death penalty, preventative detention laws and whipping of offenders 
are perhaps indicative of the level of punitiveness. There are obvious concerns on 
placing too much emphasis on the measure of punitiveness. Roger Matthews argues 
that ‘punitiveness remains a ‘thin’ and under-theorized concept’ (2005:178) and that a 
preoccupation with ‘limited oppositions and polarities’ fail to do justice to the 
diversity, contradictions, reversions and tensions in current crime control policy’ 
(2005:195). 
However, what appears clear in this context is that Malaysian norms (these include 
matters of ethnicity and religion) and its historical evolution have a definite impact on 
its political culture particularly the influence of these matters on policy makers. Thus, 
as Hamilton suggests, ‘the continued potency of national political culture and 
institutional arrangements in the determination of criminal justice policy serves to 
further reinforce the ‘cultural embeddedness’ of penal affairs’ (2013:165). 
82 
 
This broader notion of ‘cultural embeddedness’ then has an impact on the manner 
in which juvenile justice is administered. As considered in Chapter 1, in the Malaysian 
context, there appears to be an absence of any consideration of ‘culture, ideology and 
discourse’ (Muncie 2001:33) in introducing the global shared values of the CRC 
resulting in ‘policy failures’ caused by an uninformed policy transfer (Dolowitz and 
Marsh, 2000:17). These issues will be considered in subsequent chapters. 
5.  The definition of ‘child’ in Malaysia 
 
In the preceding Chapter, it was noted that following Malaysia’s ratification of the 
CRC, the Child Act 2001 adopted the provisions of Article 1 of the convention in 
defining a ‘child’ as a person below the age of 18. Notwithstanding this, as has been 
noted, there are variances in other statutory provision as to the definition of ‘child’, as 
to the terminology used (for example juvenile) or as to the various age determinants 
that set the boundaries for the definition used. These inconsistencies in the definition 
of the child with multiple, contradictory definitions of the child under both civil and 
Syariah had been noted twice by the United Nations (2007a as well as 2013) but 
remain. The lack of commitment has been alluded to in Chapter 2 and is perhaps best 
explained on the basis that there are no direct legal sanctions in the event of a breach. 
Further, a breach does not afford the alleged victim of such breach any avenue for 
redress. Malaysia has yet to ratify Optional Protocol 3, which sets out an international 
complaints procedure for child rights violations. 
Thus, for example, the Children and Young Persons (Employment) (Amendment) 
Act 2010 defines ‘child’ as a person who has not completed his fifteenth year of age, 
while a ‘young person’ is construed as a person who, not being a child, has not 
completed his eighteenth year of age. This is inconsistent with the definition in the 
Child Act 2001. In the matter of marriage, the laws define the minimum age for 
marriage for girls inconsistently. By virtue of section 10 of the Law Reform (Marriage 
and Divorce) Act 1976, the minimum age for marriage for a non-Muslim person is 
eighteen years. However, with the approval of the Chief Minister, a girl of sixteen 
may be authorized to enter into a marriage. 
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By virtue of section 8 of the Islamic Family Law Act (Federal Territory) 1984, the 
minimum age for marriage for a Muslim person is eighteen for a man and sixteen for a 
woman. However, if the Syariah judge has granted his permission in writing in certain 
circumstances, then a child younger than sixteen may enter into marriage. This has led 
to issues of child marriages that are conceivably recognised by Islamic law but may be 
incongruous with the spirit of the CRC.43 
The inconsistencies in the application of Islamic law and the CRC are due to the 
underlying historical, cultural and religious conditions that are embedded in the 
Malaysian political and cultural norms. Such inconsistencies are seen at the 
operational level and at a broader philosophical level, particularly matters that deal 
with the rights of the child. These philosophical differences influence two further 
ancillary issues, namely arbitrary age-based criteria and Islam’s interpretation of 
criminal responsibility. 
6. Evolving capacities and arbitrary lower age based restrictions 
The basic premise of the Convention is that a ‘child’ is born with fundamental 
freedoms and inherent rights available to all human beings but with specific additional 
needs in recognition of a child’s cognitive, emotional, social, moral and physical 
competencies drawn from the social, cultural, economic and emotional environment 
that they are in.  
A child faces a range of aged based criteria that govern various aspects of their 
lives at which they are deemed capable of making decisions for themselves, decisions 
with adult consequences for example to enter into contracts,44  become a company 
director45 or become a soldier.46  
                                                 
43 Child marriages were not abolished in the Child (Amendment) Act 2016. The Women, Family and 
Community Development deputy minister reported in Parliament that there were 9,061 child marriages 
recorded over the last five years: Hansard 19 May 2016, col 1120-11300. Available at: 
<http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/hindex/pdf/DR-19052016.pdf > [13 Nov 2016]. 
44 Section 11 of the Contracts Act 1950 read together with the Age of Majority Act 1971. 
45 Section 196 (2) Companies Act 2016. 
46 Section 18 (4) Armed Forces Act 1972, which however states that a recruiting officer shall not 
enlist any person under the age of seventeen and a half years without the written consent of his parents 
or of his guardian. 
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The assumption upon which the age-based criteria are set is on the basis that 
children lack the capacity to take responsibility for decisions and the minimum age 
requirement ensures that the child is protected. This of course rests on a further 
assumption that the adult’s perception of the child’s competence is the right one and 
that such an assumption is accurate. A final assumption made is that the needs of the 
child mysteriously cease or change when a child attains a specific age.  Clearly as seen 
in the section above, the age based criteria used in defining a ‘child’ leads to rather 
confusing positions.  
As briefly considered above, the minimum age of criminal responsibility in 
Malaysia (save where Islamic law is concerned) is set on an age-based criteria. Thus, 
the age of criminal responsibility as stated in the Section 82 and 83 of the Penal Code 
is ten. The code includes a doli incapax presumption, which states that children 
between ten and below twelve who have not shown sufficient maturity may be 
(emphasis added) absolved from criminality as well (of the Malaysian Penal Code). 
This means that children under ten cannot be arrested or charged with a crime. 
Children between twelve and seventeen can be arrested and taken to court if they 
commit a crime but, as discussed above, are entitled to be dealt with by youth courts. 
However as noted above, there can be complications particularly where the criminal 
offence involves a capital offence. 
As noted previously, the CRC does not prescribe a specific age for criminal 
liability, but merely states that the beginning of that age shall not be fixed at too low 
an age, and should be based on children’s emotional, mental and intellectual maturity. 
However, in considering the Malaysian context, the UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child in its concluding remarks noted with concern the low minimum age of 
criminal responsibility, which is ten years in the Penal Code. It also noted the 
discrepancies between the minimum age standards in the Penal Code, the 
interpretation of the Muslim jurists in the Syariah Court and the Syariah Criminal 
Procedure (Federal Territories) Act 1984 (United Nations, 2007a). 
Thus, a child as young as 12, who is said to be in need of special safeguards, care 
and assistance owing to his or her physical, mental and emotional immaturity, may 
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find themselves in the adult criminal justice system and subject to its most severe 
penalties. There is a greater risk that a child in conflict with the law who faces an adult 
administered criminal justice system can be exposed to severe emotional and 
psychological stress (Drizin and Leo, 2004).  As noted in Chapter 2, the basis of 
setting an arbitrary age of criminal responsibility is argued to lead to the ‘adultifying 
of children aged 10 years’ and a ‘mutation of justice’ (Goldson, 2013:126). 
There are variations across the globe in determining the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility. A 2011 report indicates that in at least 142 states, children may be 
taken to court for criminal acts at an age between 6 and 15 and of these, 31 states 
impose a minimum age of criminal responsibility at 7 (Melchiorre and Atkins, 2011). 
An alternative view suggested is to consider the principle enshrined in Article 5 in 
which the CRC acknowledges the ‘evolving capacities’ of the child which recognises 
that children will acquire competencies at different ages, and their acquisition of 
competencies will vary according to the environment and culture in differing life 
experiences. Acknowledging this recognises that children require ‘varying degrees of 
protection, participation and opportunity for autonomous decision-making in different 
contexts and across different areas of decision-making’ (Lansdown, 2005:3). 
Children in the juvenile justice system are not ‘just little adults nor is the world in 
which they live in the world of adults’ (McCord et al, 2001:15).  A similar view was 
expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Roper v. Simmons (543 U.S. 
551, 2005). In deciding that the sanction of capital punishment was unconstitutional47 
for crimes committed by individuals younger than 18 years of age, the court 
concluded that juveniles differ from adults in three significant ways.  
Firstly, on the basis that juveniles lack maturity and have an underdeveloped sense 
of responsibility that are not often found in adults and understandably so and these 
qualities often result in ‘impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.’ 
Secondly, juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and 
                                                 
47 For a brief review of the historical development of juvenile capital punishments in the United 
States, see Byrd, J. (2006). Constitutional law & (and) criminal law. University of Arkansas at Little 
Rock Law Review. 29(1):119-164. 
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outside pressures, including peer pressure owing to the fact that juveniles have less 
control, or less experience with control, over their own environment. Lastly, that the 
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult resulting in transitory 
personality traits and these factors taken together result in the diminished culpability 
of juveniles (per Justice Kennedy). 
Hence, there is a general move towards a higher age of criminal responsibility 
based on broader medico-legal perspectives recognising the concept of a development 
continuum understood through the development of neuroscience (Delmage, 2013). A 
singular test of capacity based on adult determined arbitrary age fails to engage with a 
variety of complex issues that make up the factors that influence a child’s behaviour, 
these include cognizance of the child’s stage of psychological development, and 
his/her lived experience (McDiarmid, 2013). This is particularly so since ‘the social 
brain and social cognition undergo a profound period of development in adolescence’ 
and this period represents a particularly sensitive period for the processing and 
acquisition of sociocultural knowledge (Blakemore and Mills, 2014:201). 
Much of this argument corresponds with neurological research that seeks to apply 
various technological advances to understand the adolescent brain. A range of studies 
(Furby and Beyth-Marom, 1992; Cauffman and Steinberg, 2000; Spear, 2000; Sowell, 
2003; Gogtay et al., 2004) indicate that the development of the human brain is organic 
and that organic development is most pronounced during adolescence. These studies 
connect the state of the development of the brain48 to corresponding behavioural or 
emotional tendencies unique to the adolescent which impact planning, decision 
making, impulse control or reasoning (Giedd, 2004). As the adolescent enters 
adulthood, there is evidence of pruning of areas in the frontal lobe (Sowell, 2001). 
Gardner & Steinberg, (2005) suggesting that fluctuations in the growth of the frontal 
lobe are likely to cause an adolescent to be lacking in foresight, have poor impulse 
control, to be driven by emotions, and be susceptible to peer pressure. Perhaps more 
importantly is the fact that an arbitrary age set ignores the fact that there are 
                                                 
48 Giedd describes these developments as ‘explosive’ (2004:83). 
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fundamental differences in brain activity between individuals (Mohr and Nagel, 
2010).  
A report by the Royal Society concludes that ‘it is clear that at the age of ten the 
brain is developmentally immature and continues to undergo important changes linked 
to regulating one’s own behaviour’ and that ‘the evidence of individual differences 
suggests that an arbitrary cut-off age may not be justifiable’ (Royal Society, 2011:14). 
Thus, the present age of criminal responsibility in Malaysia has a direct bearing on the 
notion of a child in conflict with the law and his/her engagement with the criminal 
justice system. There has been evidence to suggest that the majority of adolescents 
who engage in criminal behaviour will do so during adolescence and at no other 
period of their life, an ‘adolescence-limited’ behaviour (Moffitt, 1993:676). Thus, 
introducing diversionary strategies while still maintaining an arbitrary lower age of 
criminal responsibility, presents a philosophical paradox about dealing with a child in 
conflict with the law. 
 7.  Islam and criminal responsibility 
As alluded to in Chapter 2, Malaysia’s legal system facilitates the application of 
Islamic law or Syariah law. As a Federation of 13 States and three Federal Territories, 
each of the respective states administers Syariah laws and hence each State has its 
own specific laws that govern persons professing the religion of Islam.   
Notwithstanding the fact that the Child Act 2001 was enacted as the principal 
legislation governing children, a child in breach of Syariah law falls out of the 
application of the Act. Similarly, the Criminal Procedure Code which governs aspects 
of criminal law and process (for example, stop and search powers, arrest, search, bail 
etc.) does not apply when a child is in breach of Syariah laws as Syariah laws have 
specific provisions governing criminal procedure. A child in conflict with the Syariah 
law will be subjected to the Syariah courts, which have jurisdiction only over persons 
professing the religion of Islam.  
The duality of law and procedure is enshrined in the Constitution and by virtue of 
Item 1, List II of the State List, where specific areas in which States have the authority 
to pass laws over persons professing the religion of Islam have been listed.  Thus, 
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States have the jurisdiction inter alia for the creation of offences49 against precepts of 
that religion and punishment of persons professing the religion of Islam. Primarily 
these deal with Crimes punishable by hadd (the plural being hudud) that include 
crimes such as illicit sex, sodomy, homosexual behaviour, consumption of alcohol or 
even where a man impersonates a woman.50  
Hence, the application of Syariah law is based on each State having laws that 
determine the offences that are punishable under Syariah and a further set of laws in 
each state that determine the criminal procedure involved. (Emphasis added). This 
presents two discernible problems. 
The first is that there can be variances in the definition and scope of Islamic laws as 
applied in the 11 States and 3 Federal Territories. For example, none of the State laws 
that deal with offences defines a ‘child’ although all State laws, save three, merely 
refer to the child on the basis of exclusion of criminal liability for a child who has not 
yet attained puberty. In so far as criminal procedure under Syariah law, all States 
make no reference to a ‘child’ but the term ‘juvenile offender’ or ‘youthful offender’ 
is used.  (Emphasis added). A ‘youthful offender’ refers to a person above the age of 
ten and below the age of sixteen years save in the State of Perlis where the age is set 
as a person under the age of eighteen years. From the perspective of administering the 
law in Islam, this presents a problem particularly if one considers the possibility of 
criminal offences committed by a person aged 17 in more than one State. 
Secondly, there are contradictions in the manner in which the minimum age for 
criminal liability is determined between provisions of Syariah law as applied in the 
States and with that of other general criminal laws.  As considered in Chapter 2, that 
in so far as a Muslim child is concerned, where there is criminal offence committed 
                                                 
49 A private member’s Bill introduced in 2017, aims to amend the Syariah Courts (Criminal 
Jurisdiction) Act 1965 (Act 355) with a view to increasing the Syariah courts’ maximum sentencing 
limits to 30 years’ jail, RM100,000 fine and 100 strokes of the cane from the current maximum of three 
years’ jail, RM5,000 fine and six lashes.  
50 For example, Section 7 of the Syariah Criminal Code Enactment 1988 for the State of Kedah, 
states ‘any male person who, in any public place, wears woman’s attire and poses as a woman shall be 
guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding one thousand ringgit or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both.’ Similar provisions exist in all other 
States. A similar prohibition can be found in Deuteronomy 22:5 of the Old Testament. 
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under Islamic law, the child’s criminal liability is not determined by the minimum age 
requirement. It is dependent on the attainment of his or her puberty (baligh in the 
Malay language) and coupled with their capability to perceive and understand (Abiad 
and Mansoor, 2010) or is of sound mind and of free will. 
In their analysis of the provisions of the respective state Syariah laws, Yusof and 
Rahim (2014) identify significant differences in how puberty (baligh) is defined in the 
various State laws. The four approaches are:  
a. in a general sense, indicating that a child has attained puberty; 
b. when a person has attained the age of twelve qamariah (lunar) years; 
c. when a person is older than fifteen years; and 
d. where a person has attained puberty, and is of sound mind and of free will. 
The distinctions above suggest that defining criminal responsibility is not 
uniformly applied in the States and there appears to be a mix of arbitrary ages set, as 
well more generic approaches determined by the attainment of puberty. Puberty is 
deemed the point at which the child leaves childhood and enters adulthood and this 
determined by physical and sexual maturity. 
Hence, under Syariah law, physiological evidence of puberty for a male is 
determined by the ejaculation of sperm and for a female by the first menses she 
experiences. In the absence of these signs, puberty of a person will be determined 
according to his or her age. Muslim scholars however have different views in 
determining the appropriate age of puberty and there are a number of theological 
approaches that are relevant but as suggested in Chapter 2, documented evidence as to 
how this is resolved in Malaysia are not readily available for analysis.51 However in 
                                                 
51 The Daily Times in Pakistan reports the case of the Supreme Court requiring medical tests to be 
carried out in order to determine whether a 13-year old Hindu girl had attained puberty to rule on 





Malaysia’s response to the United Nations (United Nations, 2006) the conflicting 
interpretations by the following Muslim scholars were acknowledged as thus:  
a. According to the Hanafiyah, the age of puberty for both male and female is 15. 
b. According to Imam Abu Hanifah, the age of puberty for male is 18 and for 
female is 17. 
c. According to the Malikiyah, the age of puberty for both male and female is 18.  
d. According to the Syafi`iyah and the Hanabilah, the age of puberty for both 
male and female is 15 (2006:37). 
Suffice to say that the principal means of determining criminal responsibility as 
applied by Islamic law in Malaysia is reliant on physiological evidence coupled with 
the relevant age requirements being met. The challenge in applying this approach is 
that the onset of puberty is not universal in its occurrence in the life of a child. There 
is ample scientific evidence of disorders of puberty that are classified as early 
(precocious) or late puberty that cannot be easily established on the basis of purely 
physiological (or clinical) evidence but one that requires fairly complex biochemical 
assessments of puberty (Prentice and Williams, 2013) or the use of skeletal imaging 
(Diméglio et al, 2005). Thus, the mere manifestation of the physical symptoms of 
attaining puberty, are not by themselves sufficient to determine puberty. Further, there 
are broader emotional and psychological aspects that require consideration.  
The low age of criminal responsibility set under the general criminal provisions 
coupled with the reliance of puberty as an age determinant under Syariah law presents 
a problem in how the age of the child in conflict with the law is defined and 
interpreted. This notion of criminal responsibility also implies that girls under Islamic 
law may face the prospect of sanctions for breach earlier than boys and this then raises 
the issue of gender bias. 
Clearly, globally, there ‘has been a trend for countries around the world to raise 
their ages of criminal responsibility’ (Hazel, 2008: 32). The UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child (United Nations, 2007a) had recommended that Malaysia raise the 
age to at least 12 and recommended that Malaysia reviews its dual legal system (Civil 
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and Syariah) but given the complexity of the socio-political structure in Malaysia and 
the position of Islam in Malaysia, this has not been resolved. This conflict will likely 
remain even with the plan of introducing diversion and raises the issue of the extent to 
which the rights of the child have a place in this discourse. 
8. The concept of rights 
The development of the concept of rights is in tandem with the corresponding 
religious, cultural, philosophical and legal developments of human civilisation. It is 
therefore, inextricably connected with the development of socio-democratic traditions. 
There is ample historical evidence of the existence of rights in societies where systems 
of propriety and justice were established.52 Early expressions of the concept of rights 
rest upon the fundamental notion that ‘human rights are held by individuals simply 
because they are part of the human species’ (Ishay, 2004:3). The state of being human 
therefore implies that ‘human rights also are inalienable rights’ as one cannot cease 
being human, ‘no matter how badly one behaves or how barbarously one is treated’ 
(Donnelly, 2013:10). 
In its early contemporary manifestations, the concept of rights emerged as the 
expression of political will natural to man.  These early concepts of rights built upon 
the theoretical foundations of Paine, Locke and Montesquieu among others formed the 
basis for transnational concepts of human rights as witnessed in the American 
Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789. By the 20th 
century, the concept of rights had evolved as a moral, political and legal framework 
that espouses philosophical idealism.  
Thus, following the turmoil of the Second World War, the Preamble to the Charter 
of the United Nations affirms the post-war world order’s belief in ‘fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men 
and women and of nations large and small.’ The Universal53 Declaration recognises 
                                                 
52 These range from The Hindu Vedas, the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, the Bible, the Quran 
(Koran), and the writings of Confucius (Ishay, 2004:7). 
53 Whether such rights are capable of being ‘universal’ remain a contested matter and forms much 
of the debate surrounding cultural relativism and Western hegemony explored below. 
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civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. An analysis of the concept of 
rights primarily involves understanding both the form and substance of rights. 
(Emphasis added). 
Hohfeld’s (1913) analysis sought to describe the form that the concept of rights 
took. Thus, Hohfeld’s analysis therefore argues that rights, duties, privileges, no-
rights, power, immunity, disability, and liability are correlative concepts. These 
concepts interplay between each other in a scheme of opposites and correlatives. As 
such, a person’s rights would correspondingly involve an application of duties and 
each individual is situated in this complex matrix of relationships. The concept of 
rights therefore cannot be viewed in isolation from other varying but equally 
important concepts.  Hohfeld identified four types of rights, and these are claim rights, 
liberty rights or privileges, powers or abilities, and finally, immunities. These rights 
are only intended as conceptual tools and therefore arguably are not subject to 
criticism on the basis that they do not explain our legal understanding of particular 
rights.  
In spite of that view, there have been a number of differing views on the Holfeldian 
analysis of rights. For example, Neil MacCormick (1977) suggested that a right-holder 
rather than just being a generalised beneficiary of the rules was the intended 
beneficiary of a specific share of benefit. (Emphasis added). Joseph Raz (1986:189), 
argues that the interest of the right-holder or an aspect of them, are sufficient enough a 
reason for imposing duties on others either not to interfere with the performance of 
some action, or to secure the right-holder in something. These criticisms challenged 
the form or structure of the concept of rights. 
In the broader context of analysing the substance of rights, particularly those that 
impact children, two principal theoretical accounts emerged. The Will theory also 
known as the choice theory as propagated by Hart (1982), suggests that a fundamental 
feature of rights is that allows rights-holders to assert a level of control over another 
person’s duty akin to that of a ‘small scale sovereign’ (1982:183). This then implies 
that the rights holder has free choice to insist upon their rights, or to waive them.  A 
complication that arises from this line of thinking is that children (at least young ones) 
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cannot be bearers of rights, as they lack the capacity to claim or waive them 
(Campbell, 1992). In Campbell’s view, the Will theory is ‘inadequate as an expression 
of the moral significance of persons, particularly children’ (1992:1).  
However, Hart argues that the Will theory does recognise children are rights–
holders, albeit represented by others such as their parents or other guardians until they 
reach maturity (Hart, 1982). 
Neil MacCormick (1982) in his study suggests that the existence of a right precedes 
the imposition of a duty. It is because children have a right to be cared for and 
nurtured that parents have the duty to care for them (emphasis added). Therefore, 
children do have rights, irrespective of their ability to waive or claim them. The 
alternative view, identified as the Interest theory (MacCormick, 1982, Raz, 1986, 
Campbell, 1992) suggests that children, as humans, have rights if their interests are the 
basis for having rules, which require others to behave in certain ways with respect to 
these rules. The Will theory is thus inappropriate and should be rejected because of its 
inability to account for children’s rights (MacCormick 1982, 157–165). 
Freeman (1992) argues that the Will Theory is an inadequate explanation of the 
basis of children’s rights, since children who still lack the capacity to form a will are 
not in a position to assert these rights at all. As Freeman points out, children have 
interests that justify protection before they develop wills to assert their rights. 
(Emphasis added). 
Another approach is to avoid making the dichotomous division between the Will 
and the Interest theory (or for that matter between rights and needs). Wolfson (1992) 
suggests treating capability as a continuum, gradually moving from welfare rights to 
freedoms. 
A child is in need of protection because they are deemed to be ‘not yet human 
beings’ (Verhellen, 1993:358) or ‘adults in waiting’ (Matthews and Limb, 1998:67) 
and such a view of the child represented the welfare perspective of children, a 




The opposite spectrum to this philosophical debate suggests that children are 
autonomous subjects (King, 2007) competent and capable of holding human rights of 
their own. This philosophical debate framed much of the development of the notion of 
child rights, particularly in the development of the international framework. 
A range of criticisms emerged on the very notion or substance of rights itself. 
These include among others, broad criticisms on rights, feminist perspectives on the 
limitations of the rights discourse, postmodernist cynicism, communitarian challenges 
and cultural relativism perspectives (Tushnet, 1984; Perry, 1984; Smart, 2002; 
Faraday, 1994; Olsen, 1984; Gaete, 1993; Ignatieff, 2001; Hutchinson and Monahan, 
1984 among others). These criticisms focussed particularly on the individualistic and 
adversarial nature of rights, the view that the rights discourse is empty rhetoric 
concealing unjust distributions of power. Critics also argue that rights are 
indeterminate, intellectually incoherent, and therefore unhelpful in resolving actual 
conﬂicts.  Steiner et al (2008) suggest that human rights protected in international 
treaties are invariably vague and ambiguous and that this malady is most acute with 
respect to economic, social, and cultural rights. These perspectives find resonance in 
the human rights debate in Malaysia and will be explored below, particularly in 
Chapter 6. 
Notwithstanding the theoretical disputes and vagueness regarding the concept of 
rights, the international arena has demonstrated a historical commitment to the issue 
of rights as reflected in the various international instruments and treaties that have 
appeared in the 20th century. 
Higgins (1999) attributes this infusion of rights in the international sphere to the 
vagueness of international human rights in itself. Thus, the language of rights is open 
to a varied and open textured interpretation, which then serves as a means to pursue 
aspirational goals. International human rights therefore have the means to transform 
whole societies encouraging collective mobilization rather than individual claims. 
Higgins suggests that to respond to diversity in identities and cultures the 
‘personhood’ and the needs of various types of individuals, with the full range of 
cultural, gender and geographic diﬀerences need to be addressed (Higgins 1999:245) 
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and this of course includes children. The application of the form and substance of the 
concept of rights can be gleaned from the evolution of the various treaty provisions 
involving children. 
The Geneva Declaration 1924 regarded children as ‘objects’ that need protection, 
rather than individuals with personal rights. For example, the fourth principle of the 
Geneva Declaration provides that, ‘the child must be put in a position to earn a 
livelihood and must be protected (emphasis added) against every form of 
exploitation.’ 
The more detailed Declaration of the Rights of the Child 1959 regarded children as 
subjects to their own legal rights but still addressed only the protective aspect of 
children’s rights.  Thus, the Preamble to the Declaration highlights children’s need for 
special care and protection, ‘including appropriate legal protection, before as well as 
after birth.’ 
As is clear, both these documents focussed on the rights of children to special 
measures of care and protection and thus dealt, in fact, with children’s welfare. The 
notion of children’s freedoms and autonomy had not been speciﬁcally acknowledged 
yet. Article 24(1) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 also alludes to 
this by providing that a child shall have, ‘the right to such measures of protection as 
are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.’ 
Similarly, Article 10 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 1966 provided that, ‘special measures of protection and assistance should be 
taken on behalf of all children.’ 
With the adoption of the CRC, the approach taken was to strike a ‘balance between 
viewing the child as the object of caretaking who requires various services and 
protections from adults and the rights of the child to act fully in his or her capacity as 
a person’ (Fass, 2011:18). Thus, the CRC recognises that children have civil, political, 
economic, social, health, and cultural rights. Perhaps fundamentally as well, the CRC 
through Article 12 acknowledges the right of the child to be heard directly or 
indirectly through a representative in any administrative or judicial proceeding 
affecting the child. 
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The flurry of states ratifying the CRC led to the need to review state policies on the 
treatment of children and the philosophical basis for which existing laws and policies 
that are applicable to the child. Academic discourse centred primarily on the debate as 
to determining whether a child is capable of having rights. 
The CRC is the most ratified of all the treaties on human rights and implies an 
array of important changes in the social group of childhood. The governments that 
approved the CRC committed themselves to allowing children to develop their 
potential in a context without hunger, poverty, violence, negligence or other injustices 
or hardships, respecting at the same time their civil, economic, social, cultural and 
political rights. It also encompasses provisions guaranteeing respect for the child’s 
identity, self-determination and participation. Countries are legally bound to honour 
children’s rights, and this yields an opportunity to initiate public dialogue and action 
on behalf of young children (Arnold, 2004:4). 
Thus, the treaty came to endorse, for the first time, the idea that the child as a being 
in possession of rights and of fundamental liberties. It recognises every child as the 
bearer of his or her own human rights. These rights are not derived from or dependent 
upon rights of parents or any other adult. This is the foundation for both the concepts 
of emancipation and of empowerment of the child. 
9. A child rights-based approach? 
UNICEF does not have a specific definition of a ‘child rights-based’ approach. It 
elects to apply a broader view and thus refers instead to a ‘human rights-based’ 
approach to programming. Thus, diversion and alternatives should comply with the 
rights set out in the CRC and other human rights instruments (this is not limited to 
Articles 37(b) and 40, but all articles). As such, the child must be seen as a complete 
human being, not just in terms of the juvenile justice label (UNICEF, 2007b). 
International rights standards, for example the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) have also increasingly formed the basis of legal challenges brought by 
children. Many of the successful claims have invoked applying what Ferguson (2013) 
refers to as ‘rights for children.’  Ferguson argues that the concept of ‘rights for 
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children’ are to be understood from the perspective of fundamental human rights, in 
which case children are plainly rights-holders (2013:181). 
Ferguson distinguishes ‘rights for children’ with ‘children’s rights’ to which she 
refers to as ‘a class of rights that includes both rights targeted specifically at children 
and rights in relation to which the identity of the right-holder, who happens to be a 
child’ (2013:178). 
A reason attributed to the importance of rights is the social value attached to it. 
Freeman describes this value in terms of the dignity of the rights-holder and thus 
‘rights are important because they recognise the respect the bearers are entitled to. To 
accord rights is to respect dignity: to deny rights is to cast doubt on humanity and 
integrity’ (2007:7). This principle is seen in Article 40(1) of the CRC, in which 
countries are urged to ‘recognize the right of every child … to be treated in a manner 
consistent with the promotion of the child’s sense of dignity and worth.’ It has also 
been suggested that any theory of rights that fails to accommodate children’s rights 
must be deficient in some manner (MacCormick, 1976).  
The norms surrounding the notion of ‘rights of the child’ have a direct bearing on 
understanding the basis in which the Malaysian juvenile justice system is framed and 
the manner in which children are treated within that framework. Clearly, there are 
issues with reconciling philosophical issues that determine the child’s status qua 
offender and his/her status as a child. The age of criminal responsibility, the use of 
harsh sentencing and the use of detention and the apparent lack of non-detention 
approaches in the system are perhaps indicative of perceived shortcomings in the 
Malaysian juvenile justice system. It is also perhaps indicative of the extent in which 
the system embraces the notion of a rights-based youth justice system that preserves a 
child’s foundational rights. 
Hollingsworth (2013) argues that ‘an essential component of a rights-based penal 
system for children is that it should not irreparably or permanently harm the child’s 
foundational rights’ (2013:1046).   Such harm she argues can be avoided through 
lower sentences, different types of punishment and alternative guiding principles ‘not 
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because children are less culpable, but because of the impact on their development as 
fully autonomous individuals’ (2013:1067).  
Thus, for Hollingsworth, foundational rights are ‘an attempt to highlight the child’s 
special status as a ‘becoming’ rights-holder’ (2013:1061). This then facilitates what 
Buss considers as a focus on ‘what we want children to become and how we might 
help them get there’ (as cited in Hollingsworth, 2013: 1061).   
In this context, the application of a rights-based argument for diversion seeks to 
discover the extent to which Malaysia recognises the notion of foundational rights and 
further, whether the failure to introduce diversion through the amended Child Act 
ignores the foundational rights of the child to develop as fully autonomous 
individuals. Thus, while the existence of these rights, at least as a political, and 
sometimes legal, aspirational goal, are in place, the actual workings of the juvenile 
justice system appear to be inconsistent with this. 
10. The Malaysian position on rights 
The framers of the Malaysian constitution elected to describe the concept of 
‘rights’ as concepts of ‘fundamental liberties’. (Emphasis added). The distinction is 
not without argument particularly in the context of the American jurisprudence where 
distinctions are made between civil rights and civil liberties (Delgado, 2004). For 
present purposes, it may be best to conclude that the Malaysian position appears to be 
one in which these phrases appear to be used interchangeably. 
These bundles of liberties are found in Articles 5-13, Part II of the Constitution and 
include the right to life and personal liberty; freedom from slavery and forced labour; 
protection against retrospective laws and repeated trials; equality provisions; freedom 
of movement; freedom of speech, assembly and association; freedom of religion; 
rights in respect to education and the right to property. In 2001, the constitution was 
amended to include gender equality. The Malaysian constitution is silent on matters of 
equality in relation to disability, pregnancy or sexual orientation.  
While these fundamental liberties are provided for in the constitution, these rights 
are not absolute and hence are subject to limitations. For example, while there is a 
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right to life and personal liberty, such rights are subject to the law.  Parliament may 
also by law impose on the rights conferred such restrictions as it deems necessary or 
expedient in the interest of the security of the Federation. Thus, for example while one 
has the right to life, such a right is subject to the provision of section 302 of the Penal 
Code which declares that ‘whoever commits murder shall be punished with death.’   
The death penalty and other limitations on the freedom of expression and 
association and the power of the state to restrict such freedoms in the interest of 
national security places a restriction on Malaysia’s obligations arising from 
international treaties and conventions.  
These include those reservations expressed in relation to the United Nations 
Declaration on Human Rights 1948 (UDHR), Convention against the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women 1979 (CEDAW) as well as those relevant to the CRC. 
In the recent Universal Periodic Review (United Nations, 2013) Malaysia expressed, 
its commitment to progressively review reservations made with a view to withdrawal 
of reservations where appropriate. 
Judicial approaches to interpreting these rights have been restrictive. The Federal 
Constitution empowers the courts to declare invalid legislative and executive action 
that are inconsistent with the Constitution.  However, the Malaysian judiciary in 
several decisions54 has ‘adopted a strict legalist and literalist approach, marked by 
insularity and an unwillingness to contemplate fundamental underlying principles’ 
(Tew, 2016: 695). The courts have tended to defer extensively to the political 
branches exercising little meaningful review over government intrusions on 
fundamental liberties. Tew (2016) attributes this phenomenon to the strong dominance 
that the ruling party has over the executive and executive dominance of the legislative 
chamber.  
                                                 
54 Tew (2016) cites examples of this restrictive judicial interpretative approach in: Titular Roman 
Catholic Archbishop of Kuala Lumpur v. Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2014] 6 CLJ 541, State 
Government of Negeri Sembilan & Ors v. Muhammad Jazaili Mohd Khamis & Ors [2015] CLJ. 13, 
Public Prosecutor v. Azmi Sharom [2015] MLJU 594, ZI Publications Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Kerajaan 
Negeri Selangor [2016] 1 MLJ 153. 
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As such, the context in which rights in Malaysia are applied is that while the 
underlying philosophical basis is built upon broad notions of liberties to determine the 
limits of governmental action, the political reality is starkly different. Any reference to 
the concept of rights is limited to the basic idea of rights and as such do not include 
the full range of positive rights, for example economic, social and cultural rights. 
(Emphasis added). These rights have been incorporated through obligations imposed 
via the various treaty/convention provisions and are not expressly stated in the 
constitution. Ancillary legislative provisions have been enacted to complement the 
gaps in the constitution and to introduce some measure of economic, social and 
cultural rights. However, there is merit in making the claim that the state must fulfil its 
duty in protecting and guaranteeing those rights. (Emphasis added). There is also a 
claim that the judiciary must assert greater control over increasing legislative and 
executive erosion of human rights. As suggested by Harding (2012) the Malaysian 
paradox is that ‘it exhibits the fundamental rights mechanisms and rhetoric, but these 
are sporadically applied and habitually restricted in scope’ (2012:21). 
 11. The Convention and the notion of rights in Malaysia 
The implementation of the Child Act 2001, was a means to reconcile the 
expectations of the CRC with domestic laws but, as considered above, issues 
impacting on child rights remain, for example the application of the mandatory death 
sentence, the indeterminacy in life imprisonment convictions or that a child can still 
be caned and whipped. The existing provisions in the law that restrict freedom of 
association, expression or those that permit preventative detention without trial or the 
plurality of Islamic laws and secular law being applied in so far as a child is concerned 
also appear to be incongruent with the CRC. This, it appears, is a common problem. 
Hathaway (2002) suggests that ratification is sometimes seen as a meaningless signal, 
with little or no impact on state behaviour.  
Furthermore, the underlying philosophy of the CRC is premised on the element of 
protection and the recognition that the child has the right to participate (Article 12) 
and hence arguably is capable of having rights. As such, states are under an obligation 
to ensure that in both practice and policy, this philosophical aspiration was to be 
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achieved. The CRC acknowledges the significance of developmental psychology and 
the pedagogical evolution of the child for the application of the rights-based 
philosophy and this is achieved through the recognition of the concept of a child’s 
evolving capacities as enshrined in Article 5. 
As was noted in Chapter 2, Malaysia had initially entered reservations to CRC 
Articles 1, 2, 7, 13, 14, 15, 28(1)(a) and 37 on the basis that these do not conform with 
the Constitution, Syariah laws, national laws and policies of the government of 
Malaysia (UNICEF, 2014). 
At this stage, plans to introduce diversion, in compliance with the CRC, appears to 
be driven by state interests, in the mould of the realist interpretation of treaty 
compliance. This view suggests that the states’ interests ‘provides the spring of action; 
the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; calculation 
based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state’s 
interest [which is the preservation and strengthening of the state]’ (Waltz, 1979: 117).   
Shor (2008) suggests that ‘norm-violating governments conform to human rights 
norms only when it is in their self-interest to comply with external pressures’ 
(2008:119). Arguably, this appears to be the case given Malaysia’s punitive system 
and various other restrictions on rights in general. However, from a Malaysian 
perspective, there also appears to be other variables that have resulted in treaty 
obligations and these include the reputational costs (associated with compliance), 
pressure from domestic non-governmental organisations and the socialization and 
ideological conversion of public officials, particularly those directly involved in 
operational aspects of the CRC. 
This is further compounded by the lack of enforceability as far as treaty obligations 
are concerned. By virtue of Articles 43-54, a Committee on the Rights of the Child is 
established and State parties undertake to submit to the Committee periodic reports on 
the ‘measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognised . . . and on 
the progress made on the enjoyment of those rights.’  
The Committee (or for that matter the General Assembly) does not have the power 
to impose punitive measures against offending States but may make ‘suggestions and 
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general recommendations’ Further as can be seen, State parties may enter reservations 
and in the case of Malaysia (and many other State parties) may also provide 
assurances of broad intentions to comply. It is also evident from the preceding 
discussion, there are also differences of perception in particular between State 
agencies and ‘other competent bodies’ (the norm is to seek the views of various 
agencies or NGOs operating in the State concerned) invited to participate in this 
process.  
Governmental responses have always been to highlight measures taken and on 
providing assurances, where needed, that inadequacies are being resolved. Often, a 
more critical or cynical view is adopted by the NGO’s consulted. Perhaps from a 
Malaysian perspective, the positive development through the implementation of the 
CRC through domestic legislation is the inter-agency report that was undertaken by 
the Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development and UNICEF to study 
the juvenile justice system and the corresponding changes that were introduced. 
Thus, the Convention presents difficulties in ensuring efficient cooperation and 
uniformity in application among member States. However, as has been considered, 
Malaysia is not alone in its stance in not being able to give its full approval to the 
CRC provisions. A number of African, Arab and Asian countries have adopted similar 
positions and a primary argument raised was on the perceived western and hegemonic 
spirit of the Convention and therefore felt it necessary to introduce charters of their 
own. For example, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(ACRWC) 1999 or The Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004. As of November 2013, 
13 states have since ratified the Arab Charter (De Schutter, 2014:33). 
Furthermore, in the absence of a supranational authority to police compliance and 
to demand action at various levels, there is a gap between the expectations of the 
Convention and national implementation. 
Freeman (2000) suggests that a plausible reason for the gap between the 
Convention and practice is the view from the left, citing for example the views of 
Tushnet (1984, 1992). This view suggests that owing to the vague and indeterminate 
meaning afforded to the concept of rights, those who wield power can manipulate the 
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meaning of ‘rights’ as they wish. As such, the language of rights undermines efforts to 
accomplish genuine social changes by diverting attention from the real abuses, the 
imbalance of power, economic disparities, social oppression, and focuses instead on 
symbolic abstractions. Freeman (2000) also points to attacks from the right and from 
communitarism arguing that for both, there are ‘too many rights’ and ‘too few 
responsibilities’ (citing for example Etzioni, 1993). Arguably, the Malaysian position 
is fraught with these symbolic abstractions and yet this again is not unique within the 
contested notion of the perceived universality of rights. 
The Malaysian juvenile justice system, has, mirrored the evolution of international 
perspectives on child rights. In the era where children held no fundamental rights 
under the law, the Malaysian justice system did not have a separate system of justice 
for juveniles. At the time when children were considered a separate and special class 
of immature persons in need of State protection, these welfare principles were echoed 
in the Children Enactment 1922 and the subsequently enacted Juveniles Court Act of 
1947.  However, subsequent global developments in child rights did not find its way 
into Malaysia.  
From a philosophical perspective, the Malaysian juvenile justice system placed less 
emphasis on children’s rights, and instead focused on accountability and principles of 
punishment. Similar experiences in finding a balance between contrasting 
philosophical views exist in other countries that share a common historical connection 
with British colonial exploits, for example in India and Singapore (Saibaba, 2012). 
Gray’s analysis of the position in Hong Kong, another former British colony, suggests 
that the challenge is in finding the balance between contrasting philosophical 
traditions of punishment, justice, and welfare. Such a balance, Gray suggests, has 
rarely been achieved in Western jurisdictions or in Hong Kong for that matter (Gray, 
1996). These philosophical challenges therefore complicate arguments about the rights 
of the child. 
In jurisdictions that have a written constitution, there is a basis to argue that the 
rights of the child in conflict with the law can find further support from the rights 
defined in the constitution and as interpreted by the courts. For example, the Indian 
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Constitution (Articles 15(3), 21A, 23 and 47) has specific provisions on child labour 
and special laws for children. 
The position in the United States reflects a paradox of envisioning of child rights. 
Having refrained from ratifying the Convention, there are many aspects of child rights 
that are argued to be governed by broad judicial interpretations of constitutional 
rights. Yet, children in conflict with the law encounter adult-like treatment that is 
incongruous with the CRC and ‘many terrible things happen to children in the United 
States today, and the Constitution has not proven to be effective in addressing these 
evils’ (Guggenheim, 2006:44). 
  In recent years, there has been some judicial response to the issue of child rights 
and incarceration. In Graham v. Florida 560 U. S. (2010), the United States Supreme 
Court issued a historic ruling that life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted 
of non-homicide offences, unconstitutional.  In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy 
explained that the decision ‘gives all juvenile non-homicide offenders a chance to 
demonstrate maturity and reform. The juvenile should not be deprived of the 
opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of human worth and 
potential.’  
Similarly, in Miller v. Alabama 567 U. S. (2012), the Court struck down statutes in 
29 states that provide for mandatory life-without-parole sentences for children, on the 
basis that a such a provision contravenes a foundational principle that the ‘imposition 
of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they 
were not children.’ 
In Montgomery v. Louisiana 577 U.S. (2016), the court ruled that the Miller 
decision applies retroactively. For juveniles, a mandatory life sentence without the 
possibility of parole is unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy, writing for a 6-3 majority, 
noted that the Court in Roper, Graham, and Miller found that children are 
constitutionally different from adults in their level of culpability as they lack maturity 
and a sense of responsibility compared to adults. 
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The Malaysian constitution is a written one. However, it does not afford any 
specific rights to a child. Further, as noted above, neither does it contain any provision 
on the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
Article 5(1) of the Malaysian Federal Constitution provides that ‘[n]o person shall 
be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law.’ The exception 
to the provision facilitates the application of statutory limitations to the freedom to life 
and personal liberty. This includes the various capital punishment provisions that are 
applied as far as children in conflict with the law are concerned as well as those that 
allow the child to be detained for an indeterminate period, almost akin to the life-
without-parole sentences in the United States. These underlying issues have resulted 
in Malaysia expressing reservations to a number of provisions of the CRC notably 
Article 37.  
While the principles enshrined in the constitution are applicable in a general sense 
to children, as was previously noted, Malaysia’s approach to juvenile justice 
functioned based on treating children as objects of concern, reflected in the formal 
police and court-based interventions and institution-based structures and the statutory 
provisions that governed juvenile justice. The implementation of the Child Act 2001, 
while bringing with it an attempt to reconcile the expectations of the CRC with 
domestic laws did not adequately fulfil all aspects of the spirit of the convention.   
Thus, while Malaysia has ratified the treaty, introduced changes in the law and 
policies affecting a child in conflict with the law and while it is still likely to reform 
the law, ‘gaps between law and practice are often vast’ (Dusuki, 2012: 205).  At 
another level, the multiplicity of issues that are inconsistent with the philosophical 
basis of the CRC creates gaps in the idealism espoused by the convention and the 
actual workings of the criminal justice system, particularly those that affect the child 
in conflict with the law. The effect is that the child in conflict with the law in Malaysia 
is caught in a ‘rights gap’ with restrictive domestic laws at one end of the spectrum 
and broad right-based notions as expressed in the Convention at the other end. More 
pertinently, the child is not likely to be aware that this gap exists. 
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This is not a phenomenon peculiar to Malaysia. Since the inception of the CRC in 
the United Kingdom there has been a series of challenges in implementing the CRC 
with Smith suggesting that ‘little has changed in recent years to enhance the rights of 
children and young people’ (Smith, 2011:146). The situation is not very different in 
Canada with Denov commenting that ensuring ‘the provisions of the CRC are taken 
seriously requires political will, government commitment and strong public support 
for the implementation of children’s rights’ (Denov, 2004:17). 
Realistically governments face challenges in giving adequate time, resources and 
energy to addressing children’s rights. The child rights agenda is in competition with 
other government priorities and restricted financial resources. The experience in other 
jurisdictions demonstrate conflicting policy struggles where ‘discourses of child 
protection, restoration, punishment, public protection, responsibility, justice, 
rehabilitation, welfare, retribution, diversion, human rights, and so on, intersect and 
circulate in a perpetually uneasy and contradictory motion’ (Goldson and Muncie, 
2009: vii). Clearly, this underscores the view that claims are being made for children’s 
rights even though there are unresolved conflicts of a philosophical nature and if these 
conflicts are not adequately resolved, it is likely that the rights of the child will remain 
an empty and illusory concept. 
12. Islam and Child Rights in Malaysia 
Special prominence is given to Islam in the Malaysian Federal Constitution. As has 
already been considered, matters of the Islamic faith are dealt primarily by state laws 
as enacted within the Federation. Islam affords a child a range of rights and these are 
primarily those that deal with the well-being of the child. These include for example 
the right to education, health care or even gender equality. Thus, states are reminded 
of the importance of ‘parliamentary endorsement and ratification of international 
conventions, treaties and agreements pertaining to the rights of children, followed by 
the state’s adherence of such agreements, provided they do not contravene with the 
correct understanding of Shariah’ (UNICEF, 2005:11). The primary approach is to 
treat children as objects of concern and this is well represented in policies and 
approaches adopted by the administration of Muslims in Malaysia. 
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However, as has been considered above, the issue of the age of criminal 
responsibility remains a matter of concern, as there is a divergence in theoretical 
approaches towards determining the issue of age. A further socio-cultural issue 
considered was corporal punishment. 
In its report, Inhuman sentencing of children in Malaysia, (Child Rights 
International Network, 2013) CRIN stated that 19 girls and boys were sentenced to 
whipping under Syariah law and 19 were carried out under Syariah law across the 
same period.55  Corporal punishment is thus a lawful sentence under Islamic law for 
males and unlike the provisions of the Child Act 2001, for females also.  
For example, the Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997 
identifies the punishment of whipping of up to six strokes for the offences of false 
doctrine, incest, prostitution, homosexual acts and other sex offences.56 The Act 
applies to children (males or females) who have attained the age of puberty according 
to Islamic law (Articles 2 and 51) and this amplifies the differing standards in the 
application of the laws applicable to children in conflict with the law, particularly 
where the application of Islamic law is concerned.  
In so far as, imprisonment of children under Islamic Law is concerned, Section 2 of 
the Syariah Criminal Procedure (Federal Territory) Act 1997 provides for the age of 
youthful offender as ‘an offender above the age of ten and below the age of sixteen 
years.’ Any Muslim child who is above the age of ten is presumed to have the ability 
to understand the nature of the act committed but the child lacks the understanding of 
legal consequences of such act. Thus, the legislation provides for such category of 
person not to be punished by imprisonment. 
While females are not whipped under the Penal Code57 or under the earlier Child 
Act 2001, pursuant to Islamic law this is permitted. For example, in 2009, a 32-year-
old was sentenced to receive six strokes from a rattan cane after admitting in an 
                                                 
55 Whipping was also a permissible form of punishment under the Child Act 2001 but was limited 
only to males. The Child (Amendment) Act 2016 has since abolished this. 
56 See Articles 4, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25 and 26. 
57 However, the mandatory death sentence applicable for drug trafficking makes no distinction 
between males or females. 
108 
 
Islamic court to the crime of drinking beer in a bar58 (Ahmed, 2009). In 2010, three 
women were caned under Islamic law for committing adultery. This was reported to 
be the country’s first-ever case involving flogging of women59 (Anis, 2010).  
Recent amendments to the Child Act did not address the issue of corporal 
punishment but abolished judicial administered caning in court. From a Malaysian 
perspective, the confluence between child rights and Islam extend to socio-religious 
practices that include acceptance of child brides considered above or female genital 
mutilation practices.60 These issues bring to the fore the difficulty in applying a 
universal concept of rights in a culturally diverse world. 
13. Diversion in the youth justice system 
Diversion is ‘an attempt to divert, or channel out, youthful offenders from the 
juvenile justice system’ (Bynum and Thompson, 1996:430). The channelling of 
children away from the formal justice system is achieved through alternative 
procedures and programmes.  Diversion therefore involves ‘strategies developed in 
the youth justice system to prevent young people from committing crime or to ensure 
that avoid formal court action and custody if they are arrested and prosecuted’ 
(Muncie, 2004:307). Ancillary to this is the need to ensure that this is done without 
necessarily fully absolving them of culpability for their actions and where possible, to 
also offer elements of supportive interventions within existing conventional 
correctional systems (Beck et al., 2006; Goldson, 2000). 
Underlying the concept of diversion is the view that processing children in conflict 
with the law through the juvenile justice system may do more harm than good 
                                                 
58 This was subsequently commuted to a three-week community service at a children’s home by the 
Ruler of the State. 
59 Enactment No. 8 of the Syariah Criminal Procedure Enactment 2002 in Pahang (a state within 
the Federation) specifies that the whipping rod shall be not more than 1.22 meters and its thickness not 
more than 1.25 centimetres. The person ‘shall use the whipping rod with average force without lifting 
his hand over his head so that the offender’s skin is not cut and that the offender shall wear clothes 
according as per the expectations of Islam.’ 
60 Isa et al (1996) in their study of 262 Muslim women found that a form of female circumcision is 
practiced in the State of Kelantan. The authors argue that the term ‘female genital mutilation’ would 
therefore be a misnomer in the Malaysian context. Recently the Health Ministry claimed that FGM is a 




(Lundman, 1993). Thus, a formal court process may stigmatize some children for 
having committed relatively petty acts and as such society creates the criminal by 
labelling certain acts as deviant and treating individuals who commit those acts as 
outsiders, (Becker, 1963).  Such labelling Lemert (1951) argues, leads to secondary 
deviance as the offender internalizes this behaviour. Here Lemert illustrates this with 
the ‘errant schoolboy’ example (1951:275). The offender now behaves in accordance 
with the label that society has affixed (Schur, 1971). A further argument put forward 
was that in matters of delinquency, a policy of radical non-intervention should be 
adopted (Schur, 1965). Notwithstanding the view that non-intervention can be 
perceived as ‘benign neglect’ or ‘simply doing nothing’ (Cohen, 1988:198) a number 
of reasons have been put forward to argue the basis of diversion as an alternative to 
formal court proceedings.  
In part, diversion ameliorates the problem of overburdened juvenile courts and 
overcrowded prison facilities, so that courts and institutions can focus on more serious 
offenders. This then has the dual effect of helping to ease financial constraints on the 
system (Levin, 2010). Most juvenile crime is limited to a particular episode and hence 
deemed transitory and the argument being that young people will most likely grow out 
of offending behaviour over time as they mature (Cunneen and White, 2002). Further, 
diversion has been associated with reduction in recidivism (Goldson, 2000).  
A study involving young men in Canada found that involvement in the formal 
aspects of the juvenile justice system increased the likelihood of subsequent 
engagement with the adult criminal justice system. The particular study established 
that the greater the intensity of, and the more restrictive, the intervention, the greater 
will be the negative impacts later in life, particularly its impact on criminal activity 
(Gatti et al, 2009).  
In fact, studies have shown that young people who are diverted away from the 
criminal justice system experience lower levels of recidivism compared to those who 
are dealt with by the courts (Goldson, 2000) and this has been established in other 
jurisdictions for example in Australia (Cunningham, 2007).  
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Although an overview of studies done in Canada, yielded mixed results as far as 
the rate of recidivism is concerned (Wilson and Hoge, 2013).  However, perhaps more 
importantly, diversion facilitates the opportunity for children to have access to and 
receive appropriate intervention strategies away from the formal juvenile justice 
system (Beck et al., 2006). 
Diversion primarily operates at three levels: 
1. Crime prevention strategies, which aim to prevent young people becoming 
involved in criminal activity in the first instance; 
2. Diversionary schemes which aim to divert young offenders away from the 
criminal justice system as early as possible; and 
3. Sentencing options which aim to divert young people away from custodial 
sentences (Polk 2003; Polk et al 2003). 
This study initially sought to explore the second and third level of diversion — 
those practices that divert young people early in the justice process, particularly prior 
to formal court intervention and those strategies that aim to avoid custodial 
sentencing. However, as noted in Chapter 1, conversations with stakeholders led to 
blurring of these theoretical concepts and as such the application of diversion in 
practice, yields a measure of uncertainty. This is considered in Chapters 5 and 6. 
The principle that the child be accorded the right to such interventions has found 
their way into international jurisprudence through United Nations, UNICEF and other 
agencies and as such, there is an attempt to bring member states in line with a singular 
global standard of universal application. Whether this in itself is desirable or even 
attainable will be considered in this research but suffice to say the approach has been 
to encourage member states to abide by these global standards of youth justice. 
However, the reality is that while the CRC has been frequently described as the most 
ratified human rights convention in the world, it is also lamentably the most violated 
(Muncie, 2008).  
Article 40(3)(b) of the CRC requires States parties to promote the establishment of 
measures for dealing with children in conflict with the law without resorting to 
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judicial proceedings, provided that human rights and legal safeguards are fully 
respected. The Beijing Rules through Rule 11.4 recommends the provision of viable 
alternatives to juvenile justice processing in the form of community-based diversion. 
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in interpreting article 40(1) of the CRC 
suggests that such alternatives should not be limited to children who commit minor 
offences (United Nations, 2007b). 
As early as 1989, New Zealand introduced its Children, Young Persons and Their 
Families Act 1989 in which the goals and values underpinning the system are 
explicitly described in its objects and principles. These emphasise a number of 
established values relating to the protection of rights, welfare and justice 
considerations. Diversion from courts and custody was to be preferred, as well as the 
least restrictive sanctions. There is an emphasis on accountability and a separation of 
welfare and justice matters. There is also an emphasis on newer and restorative values 
of empowerment of children and families, repair of harm and the reintegration of 
offenders into society. 
The New Zealand system represented the first legislated example of a move 
towards a restorative justice approach to offending which recognised the participation 
of all involved in the particular offence and focuses on repairing the harm, 
reintegrating the offender, and restoring the balance within the community affected by 
the offence. The unique integration of Maori custom and law with that of Western 
criminal justice systems affords an underlying philosophical justification for the 
structure of the youth justice system.  
Similarly, the Scandinavian states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and 
Sweden) have strong supportive based interventions that are not reliant on criminal 
acts as the basis for these measures. The use of restorative justice concepts including 
for example the use of mediation has had a strong resonance in these jurisdictions 
(Lappi-Seppälä, 2007). 
While the context of such a restorative justice can be loosely found in the early 
cultural history of Malaysia, the concept was fragmented, at best, and with eventual 
British dominion, the fragments of such a restorative approach no longer has 
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resonance in Malaysia. The developments in New Zealand unfortunately did not 
significantly influence policy directions in Malaysia as to the child in conflict with the 
law and it is only in recent years that the concept of restorative justice had come to the 
fore in the discussion as to the direction that Malaysia should take in juvenile justice.  
Diversion as a measure has yet to achieve a high degree of acceptance in the 
region. In the South Asia region, the concepts of diversion and restorative justice have 
yet to take hold and countries in the region have yet to make diversion a core feature 
of juvenile justice legislation (UNICEF 2006). Perhaps a fundamental underlying 
reason for this is the potential for the ‘bifurcation’ of the criminal justice systems 
(Bottoms,1995:40) with coercive and punitive measures on the one end, particularly 
that of the adult criminal justice system and inclusive community-based or custodial 
sentences in the youth justice systems at the other end of the track. This is of course 
not unusual and perhaps the situation in New Zealand reflects this; where a hitherto 
stable youth justice system built upon diversion and decarceration straddles a populist 
punitive adult criminal justice system despite recent attempts to bridge this gap 
(Lynch, 2012).  
Perhaps from a Malaysian perspective, there is some blurring of lines particularly 
when one considers that, in the criminal justice system, whipping and the death 
penalty are legally prescribed sentencing options for certain offences even when 
children are involved. Clearly if a measure like diversion were to be introduced in 
situations where children are in conflict with the law, it is unlikely that there would be 
a corresponding ‘softening’ of the adult criminal justice system nor would it be likely 
that the system as applied to adults would take a greater punitive turn. This is because 
the Malaysian penal system already is punitive but it may in turn be reflective of the 
experience in New Zealand. 
While there is a consensus that diversion as a measure ought to be in place in 
Malaysia and notwithstanding the ratification of the CRC, the Child Act enacted post – 
CRC did not include any specific provisions with respect to pre-trial diversion of 
children. Reliance was placed on a general provision in Article 145(3) of the Federal 
Constitution, which inter alia provides that the public prosecutor has the power, 
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exercisable at his/ her discretion, to institute or discontinue criminal proceedings, as a 
basis to argue for the basis of introducing diversion. In any event the provision has not 
been used in that manner and more importantly, formal diversion programmes or 
processes are presently not in place and thus even if the discretion was exercised, 
diversion itself could not be carried out. Therefore, in most instances, while there may 
be some element of ‘gatekeeping’ (Gray, 2008:180) through police discretion in 
charging a child in conflict, the likely outcome is the application of a formal criminal 
process or that no action is taken.  
More worrying is that there is no mechanism to evaluate the consequence of 
exercising the discretion. There is some measure of discretion also availed to the 
Director of Public Prosecution to decide whether to prosecute but ‘there are no 
guidelines or standard procedures to encourage the use of prosecutorial discretion in 
children’s cases and no formal process for screening all cases for possible diversion’ 
(Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development and UNICEF Malaysia, 
2013:53). The lack of a procedural set of guidelines can lead to perceived biasness in 
deciding whom to charge. Perhaps more telling is that this leads to a void in available 
data in measuring the frequency in which the discretion is used or when it is not. 
In view of Malaysia’s obligations under the treaty, the joint report on the 
Malaysian Juvenile System suggest the following key areas in so far as diversion is 
concerned: 
i. Amendments to the Child Act to facilitate processes and guidelines for the 
implementation of diversion 
ii. Development of guidelines and training for police and prosecutors on the 
exercise of the new cautioning and diversion powers.  
iii. Development of a screening process and screening / assessment tools to guide 
decisions about diversion, 
iv. Designation of an agency to manage diversion programmes  
v. Development of diversion programmes through inter-agency partnerships  
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vi. Community awareness and sensitisation to build broad-based support for 
diversion (2013:55). 
 
The argument in support of diversion has found its way in the internationalization 
of rights as far as the child in conflict with the law and such an internationalization of 
rights recognises the need for alternative to court based punishments. This was 
initially expected to be part of the amended Child Act in Malaysia. However, as noted 
above, the issue of diversion was not included in the Act.  
Applying the concept of diversion in practice can be difficult. Kelly and Armitage 
(2014) cite similar issues faced by Richards. The issue raised were four interrelated 
questions, ‘… what young people are to be diverted from and to; whether young 
people are to be ‘diverted’ from the criminal justice system or offending; whether 
young people are to be ‘diverted’ from criminal justice processes or outcomes; and 
whether diversion should be considered distinct from crime prevention and early 
intervention’ (2014: 122). 
A further concern with diversionary procedures is the potential for net-widening. 
Yet there are studies that indicate different outcomes. For example, Pritchard’s (2010) 
analysis of over 50,000 police records pertaining to young people’s contact with the 
Tasmanian criminal justice system between 1991 and 2002 found no evidence of net-
widening.  
These divergent research findings notwithstanding, ‘diversion at both an 
ideological and a practical level has been a key feature of Western youth justice 
systems’ and ‘continue to have a stronghold’ in Western youth justice systems 
(Richards, 2014:124). 
Given that the diversionary approaches were excluded in the Child (Amendment) 
Act 2016, there are concerns whether the Malaysian juvenile justice system, will be 
child friendly, child appropriate and meaningful to children, fulfilling the ideal of 
‘Child First, Offender Second’ (Case and Haines, 2015:157).   It is unclear at this 
point how diversion can be introduced in a youth justice system that has multiple 




A child rights-based approach to diversion is one which sets out to further the 
realisation of all children’s rights relevant to diversion (as set out in the CRC and 
other instruments). As stated above, the child must be seen as a complete human 
being, not just in terms of the ‘juvenile justice’ label (UNICEF, 2007). However, 
given Malaysia’s reservation to a number of the CRC Articles and given the punitive 
culture existent, it is not likely that all children’s rights to diversion would be possible. 
As such, there is a danger that the implementation of diversion measures becomes 
disengaged from the context of rights and is merely a reactive response to obligations 
expressed through the UN. As suggested by Marshall and Parvis (2004:236), ‘rights 
give children a stake in our society’ and this must rest upon recognising the 
foundational rights of the child to develop as fully autonomous individuals.  
An analysis of a range of international conventions, standards, treaties and rules as 
undertaken in this and the preceding Chapter establishes the legal framework in 
dealing with children in conflict with the law in Malaysia. The discussion provides an 
understanding of the ‘culture, ideology and discourse’ involved (Muncie 2001:33). 
The subsequent Chapters will attempt to contextualise these with conversations with 
principal stakeholders and boys in the Henry Gurney School system, to determine 
whether there is a recognition of the broader context of rights and in particular, rights 
of the child to diversion. This process aims to capture the lived experiences and 
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‘I am the Lorax. I speak for the trees. I speak for the trees for the trees have no 
tongues.’ 


















In the criminal justice system, it is often the case that the voice of the child in 
conflict with the law is lost in the cacophony of adult voices. WK, the young boy 
accused of murder mentioned in preceding Chapters, found his case being first heard 
before the Magistrates Court when he was 12. He then endured a very public High 
Court trial and a short-lived period of freedom following the Court Appeal’s decision. 
Subsequently, following the Federal Court’s pronouncement of guilt some 5 years 
after the crime, he was sentenced to be detained for an indeterminate period at the 
pleasure of the King. At the trial, the child was advised to remain silent (Public 
Prosecutor v Kok Wah Kuan [2008] 1 MLJ 1). 
The court did not specifically address the broader aspects of the CRC particularly 
on the notion that children in conflict with the law needs to be protected in every stage 
of the juvenile justice process as advocated in the Convention.  
The case raised interesting constitutional issues on the concept of separation of 
powers, particularly between the executive and the legislature. It also explored the 
nuances of actus reus, mens rea and provocation in criminal law and it also 
considered the death penalty and its application to children pursuant to the Child Act 
2001. The case was argued by adults in a battle between legal practitioners and yet 
what of the very child in conflict with the law?  
In a brief interview, the child was reported to have said that living in prison 
toughened him as ‘we learn to survive because anything can happen. In prison, you 
have to take care of yourself because parents are not there to protect you’ (The Star, 
2007). His counsellor was reported to have said that although the boy was remorseful 
for the murder, the boy needed assistance to lead a normal life as the crime ‘has turned 
him into an introvert’ (The Star, 2007).  
This again raises the paradox of the child in conflict with the law. His prison 
counselor felt he needed assistance but the boy discovered very quickly that he has to 
take care of himself (emphasis added) to survive and be self-reliant in a system 
apparently designed to protect the child in accordance with Article 40(1) of the CRC 
as enshrined in the preamble of the Malaysian Child Act 2001. A system where his 
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rights are meant to be respected and his welfare protected within the ideals as 
espoused above by UNICEF through Article 40(1). 
It is apparent that in this instance, the notion of ‘Children First, Offenders Second’ 
grounded in ‘child-friendly principles of universalism, diversion and normalisation, 
progressed through inclusionary, participatory and legitimate practice and evidenced 
through measurable behaviours and outcomes’ was not achieved (Case and Haines, 
2015:226).  Further, the issue of culpability aside, the child’s foundational rights have 
been harmed and the impact on his development as a ‘fully autonomous’ individual 
has been compromised and there is a failure to recognize the child’s special status as a 
‘becoming’ rights-holder’ (Hollingsworth, 2013:1061).  
As indicated in Chapter 1, this research seeks to explore the following fundamental 
research questions: 
1. What is (are) the underlying philosophical approach (es) in Malaysia in dealing 
with rights of children in conflict with the law?  
2. Is there an obfuscation of the rights of the child and are children merely treated 
as objects of concern? If so why. 
3. What are the points of convergence/divergence in these policies with that of 
other jurisdictions and its impact on diversion strategies? 
The approach taken in this Chapter therefore is to establish the theoretical research 
scaffolding that builds on the language of child rights as considered in the preceding 
Chapters. The purpose here is to explore the approaches and choices I took in 
designing this study to best serve the objectives of the study.   
2.  Understanding legal research 
For those not within the realm of legal academia it is often difficult to understand 
what legal research and scholarship entails. What often counts for pure legal research 
is usually in the area of jurisprudence or commonly referred to as the doctrinal 
approach to research. This is where there is an engagement in law and legal concepts, 
often referred to as an analysis of black-letter law (McConville and Wing, 2007). This 
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engagement invariably involves an analysis of cases, statutes, and rules. This tradition 
of legal research has been my own personal experience as a law student and that of my 
own research experience journey.  
Given that the realm of legal research is not easily understood, Hutchinson and 
Duncan (2014) suggest that academic lawyers are beginning to realise that the 
doctrinal research methodology needs clarification for those outside the legal 
profession and that a discussion about the standing and place of doctrinal research 
compared to other methodologies is therefore required. This in their view stems from 
a critical view that the doctrinal method is simply scholarship rather than a separate 
research methodology. In support of this perception, Hutchinson and Duncan (2014) 
cite Posner’s view that law is ‘not a field with a distinct methodology, but an amalgam 
of applied logic, rhetoric, economics and familiarity with a specialized vocabulary and 
a particular body of texts, practices, and institutions’ (2014:83).  
There have been a number of attempts to provide some understanding of the 
approaches to legal research. The Arthurs Report 1983 cited in Trakman (1983), in its 
analysis of legal education and research in Canada offered a four-part, hierarchical 
classification of research arranged in an ascending order of importance.  Importance 
was placed on ‘fundamental research’ which involves the notion of law as a social 
phenomenon and exploring, for example, its social, political, economic, philosophical 
and cultural implications and associations.  
Figure 3 (below) represents Chynoweth’s (2008) interpretation of this four-part 





Figure 3: Chynoweth, P. (2008). Legal research styles. In Ruddock, L & Knight, A (eds.), 
Advanced Research Methods in the Built Environment, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford. 
However, Weisberg (1983) was critical of Arthurs’ hierarchical classification of 
research concluding that, ‘as classification this is nonsense; as prescription, it is 
worse. It is nonsense to suggest that research in law is less fundamental than research 
about law’ (Emphasis added) (1983:159). This criticism succinctly represents the 
debate that frames approaches to legal research, particularly the debate as to notions of 
the degree of importance between categories that involve research in law and research 
about law. 
In Australia, the Pearce Report 198761 cited in (Roper, 1987) categorised legal 
research in three ways. These were doctrinal research, theoretical, and finally reform-
oriented, which involve recommendations for change, based on critical examination. 
Conspicuously missing was fundamental legal research as a category with the report 
                                                 
61 Pearce, D., Campbell, E. and Harding, D. (1987). Australian Law Schools: A discipline 
assessment for the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission. 
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suggesting that the classification was too imprecise. There was also disagreement with 
the implication that this category was more important than the others were. 
Within a span of 18 years, the categorisation of legal research identified in the 
Pearce Report was deemed narrow, with the Council of Australian Law Deans 
(CALD) noting in 2005 that, ‘legal research today may be thought to be considerably 
broader than the tripartite classification of the Pearce Report’ (CALD, 2005:2).  The 
Council considered legal research as embracing empirical research, comparative 
research, research into the institutions and processes of the law, and interdisciplinary 
research (especially, though by no means exclusively, research into law and society) 
(CALD, 2005:2). (Original emphasis).  
Notably missing in the CALD classification is Arthurs’ hierarchical structure of 
legal research. At about the same time, Cownie’s (2004) empirical study62 of the 
‘lived experience’ (2004:1) of legal academics teaching and researching law in 
English universities, found that the move away from traditional black letter culture to 
a pluralistic approach seemed well advanced.  
However, Cownie notes that the same study also suggests that half the respondents 
were reluctant to describe their research as taking a socio-legal slant because of 
notions of how the black-letter culture is viewed by the profession. This view 
notwithstanding, the multidisciplinary legal research approach is said to have 
‘enriched the study of law’ and ‘influenced many aspects of legal practice’ (Baldwin 
and Davies, 2003:881).  
The relationship between the two spheres (research in law and research about law) 
is not one without debate even if the hierarchy of presumed importance is ignored. 
One view suggests that doctrinal legal research is a service to legal practice arguing 
that those that engage in a multidisciplinary approach fail to understand law as a 
normative science. The counter view from those that engage in multidisciplinary 
research is that scholarly legal research has a purpose in itself and that doctrinal legal 
                                                 
62 Cownie’s study relied on semi-structured interviews with fifty-four legal academics in law 
schools in England between June 2001 and December 2002. 
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research is not much more than merely ‘defending personal opinions’ (Gestel et al, 
2012:9). A more critical view espoused by Roger Cotterrell (1995) suggests that ‘all 
the centuries of purely doctrinal writing on law has produced less valuable knowledge 
about what law is, as social phenomena, and what it does than the relatively few 
decades of work in sophisticated modern empirical socio-legal studies’ (1995:296). 
This study is not one within the scope of tradition associated with pure doctrinal 
research.  This is because this study recognises that ‘today’s legal scholarship is 
diverse, covering many topics outside traditional areas of the law, built on 
methodologies drawn from the social sciences and humanities as well as traditional 
doctrinal analysis’ (Davidson, 2010:562). The reliance on broader areas of 
methodologies seeks to enhance this study by providing depth and context that a pure 
doctrinal study may not adequately yield. Further, given that this study seeks to 
explore the relationship between the various stakeholders and boys in the Henry 
Gurney School, a socio-legal approach best fits this purpose and best fits the research 
objectives sought. Some of these issues are considered below. 
3.  Socio-legal research 
This study involves an analysis of the state of the law and policies governing 
children in conflict with the law and with a particular focus on the rights of the child, 
in so far as diversion within the juvenile justice framework in Malaysia is concerned. 
The study will seek to contextualise this with conversations with stakeholders and 
incarcerated boys. This approach is within the broad notion of socio-legal research 
and seeks to present socio-theoretical and empirical analysis of the law and its 
relationship with the state and others involved in the juvenile justice framework. This 
process of analysis is recognised within the broad scope of an empirical study 
(Dobinson and Johns, 2007). 
This approach would facilitate a perspective on the ideology, politics and policies 
that have shaped Malaysia’s treatment of children in conflict with the law and would 




The Nuffield Inquiry (2006:3) adapting the definition from Baldwin and Davies, 
(2003) define empirical legal research as one that explores the ‘impact of law and 
legal processes in society’ particularly its impact on a range of social institutions 
citizens (2006:1). According to Cane and Kritzer, (2010:4) empirical research 
involves ‘the systematic collection of information (“data”) and its analysis according 
to some generally accepted method’ with particular importance attached to the 
systematic process of collecting and analysing the information which can come from a 
wide range of sources including surveys, documents, reporting systems, observation, 
interviews, experiments, decisions, and events.  
The underlying basis for this is that ‘empirically, law is a component part of the 
wider social and political structure, is inextricably related to it in an infinite variety of 
ways, and can therefore only be properly understood if studied in that context’ (Harris, 
1986:112). Thus, socio-legal research is recognised as having a central position in 
legal scholarship with Cotterrell (1995) suggesting that it is the ‘most important 
scholarship presently being undertaken in the legal world’ (1995:314). 
This is a departure from the traditional notion of legal scholarship rooted in legal 
doctrine and employing conventional methods of legal analysis and argument useful 
in the main to practitioners and those directly involved in such discourse. There is a 
range of views on the scope of legal education and its corresponding effects on legal 
research. For example, Edwards argues that ‘if law schools continue to stray from 
their principal mission of professional scholarship and training, the disjunction 
between legal education and the legal profession will grow and society will be the 
worse for it’ (1992:41). Rhode (2013) suggests that American legal education with its 
combination of lecture and Socratic dialogue that focuses on doctrinal analysis leaves 
much to be desired from a pedagogic standpoint. 
The reality is that contemporary legal scholarship today has become pluralistic in 
its values, purposes, methods, and perspectives. Kissam (1988) suggests that among 
other reasons, this phenomenon arises from current and contemporary interest in 
integrating legal doctrine and social context.  Cane and Kritzer (2010) suggest that the 
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healthy pluralism of empirical approaches to the study of law and legal phenomena 
includes the quantitative and qualitative approaches in empirical legal research. 
In achieving the research objectives and in answering the research questions, this 
study applied a combination of methods and in this case that combination relied 
primarily on documents as a source of research and interviewing as a means to 
enhance an understanding of the phenomenon being considered in this research (May, 
2001). The approach taken is one in the traditions of qualitative research, to ‘capture 
and categorize social phenomena and their meanings’ (Webley, 2012:928). Such 
diversity in legal scholarship is ‘recognition of the variability and richness of human 
culture’ (Sarat, 2004:36). 
4. The qualitative approach in this study 
There are many labels to qualitative research. Ely et al (2003) note that Tesch 
(1990) compiled a list of 46 terms that social scientists have used to name their 
versions of qualitative research concluding that ‘the sheer number is mind-boggling’ 
(2003:3). 
However, in defining the process, Kirk and Miller (1986: 9) suggest that qualitative 
research ‘fundamentally depends on watching people in their own territory and 
interacting with them in their own language, on their own terms’ and is ‘seen to be 
“naturalistic,” “ethnographic,” and participatory”.’ As such ‘qualitative researchers 
study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, 
phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2000: 3). Therefore, unlike quantitative research, qualitative research is ‘research that 
produces findings not arrived at by statistical procedures or other means of 
quantification’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 11). 
Thus, qualitative research emphasises the human, interpretative aspects of 
understanding the social world and the interconnectivity of different aspects of 
people’s lives. The psychological, political, social, historical and cultural factors that 
interplay in this process are all recognised as playing an important part in shaping 
people’s understanding and experience of their world. In this regard, qualitative 
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research is seen to reject the positivistic natural science model and to concentrate on 
understanding, rich description, deep reading and emergent concepts and theories. 
As suggested in the preceding Chapter, Geertz interprets this role as an 
‘interpretative one in search of meaning’ (Geertz, 1973:5). The basis for this is to 
challenge the conventional quantitative research ‘which wantonly imposes survey 
category and Lickert Scale upon its subjects’ (Hayward and Young, 2004). Hayward 
and Young further suggest that the rational choice theory and positivistic approaches 
to crime that dominate contemporary sociological theory ‘have very simple 
rational/instrumental narratives’ (Hayward and Young, 2004). Thus, interpretivism 
seeks to overcome some of the perceived limitations associated with positivism. 
It bears repeating that this study will represent an analysis of the norms that 
underpin the child in conflict with the law and in this context, will attempt to ‘bridge 
the gap between researcher and researched subject and capture the lived experiences 
and realities’ of the Malaysian context of youth justice. As noted above, this is drawn 
from Max Weber’s verstehen embodied in many aspects of qualitative research. This 
is described as ‘the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to 
arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects’ (Henderson and Talcott as cited 
in Tucker, 1965:88).  
However, the notion of verstehen is not without criticism. As early as 1948 
Theodore Abel argued, ‘[t]he most obvious limitation of the operation is its 
dependence upon knowledge derived from personal experience. The ability to define 
behaviour will vary with the amount and quality of the personal experience and the 
introspective capacity of the interpreter’ (Abel, 1948: 216). Thus, the researcher’s 
perspective and values make it impossible to conduct an objective, value free research. 
In the intervening years since, the significance of the investigator’s own 
interpretations and understanding of the phenomenon being studied has gained a much 
wider theoretical and philosophical support and acceptance. Researchers bring 
experiences of various kinds into play and these include ‘technical knowledge and 
experience derived from research, but also their personal experiences’ which Anselm 
Strauss refers to as ‘experiential data’ imploring researchers to ‘ “mine your 
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experience, there is potential gold there!” ’ (Strauss, 1987:11). Berg and Smith 
(1988:22) suggest that ‘it can be maintained that virtually no information about a 
person, group or social system exists without a relationship with that person or social 
system.’ In this regard, the researcher seeks to record accurately their own 
observations while also seeking to uncover the meanings their subjects bring to their 
life experiences. 
In response to the criticism levelled by poststructuralists and postmodernists that 
any snapshot of the life experience of a subject is inevitably viewed through lenses 
tainted by ‘language, gender, social class, race, and ethnicity’, qualitative researchers 
have adopted ‘a wide-range of interconnected interpretive methods, always seeking 
better ways to make more understandable the worlds of experience that have been 
studied’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000:12). 
One approach is to avoid the descriptors “subjectivity” or “objectivity” in 
describing the process.  Michael Patton (2001: 50) suggests adding ‘empathic 
neutrality to the emerging lexicon that attempts to supersede the hot button term 
objective and the epithet subjective.’ This approach suggests that there exists a middle 
ground between becoming ‘too involved, which can cloud judgment, and remaining 
too distant, which can reduce understanding’ (Patton, 2001:51).  
As noted by (Jansen and Peshkin, 1992) subjectivity in qualitative research is 
unavoidable but this can provide insights, hypotheses, and validity checks that 
enhance the richness of the discussion. The key perhaps is not to impose assumptions 
and values that are uncritical in relation to the research. Reason describes this as 
‘critical subjectivity’ which is ‘a quality of awareness in which we do not suppress our 
primary experience; nor do we allow ourselves to be swept away and overwhelmed by 
it; rather we raise it to consciousness and use it as part of the inquiry process’ 
(Reason, 1988:12).  
In this sense ‘both qualitative and quantitative researchers think they know 
something about society worth telling others, and they use a variety of forms, media, 
and means to communicate their ideas and findings’ (Becker, 1986:122). The 
approach taken in this study therefore is to avoid being dismissive or intolerant of 
127 
 
other varying research approaches in order to preclude the ‘rigidity of polarized, 
dualistic thinking that sets qualitative and quantitative research as black and white 
knights engaged in an endless ideological battle…’ (Darbyshire, 1997:1) but at the 
same time being prepared to ‘watch out for methodological watchdogs!’ (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992:227). 
5. Research Design 
Yin (1994:18) refers to the concept of design as ‘the logic that links the data to be 
collected (and the conclusions to be drawn) to the initial questions of the study.’ In 
undertaking this study, I relied on understanding and evaluating my own experience in 
traditional pure doctrinal research as an undergraduate and post-graduate student and 
as a researcher. In traditional pure doctrinal research, legal doctrinal scholars not only 
use the legal system as their subject of inquiry, but also as their theoretical framework.  
This approach in legal research served me well in the analysis of the various 
statutory provisions, case law and international treaty obligations considered in this 
study. While I have found these processes useful, I found that there are limitations in 
this approach. Of particular concern is the lack of engagement with the individuals 
who are most often the subjects of the law, the boys and the various stakeholders in 
the juvenile justice system. Thus, I felt that the choice of hearing from these 
individuals would help enrich the study. This of course entailed for me, the discovery 
of new approaches and skills that I had hitherto not been exposed to as a student or as 
researcher. These approaches are also not generally used in the realm of legal practice. 
In the course of understanding legal doctrinal scholarship, there have been attempts 
to encourage the use of a wider range of skills. For example, Karl Llewellyn, (1955) 
encouraged legal scholars to work patiently on new kinds of extra-doctrinal 
scholarship by working carefully with interdisciplinary ideas. This notion of exploring 
interdisciplinary knowledge to widen my scope of understanding legal phenomena 
appealed to me as I felt that this would put me in a better position to understand and 




Tushnet (1981) notes that legal scholars need substantial amounts of time to 
develop an understanding of social theory that might usefully be employed in extra-
doctrinal legal scholarship. The challenge is that legal scholarship is often ‘torn 
between grasping as much as possible the expanding reality of law and its context, on 
the one hand, and reducing this complex whole to manageable proportions, on the 
other’ (Hoecke, 2011: vii). 
In recognising this challenge, I sought to strike a balance between these diverse 
needs in contemporary legal scholarship. Hence this study is an exploratory inquiry 
using semi-structured interviews with court officers, lawyers, police, prison officers, 
civil servants, NGO’s, UNICEF and incarcerated boys in Malaysia to seek an 
understanding on child rights in relation to diversion and framing these with the 
documents and cases relevant to the discussion. I was conscious of the need to keep 
the scope of the research to manageable portions.  I sought to achieve this by applying 
the traditions associated with empirical qualitative research in law particularly the 
philosophical and theoretical foundations associated with the methodology as 
considered in this Chapter.   
The qualitative approach was taken because I was keen to explore and understand 
the social world using both the participant’s and my understanding of the phenomena 
being explored; in this case the rights of the child to diversion in Malaysia. This is due 
to the view that understanding the phenomena is mediated through meaning and 
human involvement and this I felt was best understood through the research design I 
had applied in this study.  
The qualitative approach has found increasing application in legal scholarship 
particularly in seeking to understand people’s perception of law, justice and the legal 
profession (Webley, 2012:927).  This is not to say that similarly, quantitative research 
in law has not been undertaken nor enriched the body of legal scholarship and 
knowledge. For example, a recent study on examining victim-oriented tort law in 
action using an empirical examination of 1,237 decisions involving claims of sexual 
abuse in the Catholic Church in Netherlands (van Dijck, 2018) or a 2014 study on 205 
death-eligible murders leading to homicide convictions in Connecticut from 1973–
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2007 to determine if there were unlawful racial, gender, and geographic disparities 
(Donohue, 2014). 
Brownsword is of the view that in so far as socio-legal research is concerned, it is 
now accepted that theoretical work and empirical content share a level of engagement 
and synergy (as cited in Gestel et al, 2012 ) and that all empirical research has an 
implicit, if not explicit, research design (Yin, 1994).  However, in this study, a broader 
and less restrictive concept of “design” commonly associated with the quantitative 
research field was employed. Thus, I did not have a pre-determined well-worked-out 
set of hypotheses to be tested nor did I have specific data-gathering instruments that 
produce data to be statistically analysed in a separate process (Becker et al, 1977).  
The theoretical framework derived from the data and data collection and analysis 
proceeded together. I endeavoured to ensure the study was not context bound but 
sought to be context sensitive and reflexive.  Reflexivity represents the capacity to 
reflect upon the researcher’s actions and values during the research, when producing 
data and writing accounts. Thus, in this regard, the research design was a reflexive 
process ‘operating through every stage of a project’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 
1995:24). This aspect of qualitative research recognises that it ‘is not static but 
developmental and dynamic in character, the focus is on process as well as outcomes’ 
(Holloway and Wheeler 2010:4). 
The following sections explore the approaches and techniques I used to collect and 
analyse data, and how these elements taken together constituted an integrated strategy 
to seek an understanding on how events, actions, and meanings have shaped the issue 
of child rights in relation to diversion in Malaysia. 
6. Collection of data  
Denzin and Lincoln, (2000:3) suggest that ‘qualitative research involves the studied 
use and collection of a variety of empirical materials.’ However, in most cases data 
are usually collected through three main methods: direct observation, in-depth 
interviews and analysis of documents (May, 2001: 138-73; Punch, 2005:168-192; or 
Patton, 2001: 4-5). These methods are usually applied on their own but it is also 
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possible that several types of data collection might well be used in one qualitative 
project.  
Given that this study is an exploratory inquiry in seeking an understanding of child 
rights in relation to diversion, the methods I chose serve as a means to answer my 
research questions by providing the data needed.  In order to avoid the potential risks 
that the conclusions derived reflect only the systematic biases or limitations of one 
specific method, I relied on the integration of data from documents and interviews of 
stakeholders and of incarcerated boys themselves. This afforded a better assessment of 
the different voices and multiple constructions of the notion of child rights in general 
and more specifically to those that relate to diversion in the juvenile justice system.  
This is not triangulation in the strict sense of mixing quantitative methods with that 
of qualitative methods as a means of validity testing but an attempt to engage with the 
complexity of the issue of child rights to develop a richer and deeper understanding. 
Kelle (2001: para 14) notes that, ‘triangulation should not be considered as a single 
unique method, but as a somewhat vague metaphor with different possible meanings 
that can be related to a variety of different methodological problems and tasks.’   
The focus in this study is on understanding the norms that determine the notion of 
child rights. This is evidenced through the various documents and contextualising 
these through interviews with the social actors that are involved in this process both at 
a micro and macro level (the boys themselves and the adults that are involved in 
policy making and the administration of juvenile justice). I felt that this could provide 
a robust explanation for whether a rights-based argument can be sustained with 
regards to diversion.  
6.1 Documents as a resource for research 
May notes that, ‘documents, as the sedimentations of social practices, have the 
potential to inform and structure the decisions which people make on a daily and 
longer-term basis; they also constitute particular readings of social events’ (2001:176).  
Macdonald (2008) suggests that documentary evidence provide a record of the 
social world. The documents in this context are “socially produced” as they are 
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produced ‘on the basis of certain ideas, theories … principles,’ and written for specific 
purposes and audiences, which in turn shaped their content and form (2008:287). The 
social contexts of the documents considered in the preceding Chapters reflect the 
evolving interpretations of the child and the rights of the child particularly the 
international treaties discussed and the corresponding Malaysian legislation.  
Yanow (2007) suggests that documents can provide background information prior 
to designing the research project and as such can either corroborate interview data or 
they may refute them. This provides an opportunity for the research to challenge or 
confirm the narrative in these documents. In traditional doctrinal legal scholarship, 
legal scholars collect empirical data from statutes or cases; develop hypotheses on 
their meaning and scope, which are then tested using principles of interpretation or 
precedents or applying jurisprudential arguments. There is a strong reliance on a range 
of documents in the analysis of the law. This has been my training and has been the 
main approach to my own understanding of legal research. 
While this study had a strong reliance on documents, the nature of analysis is 
broader than the approach taken in traditional doctrinal legal scholarship. Thus, owing 
to the nature of the subject matter of this study, I relied on documents as a resource 
for research. This is to be distinguished from documents being made the subject of 
social research (Brookman (1999) cited in Noaks and Wincup, 2004:107). (Emphasis 
added). 
The range of documents subjected to this process of analysis included inter alia, a 
range of formal documents including statutory enactments, judicial pronouncements in 
decided cases, treaty and conventions, records of parliamentary proceedings, a range 
of international and domestic policy documents and media reports. Documents 
therefore ‘provide evidence of policy directions, legislative intent, and understandings 
of perceived shortcomings or best practice in the legal system, and may even indicate 
agenda for change’ (Webley, 2012:8). In the context of this study, these are key issues 
that influence dealing with children in conflict with the law, particularly the 
underlying philosophical arguments.  
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However, the reliance on documents as resource for analysis is not without 
criticism. A general critique directed, is that like most qualitative analyses it tends to 
be ‘conjectural, non-verifiable, non-cumulative, ‘meanings’… arrived at by sheer 
intuition and individual guesswork’ (Cohen, 1974: 5) and thus expects readers to trust 
the interpretations given and further, to assume that these are then accurate and 
legitimate.63  This view also recognises that there is an inherent danger of an 
‘ideological hegemony’ where the literature being reviewed and the assumptions 
entrenched in it can also deform the framing of the research and as such the researcher 
is therefore implored to ‘use the literature, don’t let it use you’ (Becker, 1986:149). 
Although this study does not involve making documents the subject of social 
research, elements of the four criteria of ‘authenticity, credibility, representativeness 
and meaning’ were applied to assess the quality of the documentary evidence being 
investigated (May, 2001 in applying the typology developed in Scott 1990).  
In the context of this research, the documents relied on provided evidence of policy 
directions, legislative intent and in some instances, social reality itself. I relied on a 
range of public and /or formal documents and this facilitated an appreciation of the 
social and cultural context and forms of discourse that shaped the documents 
concerned. Global developments in child rights have found their way into the 
Malaysian landscape and these were considered in preceding Chapters. The analysis 
of documents afforded the opportunity to discover the points of convergence and 
divergence when these international standards are measured against the existing 
Malaysian juvenile justice system. More importantly, I was able to assess whether the 
aspirational aspects as expressed in these documents were actually applied in practice 
through conversations with stakeholders and incarcerated boys.  In assessing 
‘credibility, representativeness and meaning’ I sought to find evidence of this through 
the interviews and drawing themes that bring the documents reviewed into context and 
this is explored in Chapters 5 and 6.  
                                                 
63 Bloch for example, asks inter alia ‘Did they speak the truth? Were the books ascribed to Moses 




Building on the scaffolding of the research questions in this study, interviews 
helped flesh out the form and shape of the study. Interviews provided the data that 
contributed to discovering the actual or perceived experiences of those involved. 
Qualitative interviewing is not construed as merely a means or method to obtain 
answers to questions. (Emphasis added). It is a technique in which the interaction 
between the researcher and the participant elucidates knowledge about the social 
world (Gubrium &Holstein, 1997). Thus, the process of active interviewing involves a 
broader function in which there is an evaluation of the manner in which information is 
created as well as how interviewees respond, rather than just merely assessing, what 
was said (Byrne, 2004). 
The purpose of the research interview in this context was to explore the views, 
experiences, beliefs and/or motivations of specific stakeholders on the issues raised in 
this study. In this regard, interviews provided a ‘deeper’ understanding of social 
phenomena than would ordinarily be obtained from purely quantitative methods, such 
as questionnaires (Silverman, 2005). I was therefore able to ‘understand the world 
from the subject’s points of view, to unfold the meaning of people’s experiences’ 
(Kvale, 2007: xvii). 
Individual interviews are used extensively by qualitative researchers in examining 
legal phenomena, and perceptions of law. For example, as Cownie (2004) did in 
understanding the lived experience of academics or as Sommerland (2007) did to 
investigate contemporary changes to the legal profession.  
The choice of using interviews was based upon the desire to find the approach that 
would best provide the richness and context that I sought to explore. This allowed an 
opportunity to find issues that are often missed through other approaches. These 
included exploring subtleties and complexities, and evaluating possible relationships, 
causes, effects and dynamic processes involved in the context of the study. The 
analysis of the data was descriptive and narrative in style, which I hope will bring 
value to practitioners and policy makers. 
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In the context of this study, a series of semi-structured interviews were executed 
with principal stakeholders. This allowed an opportunity to ask a series of open-ended 
questions, with accompanying questions that sought to probe for more detailed and 
contextual data. This approach facilitated acquiring rich in-depth information with 
opportunities to seek nuances that a purely textual research might miss. This in turn 
provided the opportunity to understand the unique experience of each individual as 
well as an appreciation of shared circumstances in which they encounter with children 
in conflict with the law, and meanings they attribute to their own lived experiences.  
Thus, I developed ‘an understanding of the context of the project to facilitate 
alertness to significant themes’ (Noaks and Wincup, 2004:79). A further advantage of 
semi-structured interviews was ‘that it is open to the reception of unanticipated 
information to be discussed, which may not have been highlighted in a structured 
interview’ (Barbour and Schostak 2005:42). This flexibility is advantageous as I could 
probe a line of questioning in response to the participants’ answers, while keeping to 
the main topic of the interview (Byrne, 2004). 
In interviewing the principal stakeholders, I drew heavily on the ‘responsive 
interviewing’ model proposed by Rubin and Rubin (2012). This in-depth interviewing 
model is within the realm of the interpretive constructionist philosophy and allowed 
me to interview purposefully selected individuals ‘who are knowledgeable, listening 
to what they have to say, and asking new questions based on the answers they 
provide’ (2012:5) and to treat both the interviewer and interviewee as ‘people, with 
feelings, opinions and experiences’ (2012:10). However, this framework served as a 
guide and not a rule and as Rubin and Rubin suggest that, a philosophy should not be 
a ‘list of commands or instructions to always do this or never that’ (2012:39). 
As this study is qualitative in nature, it therefore produced findings not arrived at 
by statistical procedures or quantification methods (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). This 
point notwithstanding, a recurring challenge often posed to the nature of qualitative 
research is how many subjects. Kvale (1994) suggests that this is ultimately 
contingent on the purpose of the study. 
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As far as this study is concerned, the number of subjects chosen reflect the 
epistemological and methodological questions about the nature and purpose of the 
research. This approach is in keeping with the view that ‘the quest for universal 
generalizations is being replaced by an emphasis upon the contextuality of 
knowledge’ (Kvale, 1994:166).  
Given that the purpose was to seek the views of knowledgeable participants with 
insights into the specific area of research, a range of principal participants were 
considered. The selection of participants followed Patton’s (2001) concept of 
purposeful sampling and covered the range of stakeholders. Access was also gained to 
interview boys from the Henry Gurney School Puncak Borneo, Sarawak and this will 
be considered below. Thus, ‘the logic and power of purposeful sampling lies in 
selecting information-rich cases for study in depth. Information-rich cases are those 
from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the 
purpose of the research, thus the term purposeful sampling’ (Patton, 1990:169). 
As this study entails interviewing a pre-defined and visible set of actors, I was able 
to identify the particular set of respondents of interest that were able to assist in 
discovering the issue of child rights in relation to diversion. I utilised personal 
networks for opportunities to contact relevant officials. These contacts were 
individuals that I had encountered in the course of my involvement in the 
Constitutional Law Committee of the Malaysian Bar Council and in my role as a state 
executive committee member of the Malaysian Crime Prevention Foundation.  
As Kidder et al (1986) suggest, with good judgement and an appropriate strategy, 
researchers applying purposive sampling can select the cases to be included and thus 
develop samples that best suit the needs of the research study.  Given that the range of 
participants (sample) is stratified and included legislators, the judiciary, the police and 
others involved directly in policy decision-making in specific aspects of children in 
conflict with the law, it was necessary to consider principles of elite interviewing. 
Elite interviewing is defined as ‘the use of interviews to study those at the ‘top’ of any 
stratification system’ (Moyser, 2006:85).  
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The term ‘elite’ has often been adapted according to the specific nature of the 
research enquiry. Hence, ‘elite’ has been defined as ‘a group of individuals, who hold, 
or have held, a privileged position in a society’ (Richards, 1996:199). In Linda 
McDowell’s study of employees working at different levels for merchant and 
investment banks in the City of London the term ‘elite’ was adapted to mean ‘highly 
skilled, professionally competent, and class-specific’ (McDowell, 1998: 2135).  
In the context of this study, the term ‘elite’ was taken to mean an interviewee who 
is given non-standardised special treatment because of the specialist knowledge they 
possess and are thus able to ‘teach’ the researcher (Dexter, 2006:18-19). This was 
certainly the case in this study, as I had interviewed individuals who were directly 
involved in policymaking decisions or in the administration of justice. These included 
for example, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Women, Family and Community 
Development, a Deputy Superintendent of Police formerly from the specialist child 
unit (D11) of the police force, a Magistrate from the Court for Children, Prison 
officers, a Member of Parliament and the various specific skilled and class specific 
individuals interviewed from various child rights organisations.  
Owing to my interaction with some of these individuals in the committees 
mentioned above, access to these elites was established and I was able to build rapport 
with them. I felt that this in turn led to good intellectual dialogue and honest 
reflections on the issues. Perhaps at some level, they treated me as an ‘elite’ although I 
did not consciously see myself as one. Yet this led to greater candour in the manner of 
responses given and facilitated open discussions. 
This interviewing process facilitated discovering their perspectives and/or 
discovering the underlying motivations for policy decisions or approaches. The elite 
interview data collected is to confirm (or otherwise) information had been collected 
through documents and other participants in the study. The interview process 
involving elites required specific strategies and approaches unique to the relationship 
(Harvey, 2011). 
I provided comprehensive information about the study prior to the interview 
(Appendix 1) and I ensured that I made adequate preparations prior to the interview. 
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This involved developing an understanding of the specific role of the person that I was 
going to interview. This provided an opportunity to explain to the interviewees why 
they were chosen and why they were specifically able to provide considerable value to 
the study. Harvey suggests that interviewers need to be prepared ‘because often elites 
might consciously or sub-consciously challenge them on their subject and its 
relevance’ (2011:434).  
In keeping with Harvey’s advice ‘to avoid asking elites closed questions because 
they do not like to be confined to a restricted set of answers’ (2011:434) the semi-
structured interview approach worked best. Additional questions were framed in 
response to the answers given and this yielded conversations that were open textured 
and in some cases extended beyond 45 minutes.  
I was conscious of the fact that in the actual execution of the interviews, it did not 
proceed in what is commonly understood as interviewing. I found that the actual 
process was more akin to having conversations with the individuals. Questions were 
asked but it was framed within the context of having a conversation. This I found 
created a greater connection with the persons I spoke to especially with the various 
stakeholders concerned. 
In keeping with the traditions associated with qualitative research the selection of 
participants and situations were not intended to be statistically representative 
generalizable to an entire population. Instead, the focused, in-depth study was 
designed to go beyond description to find meaning, even if that meaning or the 
perceptions involved a small number. From this, I was able to explore how the 
participants understand the world and interact with each other. The purpose is not to 
measure frequency but seek depth and insight in understanding the phenomena.  






Table 4: Purposeful sampling of participants  
Conversations with principal stakeholders and the boys, sought to explore whether 
there is a recognition of the rights of the child to diversion and to seek an 
understanding of the broader context of these rights. This process aimed to capture the 
lived experiences and realities of the people involved in the phenomena in question 
(Creswell, 2013). An understanding of the multiple participant meanings that are set in 
the context of the political, social and cultural environment in Malaysia would assist 
in drawing out a deeper appreciation of the specific research questions. This facilitates 
the text, subtext and context of child rights in relation to diversion to be explored.  
These conversations involved interviews with 14 stakeholders in the juvenile 
justice system, 2 correctional officers and 10 boys from the Henry Gurney School 
(Figure 4 below). 
CATEGORY DESCRIPTION METHOD TOTAL 
Government Agencies/ Policy 
Stakeholders/Legislators/Academics 
i. The Ministry of Women 
Family and Community 
Development                    
ii. Constitutional Law 
Committee Bar Council 
Malaysia 
iii. Child Rights Committee Bar 
Council Malaysia 
iv. UNICEF Malaysia 
v. National Child Rights/ Non-
Governmental 
Organizations/Academics 
vi. Member of Parliament 






           1 
 
1 
   
 
2 
     1 
     6 
 
1 
Stakeholders in the Criminal Justice 
System 
i. Magistrates/Court for 
children 
ii. Royal Malaysian Police 




            1 
            1                       
2 
















The following table (Table 5) summarises the stakeholders interviewed in this 
study: 
No Participant Affiliation/Organisation 
1.  Jones Child Rights activist 
2.  Vivian Court for Children adviser and Child Rights NGO 
3.  Farida Lawyer, Constitutional Law Committee, Bar Council, Malaysia 
and human rights advocate 
4.  Sylvia Child protection officer, UNICEF 
5.  Terry Retired prison officer and presently a counsellor 
6.  Adiba Co-ordinator, Community Outreach Programme established in a 
public university 
7.  Noemi Member National Advisory and Consultative Council for Children 
and an academic 
8.  Gus Court for Children adviser and Child Rights NGO 
9.  Irene Magistrate, Court for Children 
10.  Ona Police Officer formerly with the Sexual, Women and Child 
Investigation Division (D11), Criminal Investigation Department 
11.  Charles Senior civil servant, Ministry of Women, Family and Community 
Development 
12.  Tabitha Member of Parliament 
13.  Lawrence Lawyer, member of the Child Rights Committee, Bar Council 
Malaysia 
14.  Arianne Lawyer, member of the Child Rights Committee, Bar Council 
Malaysia 
15.  George Correctional Officer, Henry Gurney, Puncak Borneo, Sarawak, 
Malaysia 
16.  Luke Correctional Officer, Henry Gurney, Puncak Borneo, Sarawak, 
Malaysia 
Table 5: Summary of stakeholders interviewed. 
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The table below (Table 6) represents the boys interviewed at the Henry Gurney 
School, Puncak Borneo, Sarawak, Malaysia: 









1.  Wilson 18 20 2015-2017 Theft: s378 Penal Code 
2.  Nicholas 17 19 2016-2019 
Possession of stolen goods: s411Penal Code 
Methamphetamine: s15 Dangerous Drugs 
Act 1952 
3.  Lony 18 20 2015-2018 Statutory rape: s375 Penal Code 
4.  William 18 19 2016-2018 Housebreaking and possession of stolen 
goods: s457& s411 Penal Code 
5.  Everest 18 20 2017-
201864 
Possession of stolen goods: s411 Penal Code 
Criminal intimidation: s506 Penal Code 
Attempted murder: s307 Penal Code 
6.  Angah 17 20 2014-2017 
Rape: s375 Penal Code  
Theft: s378 Penal Code  
Ganja: s15 Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 
7.  Aman 16 18 2015-2018 Criminal intimidation: s506 Penal Code 
8.  Udin 16 17 2016-2019 Statutory rape: s375 Penal Code 
9.  Dom 18 20 2015-2018 Methamphetamine: s15 Dangerous Drugs 
Act 1952 
10.  Odeng 19 21 2015-2017 Statutory rape: s375 Penal Code 
Table 6: Boys interviewed at the Henry Gurney School, Puncak Borneo, Sarawak, Malaysia. 
 
 
                                                 
64 Everest was placed in a different Henry Gurney School prior to arriving to the one in Puncak 
Borneo Sarawak in 2017. 
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I recorded the interviews and then transcribed the interviews in detail which itself 
required many hours of effort. Agar (1996) found that it can take six hours for every 
recorded hour and indeed I found it to be a lonely endeavour with tiredness and 
fatigue setting in often through the process  (Roulston et al, 2003). However, such 
detailed transcription facilitated familiarity with the content and thus through this 
process and I could observe the subtitles in the way people interacted (Rapley, 2007) 
even if in this instance, such interaction occurred without the participants physically 
interacting with each other. Admittedly, the method of converting verbal 
communication to text can (and does) result in the loss of inflection and context, but 
as this research does not have as its central focus, conversational discourse analysis, 
this was considered as an acceptable compromise. 
6.3 Interviewing Children 
As noted above, 10 boys were interviewed. The boys interviewed had an average 
age 19.4 and technically fall out of the specific definition of ‘child’ as per the CRC. 
However, it is pertinent to note that one of the boys interviewed was aged 17 at the 
time of the interview. All the boys (save one) entered the Henry Gurney School 
system at the age of 18 or below. Perhaps more significantly, all the boys had already 
come into contact with the juvenile justice system when they were children. Further, 
given the vulnerability of their specific experience through the juvenile justice system, 
I felt it necessary to acknowledge the treatment of children in the research process.  
Article 12 of the Convention gives children the right to participation but children’s 
views have historically been deemed unimportant and unreliable. The development of 
law in relation to child witnesses in criminal trials being a good illustration. The law 
traditionally required the judge to warn juries of the danger of convicting a defendant 
on the evidence of a child unless independent evidence capable of corroborating the 
child’s account were available. In the United Kingdom, the rule in relation to unsworn 
evidence of children has been abolished by section 34 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1988. 
In Malaysia, section 90(9) (b) of the Child Act 2001 allows a child to give sworn 
evidence or make any statement when making his defence. In relation to unsworn 
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evidence, the position in Malaysia is similar to the situation in the United Kingdom 
prior to the 1988 amendment (Section 133A of the Evidence Act 1950).65  
In so far as the voice of the child in research, Mills (2004) notes that ‘the neglect of 
children’s perspectives in social sciences has come about as a result of particular 
social constructions that estimated them as incapable of producing relevant, reliable or 
representative evidence’ (Mills 2004: 31).  Children have more frequently been the 
objects rather than the subjects of social research (Morrow and Richards, 1996). 
In the context of this study, I felt it was necessary to recognise that, 
‘acknowledging children as rights-holders has significant implications for research 
processes’ Lundy and McEvoy (2012a:129). Adult proxies can never give an accurate 
and valid account of children’s experiences or opinions (Mahon et al, 1996). I felt 
therefore that it was pertinent to understand their lived experiences of the boys in the 
Henry Gurney School system and to acknowledge their voice without relying on adult 
proxies. 
Punch suggests that children are not used to expressing their views freely or being 
taken seriously by adults because of their position in an adult-dominated society 
(1992). Therefore, the ‘cognitive abilities of children and power differentials between 
adults and children require special consideration’ (Mishna et al, 2004:450). I felt I 
needed to be reflexive to the boys’ voices to take into account the actual research 
contexts of their voices and ‘the power imbalances that shape them’ (Spyrou, 
2011:152). Taking account of the context requires that I had to be critically reflexive 
and to constantly evaluate my role as a researcher and the research subject. The issues 
that influenced the interview process of boys in this study is considered in detail 
below. 
 
                                                 
65 This states that where a child of tender years who is called as a witness does not in the opinion of 
the court understand the nature of an oath, he may give unsworn evidence if the court is satisfied that he 
is possessed of sufficient intelligence to justify the reception of the evidence and understands the duty 




6.4 Credibility and validity 
As with the use of documents as a resource for research, the use of interviews as a 
technique has been challenged. The challenge comes from the within the fraternity of 
qualitative research as well as beyond. For example, there are concerns as to whether 
the informant in an interview is telling the truth or whether the truths being explored 
are stable across situations and perspectives (Dean and Whyte, 1958). Becker and 
Geer (1957) suggest that there is a level of ‘incompleteness’ of interview data as 
compared with the data obtained from participant observation. Deutscher (1973) 
argues of the realities in the disjunctive truths between what people say and what they 
actually do.  (Emphasis added). Thus, the data from an interview which measures 
verbal behaviour, is only presumed to be descriptive of what people are doing and this 
Deutscher argues affects the validity of this presumption.  
Kvale suggests that there are ‘ten standardized responses’ to the rather ‘stereotyped 
objections’ to the stimulus “qualitative research interview” and that while these 
objections are ‘highly predictable, they may be taken into account when designing, 
reporting, and defending an interview study.’ In fact, in answering and dismissing 
these objections, Kvale introduces ten ‘alternative’ challenges to the process of 
interviewing (1994:147). 
While these arguments do not generally invalidate the use of interview data in the 
usual manner, they serve in providing the researcher with an understanding of the 
limits to what can inferred from such data. As such, the use of documents and 
stratified sampling of participants assist in building levels of assurance. I applied the 
range of general guidelines and strategies to ensure the credibility and reliability of 
this method of gathering data and principal reliance was made to those identified in 
Arksey and Knight (1999).  
According to Arksey and Knight, the validity of the interview process can be 
strengthened by using interview techniques that build rapport and trust, prompting 
interviewees to illustrate and expand their initial thoughts, ensuring that the interview 
process is sufficiently long to ensure greater depth and constructing interview 
questions that are drawn from literature (1999:43-59). 
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As noted above, 16 interviews were conducted with stakeholders. Each of these 
sessions were approximately between 45 minutes to an hour. The 10 boys in the 
Henry Gurney School were interviewed for about 30 minutes each. The interviewees 
were comfortable and at ease with sharing their knowledge and experience and this 
afforded useful and valuable data. Rowley suggests that ‘a good rule-of-thumb for 
new researchers is to aim for around 12 interviews of approximately 30 minutes in 
length, or the equivalent, such as six to eight interviews of around one hour’ being 
mindful to avoid “drowning in a sea of data” (2012: 263).  
The restriction on interviewing the boys was borne out of necessity as the Prison 
Department had allocated approximately 6 hours on one day to interview the 10 boys. 
Given the restriction of time, it became expedient to make full use of the time afforded 
and as such, the interviews were focussed on the specific experiences the boys 
encountered in the juvenile justice system particularly those that involved arrest, 
detention and proceedings in the Children’s Court and to seek their views on 
diversion. The iterative nature of the qualitative research process also permitted some 
level of adjustment as analytic insights were tested against new observations to allow 
refinement to the basic research questions (Stake, 1995).(see Appendix 8 for the basic 
research questions). The restriction on time did not impact the scope of the study 
given that the interviews were designed with the research objectives in mind. Further, 
as became apparent during the course of the interviews, the boys were willing to share 
their experiences of arrest, detention and trial. This provided information rich in its 
detail and ensured that the quality and validity of the data obtained was not 
compromised. Evidence of this is seen in the following Chapter. 
7. Ethical Considerations 
The increased concern for accountability in research has led to the establishment of 
systems for research governance. Thus, data and information arising out of research 
should be accessible and open to scrutiny. This requires researchers to conduct their 
work responsibly, subject to the highest ethical standards within the moral and legal 




The nature of the in-depth, unstructured nature of qualitative research and the fact 
that ‘it raises issues that are not always anticipated mean that ethical considerations 
have a particular resonance in qualitative research studies’ (Ritchie and Lewis, 
2003:66). The need to pay close heed to ethical issues in qualitative research is well 
documented (Ritchie et al 2013, Miller et al 2012; Christians, 2000; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2000; Fine et al, 2000 among others). This involves responsibilities to 
research participants, particularly the boys, to colleagues, policy makers, and the 
people to whom the findings derived will be made aware of.   
Joseph Maxwell (2009:216) argues that ‘ethical concerns should be involved in 
every aspect of design’ including methods, goals, the selection of research questions, 
validity concerns, and the critical assessment of the conceptual framework. Given that 
there was a need to interview a range of participants, it was envisaged that there would 
likely to be inherent tensions particularly owing to the fluidity and inductive 
uncertainty in undertaking qualitative research with ethical guidelines that are static 
and increasingly formalised through the requirements in ensuring ethics clearances in 
universities and funding agencies.  
Thus, this study sought to ensure that participants had a complete understanding of 
the purpose and methods to be used in the study, the risks involved, and the demands 
placed upon them as a participant. Participants were also made aware that due 
consideration would be made to ensure that confidentiality is maintained but that 
despite every effort made to preserve it, anonymity and confidentiality may in certain 
circumstances be compromised. 
The primary ethical issues in this research revolved on issues of informed consent, 
anonymity and confidentiality. The other key issues related to the management of 
disclosures, and to participants’ potential discomfort, particularly for the boys in the 
Henry Gurney School. 
Further as this research involved incarcerated boys with one aged 17, due care and 
diligence to the protocols covering such research as defined by the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Research Ethics and Research 
Governance Code at Lancaster University as well the standards of good ethical and 
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research practice published by The British Society of Criminology’s Code of Ethics for 
Researchers (now the British Society of Criminology Statement of Ethics) 2015 and 
the Social Research Association. The principles of good practice set out in the Data 
Protection Act 1998 (UK) and the Personal Data Protection Act 2010 (Malaysia) 
were abided by. 
However, as Smyth and Williamson note (2004: 10), these codes operate primarily 
on a system of ‘self-regulation’ given that membership of these organisations is 
voluntary and the guidelines are not enforceable by law.  In fact, Goodyear-Smith et al 
(2002) suggest that if the emphasis is on the prevention of unethical research, this 
inevitably results in the impediment of researchers from doing their work. The 
preferable focus should be the promotion of ethical research. (Emphasis added). Yet 
this is also a contested matter with some arguing that the ethical review process is 
more concerned about institutional liability (Adler and Adler, 2002) than about the 
promotion of ethical research. 
While social researchers can interpret ethical guidelines as just that, merely 
guidelines, researchers are, nevertheless, subject to certain legal requirements that 
influence how research ethics, and more specifically issues of informed consent, are 
managed particularly where children are involved. Malaysia does not have similar 
provisions to for example Article 8 of the United Kingdom’s the Human Rights Act 
1998 or the Data Protection Act 1998 which has been suggested to have relevance to 
consent in relation to all research (Montgomery, 2003).   
The Human Rights Act 1998 protects the right to respect for private and family life 
and is argued to support the need for consent to participate in research (Masson, 
2004).  In the context of medical records, the European Court of Human Rights is of 
the view that, ‘the protection of personal data, particularly medical data, is of 
fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of his or her right to respect for 
private and family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention’ (MS v Sweden 
(1997) 28 EHRR 313, para. 41). 
The Malaysian constitution does not have similar provisions and the right to 
privacy is not expressly recognised as a constitutional right. Malaysian courts have 
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however recognised a cause of action for violation or invasion of privacy rights is 
actionable under the law of tort. For example, in Lee Ewe Poh v Dr Lim Teik Man & 
Anor [2011] 1 MLJ 835, a patient was successful in an action against her doctor for 
taking photographs of her private parts during a stapler haemorrhoidectomy procedure 
without her consent.  
The Malaysian Personal Data Protection Act 2010 regulates the collection, 
holding, processing and use of personal data however; the Act has no application in 
relation to non-commercial affairs. There are specific laws that govern healthcare and 
the issue of consent is recognised as far as research in these areas are concerned. The 
lack of specific regulatory framework governing the right to privacy in Malaysia 
notwithstanding, this research adopted those standards expected and expressed 
through the various codes and guidelines identified.  
In the context of this study, the initial submission for ethical approval commenced 
in November 2015 and involved the completion of the required documentation as per 
the Research Ethics and Research Governance Code at Lancaster University. This 
involved the completion of prescribed forms, the submission of an outline of the 
proposed study and documents that provide an assurance of ethical procedures to 
follow regarding the use of human subjects in this study (a complete set of participant 
information sheets and consent forms with variations to take into account the 
appropriate level of understanding for children). At this point in time, details of the 
potential incarcerated participants were not known. Ethical approval was obtained in 
early 2016. An amended submission was made in July 2017 following conditions 
imposed by the Henry Gurney School. This is considered below. 
 As such, formal written consent from all participants was obtained including from 
the legal guardians of the boys and from the boys directly involved in the research. 
This was supported with an information sheet specifying what participation entails. 
Participants were given assurances as to confidentiality and anonymity as well as to 
their right to withdraw from the research. All data was digitised, password protected 
and all portable devices used for the storage of identifiable data was password 
encrypted. The relevant documents are found in Appendices 1 and 2. 
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8. The Henry Gurney School, Puncak Borneo, Sarawak experience 
As noted above, the Henry Gurney School was established by the Henry Gurney 
School Regulations in 1949 pursuant to the Juvenile Courts Act 1947. It is a closed, 
secure institution for the detention of children and juveniles aged between 14 to 21 
years pursuant to Section 74 of the Child Act 2001.  As at August 2017, there are five 
Henry Gurney Schools, namely in Telok Mas, Melaka (all-boys); Kota Kinabalu, 
Sabah (all-girls); Keningau, Sabah (all-boys); Puncak Borneo, Sarawak (all-boys); and 
Batu Gajah, Perak (all-girls).   
I had been given permission to interview 10 boys in the Henry Gurney School 
Puncak Borneo. The Henry Gurney School Puncak Borneo is an all-boys correctional 
institution, governed by Malaysia Prisons Department under the purview of the 
Ministry of Home Affairs.66 As the school comes under the supervision of the Prison 
Department, the provisions of the Prison Act 1995 and Prison Regulations 2000 
apply. These laws have very limited special provisions for young prisoners.  
The Prison Act 1995 defines a juvenile or a young offender as a prisoner who is 
under the age of 21 years.  As noted above, the Prison system does not use the phrase 
‘child in conflict with the law’ but uses a different definition and acknowledges a 
wider aged range of persons. In this instance, all the boys interviewed save one, 
entered the Henry Gurney system before they were 18. 
The school is co-located within the Puncak Borneo Prison complex, which is about 
30 kilometres away from the heart of Kuching, 980 kilometres and two hours by flight 
from Kuala Lumpur, where I reside (Figure 5 below).  
                                                 
66 The Prison Department is also responsible for the administration and management of all penal 




Figure 5: A map of Malaysia indicating the geographical locations of Kuala Lumpur and Kuching. 
Available at <http://www.sejarah-negara.com> [3 October 2017]. 
The Prison has a total area of 43.91 hectares, is surrounded by high walls, and is 
equipped with an anti-climb fence and an integrated electronic security system, which 
includes CCTV monitoring (Figure 6, below). It has a capacity for 550 male and 
female inmates who are either remand or convicted prisoners. Although the Prison 
itself began operations in 2008, it only commenced receiving juveniles in 2016 
(Prison Department, Malaysia, n.d.). 
 
 
Figure 6: Entrance to the Puncak Borneo Prison, Kuching Sarawak. Source: Prison Department 
Malaysia. Available at: <http://www.prison.gov.my/images/carta-en/penjara-penjara.htm> [10 Sep 
2017].   
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The school is equipped with basic facilities, such as classrooms, a canteen, 
dormitories, offices and counselling rooms. The juveniles are required to participate in 
a series of structured programmes through the Putra Module (putra means son in 
Malay and derives its origins from Sanskrit). The overall approach is to shape 
attitudes and to develop knowledge and skills akin to those once used in the Borstal 
system in the United Kingdom. The language of section 75 (1) (c) (ii) of the Child Act 
2001 reflects this, ‘[that]by reason of the nature of the child’s criminal habits and 
tendencies it is expedient that the child be subject to detention for such term and under 
such instruction and discipline as appears most conducive to his reformation and the 
repression of crime.’ 
These modules cater to those below the age of 18 years, those aged 18 and above 
and those without basic education (Kassim, 2006). The requirement to provide 
education is as per the provisions of the Rule 151 of the Prison Rules 2000 and Rule 
38 of the Henry Gurney School Regulations 1949. To ensure that juveniles receive 
appropriate levels of education, retired teachers who are rehired on contract, enter the 
facilities to conduct lessons.  
8.1 Gaining access 
Clearly the context in which this study aims to explore involved several challenges, 
given that there are powerful dynamics at play. The role of the perennial ‘gatekeeper’ 
who ‘controls research access’ cannot be denied (Saunders, 2006). As has been 
considered above, access to data is restricted and there are further restrictions imposed 
by law on certain information. For example, the Official Secrets Act 1972 contains 
provisions which seek to prohibit disclosure of information and other details about 
official documents not necessarily on the basis that the information is otherwise 
unavailable or unobtainable.  
Malaysia does not have in place any laws that support access to information 
through principles of the freedom of information. This is notwithstanding the fact that 
Malaysia has adopted Article 23 of the ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations) Human Rights Declaration, which affirms all the civil and political rights in 
the Universal Declaration of Human of Human Rights. The freedom of speech 
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provision in the Federal Constitution (Article 10) is narrowly interpreted and as such, 
freedom of information is not regarded as a fundamental human right. This of course 
makes the issue of gaining access a live issue for researchers. 
Following University approval to conduct interviews, I made a formal written 
request to the Malaysian Prison Department to interview children in the prison system. 
The Prison Department required a copy of my offer letter, a copy of an outline of my 
research proposal and the proposed questions for the children. However, this request 
was rejected via a formal letter dated 24th November 2016 with the justification that 
the children concerned were already being ‘subjected to too many studies’ (Appendix 
5). 
Blaxter et al. suggest that researchers need to ‘negotiate access’ and to ‘adopt a 
reasoned, planned and modest strategy’ to improve the probability in gaining access to 
such documents or information (as cited in Noaks and Wincup, 2004:55). This process 
of negotiation will require the researcher to ensure that the process of research is not 
potentially threatening to the gatekeeper so as not create ‘politics of distrust’ (Davies 
et al., 2011). To avoid the potential to cause such distrust it is best to create an 
environment that is characterised by ‘mutual respect, trust and professional integrity’ 
typified as a “warm” environment (Larsen and Walby, 2012:281).  
I adopted these strategies to appeal the rejection. This involved making phone calls 
and negotiating with the Prison Department to gain access. The discussions centred on 
answering issues identified by Bogdan and Bilken (2007:87-88) namely explaining in 
greater detail specific aspects of the study, the expected level of disruption to the daily 
routines of staff and participants, the ultimate purpose of the study and exploring 
future engagements with the Prison Department. There was also an honest discussion 
with the Prison Department officials as to the ultimate objective of the study in 
relation to the children in conflict with the law and I had the opportunity to discuss the 
prospects of future engagements with the Prison Department. 
 Following these discussions, I made a formal appeal, which was submitted in June 
2017. The Prison Department in a letter dated 21st June 2017, approved the request to 
interview ten male juveniles (limited to Malaysian citizens) and two senior 
153 
 
correctional officers at the Henry Gurney School, Puncak Borneo, Sarawak (this is 
980km away and two hours by flight from Kuala Lumpur) on the 19th July 2017 from 
9.30 a.m. to 3.30 p.m.  
In approving the study, the following conditions were imposed: 
1. That I would undertake inter alia: 
a. not to use information obtained for purposes of publicity or use such 
information in any seminar, forum, conference, symposium or academic 
journal or any other medium that would facilitate other parties obtaining 
such information; 
b. not to capture images, record the interviews using devices and to comply 
with a list of 11 other conditions; 
c. not to adversely affect the image of the Prison Department, the Ministry 
of Home Affairs and the Government of Malaysia; 
d. to submit two copies of the research findings to the Institution as well as 
the Policy Division, Malaysian Prison Department. 
2. A further requirement to sign off a letter of undertaking to comply with the 
specific conditions of the Official Secrets Act 1972 and to acknowledge that the 
full extent of the law will be applied should there be a breach of the provisions 
therein. 
The Prison Department also reserved the right to withdraw the approval granted or 
the results of the research carried out in the event of any material breach of the 
conditions imposed (for the full set of documents as translated see Appendix 6). 
The level of gatekeeper control therefore was at multiple levels. These included 
limiting the conditions for access to participants, limiting access to data and to 
respondents, restricting the scope of analysis and by retaining prerogatives with 
respect to dissemination strategies (Broadhead and Rist, 1976).  
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Firstly, there were controls as to where (emphasis added) it was appropriate to 
conduct the study. The reasons for the choice of the specific institution selected were 
not made known to me. There were other Henry Gurney Schools closer to Kuala 
Lumpur and the trip to Puncak Borneo incurred personal costs and resulted in delays 
in the completion of this study. In negotiations with the Prison Department, the 
suggestion was that children in the Integrity School and those in the Henry Gurney 
Schools closer to Kuala Lumpur were being subject to too many studies and this had 
an impact on staffing and the juvenile’s daily routines. It was necessary therefore to 
persevere although admittedly, the impact on time and cost in most circumstances 
would deter researchers to pursue the opportunity to interview participants. 
Secondly, gatekeeper control was exercised in the choice of participants or who 
(emphasis added) to interview. The boys were pre-selected by the institution and were 
made to sign off institutional consent forms prior to the interview date. The criteria for 
selection was not made known but only male juveniles were to be interviewed. There 
was no indication of whether the boys were given the option to decide whether they 
wanted to take part in the study. The sample was ten juveniles in conflict with the law, 
aged between 17 to 20 years old (a mean of 19.4)67 and I had no control of the age 
group selected. It does appear that the institution had decided to select older boys, 
perhaps being mindful of the nature of the subject matter of the interviews. The 
obvious danger here was the potential for institution managed information being 
inherently “safe” or biased given that the choice of participants was determined by the 
School. The potential for such danger is explored further below.  
Finally, gatekeeper control was also asserted in how (emphasis added) the 
information obtained could be used. The numerous restrictions on the use of 
information and the nuances of maintaining institutional reputation at the peril of 
punishment presented interesting challenges as to gatekeeper control and management 
of data. 
                                                 
67 The Henry Gurney School is a closed secure institution for the detention of children aged between 
14 to 21 years. While the mean was 19.4 years, the boys interviewed (save one) entered the system 
prior to being 18 years of age and a few of them encountered aspects of the juvenile justice system 
early on in their lives. The interviews ought to explore the experiences leading up to incarceration.  
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These matters are not new and the notion of gatekeeper control and access to 
information has been the subject of concern amongst researchers. Broadhead and Rist 
(1976) cite Spencer’s study of the military elite in West Point and summarised the 
strategies often employed by gatekeepers thus:  
1. Refusal to allow access to data by classifying “For Official Use Only”; 
2. Limited access only to data that are either incomplete, distorted, or managed; 
3. Explicit control of the researcher by the assignment of personnel (1976:329). 
Clearly, there were pragmatic issues to consider as well. If I breached the 
conditions imposed, I would certainly forfeit any future entry or research opportunities 
with the Prison Department. This of course interferes with any plans to engage with 
the institution. My pragmatic consideration here was one succinctly described by 
Buchanan et al (1988) as a four-stage access model of ‘getting in, getting on, getting 
out and getting back.’ Further, given that one of the fundamental aspects of this study 
was to, as a matter of principle, listen to children’s voices and viewpoints, this 
opportunity was too invaluable to refuse, the restrictions notwithstanding. 
As noted above, the need to be critically reflexive required an evaluation of the 
researcher’s role and the research subject. In this context, this included considering 
children’s voices within the specific institutional setting, to reflect on the negotiations 
and interactions with the Prison Department, the role of the gatekeeper and the level 
of influence the research process. As Glazer (1972:172) notes, ‘a conscious attempt to 
compile cases of bureaucratic intrusion would be enlightening and would serve to alert 
other social scientists to the variety of dangers they face as they attempt to study those 
whose power far exceeds their own.’ The experience in the context of this study 
exemplifies the need for the researcher to work at developing the relationship with the 
gatekeeper to establish points of commonality that can serve as the foundation to 
develop future engagements.  
Further, in the context of this study, the requirements imposed by the central Prison 
Department was mitigated by the positive response received at the Henry Gurney 
School, Puncak Borneo in Kuching. Staff were favourable and supportive of the 
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nature of the study. The boys were forthright and honest with their thoughts and there 
was no evidence of control or censorship exercised by the institution. The lived 
experience of the boys afforded invaluable insight into the complex issues the study 
explored. There was also an opportunity to continue engagement with the custodial 
officers through training in the future. These aspects are explored below. 
8.2 Informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity  
Informed consent means that participants enter the research project voluntarily, 
understanding the nature of the study and the danger and obligations that are involved 
(Bogdan & Biklen, 2007). It is an ethical principle that implies a responsibility on the 
part of the researcher to ‘strive to ensure that those involved as participants in research 
not only agree and consent to participating in the research of their own free choice, 
without being pressurized or influenced, but that they are fully informed about what it 
is they are consenting to’ (Davies, 2006: 150). 
Thus, an explanation ought to be in terms “meaningful” to participants. (Emphasis 
added).  Researchers should also make clear that participants have the right to refuse 
permission or withdraw from involvement in research at any time and the extent to 
which they will be afforded anonymity and confidentiality (British Society of 
Criminology Statement of Ethics, 2015; Statement of Ethical Practice for the British 
Sociological Association, 2002). The American Psychological Association’s Ethical 
Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct suggests that researchers should use 
language that is ‘reasonably understandable’ (2017, Para 3.10a:6). 
In most cases of academic research, this process involves two stages; the 
submission of relevant documents (including a participant information sheet and 
consent forms) to seek clearance from a university ethics committee and this then 
requires the researcher making an undertaking to obtain informed consent from the 
participant prior to the research being conducted. There may be some variation in this 
process. For example, in a study of international variation in ethics committee 
requirements in New Zealand, United Kingdom, Israel, Canada and America a range 
from nil in Israel to considerable amendments designed to minimise participant harm 
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in New Zealand was found (Goodyear-Smith et al, 2002). As noted above, in the 
context of this study, these processes were complied with.  
As this research involved incarcerated boys, there was a need to pay special 
attention to ethical concerns involving consent. At one end of the spectrum, one of the 
boys was aged 17. The philosophical debate centres around whether children are 
competent enough to give informed consent or is there a need for additional consent 
from an adult responsible for the child at the time participation is sought. What then is 
the level of understanding that children can be expected to have of what they are 
consenting to? 
Farrell (2005) for example, suggests that researchers should regard children as 
competent participants and therefore respect their informed consent to participate in 
the research and correspondingly their right to decline involvement or withdraw from 
research.  
As argued by Alderson, ‘to involve children more directly in research can rescue 
them from silence and exclusion, and from being represented, by default, as passive 
objects, whilst respect for their informed and voluntary consent can help to protect 
them from covert, invasive, exploitative or abusive research’ (2001:142). In this 
process, research involving children should demonstrate ‘respect for children’s status 
as social actors,’ but should not ‘diminish adult responsibilities’ to them and in so 
doing there is significant knowledge that can be gained (Woodhead and Faulkner 
2000: 31).  
From a Malaysian perspective, the age of consent is determined by the Age of 
Majority Act 1971, which sets the age of majority at 18. Thus, as far as the law is 
concerned, a child below the age of 18 requires the consent of the parents or 
guardians. However, in recognising the social status of children, I felt it necessary for 
the boy aged 17 to also consent to the study thereby implying that correspondingly, 
the boy concerned should be able to deny participation.  
A second aspect of the spectrum is that given that this research involved boys in 
institutional settings, Heath et al., (2007) argue that children must be fully informed 
failing which the consent becomes a question of assent, which refers to a passive 
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acceptance or non-refusal. (Emphasis added). This refers to a ‘non-refusal or simple 
agreement without the understanding, discretion and legal validity associated with 
consequences’ (Alderson, 2007:2274). 
 However, in the Henry Gurney experience, regulatory requirements mandated 
securing consent from adult gatekeepers (in this case, institutional officers). Thus, my 
approach was to respect the gatekeeper’s legitimate interests in securing consent but at 
the same time ensuring that the principle of obtaining informed consent directly from 
the boys is not ignored or based on passive assent rather than freely given and fully 
informed consent. This is to avoid making the legal debate about minors’ consent 
more about adults’ freedoms than about children’s rights (Alderson, 2007:2273). 
In the context of this study, the participant information sheets and consent forms 
were sent to the Henry Gurney School in advance of the interview date. On the date of 
the interview, the details of the participant information sheet were explained to each 
participant and participants signed off accordingly. The institution had also mandated 
that the participants consent to taking part in the study using a standard set of forms 
prepared by the Prison Department.  
Of the ten participants, one was aged 17 at the time of the interview. A child 
committed to the Henry Gurney School will be subject to the care, control and legal 
custody of the Commissioner of the Henry Gurney School. Parents do have some 
measure of visitation rights but in all other respects, the institution now has legal 
authority over the child akin to a ward of the State. One of the conditions for 
committal is that the parents or guardian of the child can no longer exercise or is 
incapable of exercising any proper control over the child (section 75(b) (i) of the Child 
Act 2001). Therefore, in so far as these child, the Prison Department acted as the 
institutional guardian and therefore had the power to grant consent in the conduct of 
research. As considered above, I was not aware of who I was to interview until the day 
of the interviews itself. 
A further matter that emerged was the requirement to submit two copies of the 
research findings to the Institution as well as the Policy Division of the Malaysian 
Prison Department. While all participants would be anonymised in the study, 
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anonymity and confidentiality could not be fully assured. Because of this 
development, an amended submission to the original University ethics application was 
made. This was approved before the interviews commenced. The participant 
information sheet for the participants in the Henry Gurney School were amended 
accordingly (Appendices 3 and 4) and all participants were informed of this. Details of 
the study were explained again to each of the participants and this was done in the 
Malay language as well. All documents had already been translated to the Malay 
language prior to the interview. All participants accepted this and there were no 
withdrawals from the study. Details of these matters are considered below. 
One of the advantages of qualitative research is the discovery-based nature of the 
approach. This approach often yields valuable information that emerge from 
conversations with participants and often significant methodological decisions are 
made on the cusp of new research questions and issues that may be drawn from the 
process of data gathering itself. However as noted by Smythe and Murray (2000) this 
complicates the informed consent process as it incurs the risk that the research 
interview may touch on issues that neither the researcher nor the participant were 
prepared to discuss and therefore may well go beyond what was specified in the 
informed consent documents. 
The reality though, is that ‘full disclosure of information is neither definable nor 
achievable’ (O’Neill, 2002:44). A cognizance of these issues is certainly important but 
perhaps informed consent ‘must not be treated as a sacred principle’ and its 
application ‘will vary according to circumstance’ (Hammersley & Traianou, 2012: 
98). Some of these issues emerged in this study as participants shared their life 
experiences beyond the confines of the specific research documents.  
8.3 Conversations with the boys in the Henry Gurney School 
I had arrived in Kuching a day before the assigned date of the interviews. As I had 
never visited the facility before, I hired a car and headed out in search of the Prison 
complex. The complex is in a remote area surrounded by villages and plantations.  
Having located the facility, I returned to the Hotel and spent the evening preparing for 
the interviews. I had some levels of anxiousness as I was not too sure what to expect 
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and was concerned with my ability to capture conversations without the aid of a 
recording device. 
  I left the hotel at 8.00 a.m. and arrived at the Prison complex by about 8.45 a.m. 
Access to the School involved a vehicle and security check at the entrance to the 
Prison complex (See Figure 6 above). After a short drive of about 1km, I was required 
to leave my car at a designated visitor car park. About 500 meters from the car park, I 
was taken through another set of high secure gates (three in total) before arriving at 
the School complex. I was met by the officer in charge of my visit and led to an 
administrative office. 
Within the complex, the boys moved around freely. All of them had their heads 
shaved and were dressed in white uniforms while correctional officers were dressed in 
dark brown uniforms. Correctional officers were not armed although there were armed 
personnel at the entry point and at other specific locations within the entire complex. 
The boys have defined and structured daily activities. I was informed that the muster 
roll at the time of the interview at the facility was 91 boys. I found that the very use of 
the archaic term “muster” was a clear and stark reminder that I was in a prison and 
that a substantial part of prison culture and its physical structure have remained 
unchanged over centuries. 
Prior to the interview being conducted, all my personal effects (my phone, bag and 
other personal effects) had to be surrendered and were stored in a secure locker in a 
secure office. I was only allowed to keep my folder containing the documents needed 
for the interviews. I was reminded on the prohibition on using recording devices. The 
children were interviewed in a small private room adjacent to the administrative 
offices. The room was about 27.8 square meters and had a solid iron door with a 
sliding bolt. The visual cues of prison life real and present. 
 As a matter of security, a correctional officer sat at the back of the room. I was 
informed that his presence was to ensure my safety and security. Perhaps, he was also 
there to ensure I did not ask damaging questions or alternatively to ensure that I did 
not ask questions that might be harmful to the boys. I was not entirely sure what his 
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presence truly achieved as his presence was not uniformly exercised and there were 
long periods where he was not present. 
As discussed above, the questions (see Appendix 8) and participant information 
sheets were translated into the Malay language and had been sent to the Prison prior to 
the interview. The Prison had also mandated that each participant sign off an 
institutional consent form. The institutional officers also signed all the forms and this 
included my letter of undertaking. 
I met with ten boys and two correctional officers. The boys were aged between 17 
to 20 years old (a mean of 19.4 years), who have been incarcerated in the Henry 
Gurney School with some having been incarcerated for only six months and those 
who were there for two years. The range of convictions included property-offences 
(theft, possession of stolen goods for example), substance abuse, statutory rape, 
criminal intimidation and attempted murder. Most of these offences took place when 
the juvenile was under the age of 18.  
One of the respondents was married and two had children. 20% of the respondents 
were ethnic Malay and the rest came from the native population of Sarawak (from 
tribal populations like the Iban or the Dayak people). The Malay language as spoken 
in these regions is slightly different from that which is spoken in Kuala Lumpur but 
this did not pose a problem as good rapport was achieved with the participants and I 
was able to converse with them in a rather casual mode. I was not dressed in a formal 
manner and this in addition, I believe, helped in making the boys feel less intimidated. 
Given that the boys only spoke in the Malay language, the process of transcription 
involved translating conversations from the Malay language to the English language. 
The translation process can be a complex and challenging situation particularly, if the 
researcher is not a native speaker of the language used by the research participants 
(Moerman, 1996). However, in the case of this study, as I have spoken the Malay 
language since early childhood, I did not have to rely on an interpreter in conducting 
the interviews and could translate the conversations myself.  
In those cases where the researcher and the translator are the same person Vulliamy 
suggests that the quality of translation is influenced by factors such as: the 
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autobiography of the researcher-translator; the researcher’s knowledge of the language 
and the culture of the people under study and the researcher’s fluency in the language 
of the write-up (Vulliamy, 1990).  
While there are valid concerns about the translation process, in the case of this 
study, there were a number of factors that ensured that the quality of the translation 
process was not compromised.  
Firstly, given that this study did not involve conversation analysis or represent an 
ethnographic or anthropological study, issues of language and translation were not the 
primary focus of this study. Given the specific aims of the study, the approach taken 
was therefore to ensure that the process of reduction and representation was primarily 
to make the written text readable and meaningful while ensuring accuracy of the 
transcript. 
Secondly, the Malay language is the national language in Malaysia and it was the 
medium of instruction throughout my educational experience and thus not a foreign 
language to me. My own familiarity with the language ensured a deeper level of 
context to the conversations. This element of familiarity with the language meant that 
the boys felt that I understood their cultural perspectives (Temple 2002). The 
advantage of this is that the boys were speaking to me in a language they were 
comfortable with as such and consequently, the boys were forthcoming with sharing 
their experiences. 
Thirdly, given the restrictions on time imposed by the Prison Department, the 
questions were very focussed and direct and as such the responses from the boys were 
also focussed on the specific matters raised. This led to a more direct use of language 
which in turn meant that the perils of conversations getting lost in translation were 
negated. Further, given the formal use of the Malay language used, the conversations 
did not involve the use of prison argot (Crewe & Einat, 2007). 
At the start of each interview, I explained the purpose of the meeting and each 
aspect of the consent form was explained in the Malay language. These documents 
were prepared with children in mind and hence the language used was direct. The 
boys took the time to read the entire participant information sheet and in some 
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instances verbalising each clause. I had not expected this yet I felt that they were 
genuinely seeking to be sure about the process and verbalising helped them 
understand what they were reading. This was very different with my engagement with 
stakeholders who moved through this part of the process rather quickly.  
I also explained the issue of institutional access to data in that the issues we 
discussed would be made available to the Prison Department. The boys did not appear 
too concerned with this issue. There was genuine interest in the subject matter being 
explored and the presence of the correctional officer in the room appeared to have no 
impact on the level of engagement that each participant demonstrated.  I did not feel 
that the boys feared that any information they disclose would result in reprisals once I 
left.  
I found that the boys were very cooperative and open with their thoughts even 
though they were dealing with a stranger. I developed a level of understanding with 
them and clearly, the use of the Malay language facilitated easier conversational 
discussions. However, at the same time, I was prepared to encounter situations where 
they were saying things they believed I wanted to hear. Some of the boys clearly 
attempted to downplay their active participation in crimes for example, but this was 
balanced with some conversations that indicated greater reflection on their role in 
crimes. One or two of the boys were using drugs from as early as 13. I observed the 
impact of the long-term use of these drugs in some of the conversations. There were 
perceivable deficits in thinking and motor skills (for example slowness in reading the 
documents and some difficulty in handling the pen to write, or in opening the door). 
As narrating their experiences may be upsetting or traumatic, I endeavoured to 
ensure that my communication and interviewing of the boys was done in a sensitive 
and respectful manner. I had been required to have an observer trained in psychology 
present to ensure that I did not ask questions that were harmful or damaging and we 
(the observer and I) had prior discussions on how I should structure my approach in 
talking to the boys. I used an informal and relaxed approach to help the boys feel at 
ease.  In exercising a reflexive approach in this study, I sought to balance the 
obligation to protect boys from harm while also ensuring that their rights in 
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participating in this study are respected. However, at the end of the process, I could 
not be certain of the consequences of our conversations. There was an indication that 
the boys do share their experiences with each other as well as with counsellors, which 
may mitigate some of these emotional experiences. 
Towards the end of each interview, we spoke of other matters; sports, music and 
other interests that they may have. We spoke of their aspirations and hopes, and 
explored positive issues. Some of them had clear ideas about what they wanted to do 
while others were not too sure.  
   The interviews commenced at 9.15 a.m. and ended a little after 5.00 p.m. with a 
lunch break in between. Each interview took about 30 minutes. While this was a very 
intense process, I found that listening to the boys provided meaningful insight into 
their lives in a system that is supposed to have their best interests in mind. I took a 
lunch break at about 1.00 p.m. Lunch was in a canteen manned by female inmates 
from the main Prison complex, dressed in coloured uniforms that reflect their status 
(for example, remand or sentenced). These women appear to have some level of 
freedom in preparing the food and operating the cash till. 
The interviews primarily focused on understanding the background of the boys and 
their experience through the criminal justice system including the present experience 
in the Henry Gurney School. Their awareness on child rights and on diversion were 
also explored. It was indeed a challenge to record conversations without the benefit of 
a recording device, but I made notes of salient points raised.  
At the end of the session with the boys, I then had a discussion with two 
correctional officers. I was struck by the openness and honesty they displayed. I 
believe that this could be attributable to the fact that institutions operating further from 
central control functioned differently and I had the impression that the officers in this 
particular Henry Gurney facility had greater levels of latitude in how they behaved 
even with an “outsider” like me. 
As I left, the reality of the incarceration for these boys was clearly felt. I could 
walk out but they could not. After returning to the hotel, I recorded my thoughts and 
impressions on a recording device. This afforded an opportunity to reflect on the 
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events of the day. Listening to the boys and their experiences certainly gave me a 
special insight into their lives and allowed me an opportunity to experience for myself 
how the CRC and the corresponding laws and policies operate in the lives of these 
boys. I was struck by the paradox of gaining access. It was easier to meet the adults 
who are involved in the system then to meet the very children subjected through the 
system. I felt that children’s voices were subject to adult controls, in a very adult 
dominated environment.  
I understood that I needed to be pragmatic about my emotional experience through 
this process. Yet this was not easy. The narratives, while providing insights into their 
lives were also stories about their lives and about mistakes and regrets. (Emphasis 
added). In most cases these were stories about their unpleasant experience in a system 
designed by adults, apparently in the guise of treaty obligations, yet instead exposed 
them to the harsh realities of adult life in prison. Some of these views also emerged in 
my discussions with the adult interviewees. Many of the elites work closely with 
children but I must admit that there was a sense of helplessness with the current state 
of affairs. Many of these boys will soon exit the system and attempt to build a normal 
life yet I was not sure if this is possible given the effects of incarceration and the lives 
they led prior to incarceration. I was encouraged by the prospects of returning in the 
future to conduct child rights training and engaging with other stakeholders in this 
process. 
9. Analysis of data 
In keeping with a phenomenological analysis of the conversations with the key 
stakeholders, the method of analysis undertaken is to take the significant statements 
and group them into larger units of information to seek themes and patterns. This 
approach to data analysis as applied through the lens of a constructivist, involved 
using descriptive and evaluative thematic coding of the interview transcripts. This 
facilitated breaking the data down into more manageable “chunks” and organising of 
the data using computers in qualitative data analysis. 
The use of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS) is not without 
criticism. Early on (Seidel, 1991) suggests that software may cause researchers to be 
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guided in a particular direction and that the conflation of coding with analysis leads to 
‘analytic madness’ (1991:109). Another challenge is that that the extensive use of 
technological aids could, as encountered by Seidel himself; distance the researcher 
from the data. Further, the vast volume of data can often result in a quantitative 
analysis of qualitative data, which then muddles the methods across the social 
sciences (Barry, 1998).  
The approach taken in the context of this work is to rely in the use of CAQDAS as 
a supplementary tool for organising the data. In an early study of qualitative 
researchers who had used data analysis software, Smith and Hesse-Biber (1996) found 
that it was used mainly as an organising tool. Of course, in the 20 years since, 
software development precipitates far greater range of use but as far as this work is 
concerned, the principal use of such software is to carry out administrative tasks of 
organising the data more efficiently. The analysis seeks to go beyond merely counting 
words or extracting objective content from texts but endeavors to examine meanings, 
themes and patterns that may be manifest or latent in the interview transcripts.  
In the context of this research, I decided to use NVivo68 as the CAQDAS of choice 
over other packages. This decision was taken primarily because it was relatively 
simple to use and it was possible to import documents directly from a word processing 
package and organise these documents easily on screen. Thus, the software served as a 
central repository from which access to the transcripts (and audio files) was easily 
referenced, ‘to capture the meanings, valid inferences from emphasis, and themes of 
texts’ (Krippendorff, 2004:19).  
The process of coding and analysing data proceeded through ‘data reduction and 
sense-making effort’ from which the volume of qualitative material was evaluated to 
identify ‘core consistencies and meanings’ (Patton, 2002:453). This was followed with 
a process of seeking clarity in the data and synthesizing parallel ideas. Systematic 
labelling concepts yielded themes that were subject to an initial coding before the final 
                                                 
68 NVivo is a software package designed by © QSR International Pty Ltd to aid qualitative data 
analysis. For this study, NVivo 11 was used. 
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themes were arrived at. The specific themes and sub-themes that emerged are 
explored in the following Chapter. 
The transcription of conversations did not follow in the traditions of verbatim 
transcription and so the written words were not an exact replication of the audio 
recorded words (Poland, 1995). This approach was taken as I felt that the process of 
transcription should be more about interpretation and generation of meanings 
(Halcomb & Davidson, 2006). Thus, in keeping with the specific research objectives, 
the process of transcription was reflexive and iterative. 
In dealing with the conversations with the boys in the Malay language, I had to 
decide whether to use a literal or a less restrictive approach to the translation of the 
interviews into English. Honig (1997) suggests that a literal, word-for-word 
translation does greater justice to the participant’s thoughts. The drawback is that such 
a practice reduces the readability of the text. Given that the aim of the study was to 
present information that could shape policy decision making and impact practitioners, 
a less restrictive contextual ‘free’ translation approach was taken to the text. Thus, a 
reconstructive approach was used to “polish” the conversations being mindful that in 
the process of editing that I was alert to the risk of misrepresenting the meaning of the 
conversational partner (Rubin and Rubin, 2012). However, as indicated above, the 
questions used in the context of the study were specific to the aims of the study and 
involved very direct responses and as such, I believe the potential for misrepresenting 
the boys was greatly mitigated. 
10.  Reflections 
Evaluating legal scholarship can present challenges. Rubin (1992) suggests that 
although legal academics are constantly engaged in the process of evaluating legal 
scholarship, this invariably does not involve the application of any theory of 
evaluation. In most cases, legal academics evaluate legal scholarship ‘by intuition, 
trusting in some undefined quality of judgment’ (1992:889) or on the basis ‘of vague 
discussions in the faculty lounge’ (Coombs, 1992:706).  
In the absence of how standards are met, Kissam suggests that, ‘works of 
scholarship are characterized as “original,” “insightful,” and “outstanding,” or 
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conversely as “unimaginative,” “mechanical” and “routine”.’ (1988:222). Siems 
(2008), argues that the dissemination of knowledge in an original manner to satisfy the 
originality standard for scholarship in a professional discipline like law adds value to 
legal scholarship. Thus, research that analyses a specific legal problem with a view in 
achieving coherence and integrity of the law satisfies the originality standard expected 
in legal scholarship (2008:149). Rubin suggests that legal scholarship be evaluated 
‘using the criteria of clarity, persuasiveness, significance, and applicability’ 
(1992:889).  
My experience in pure doctrinal research provided me with a point of reference to 
frame this study. The whole process of exploring qualitative socio-legal research 
involved a rather steep learning curve but from a personal point of view, this was 
certainly worth the effort. I was keen to ensure that the context of this study avoided 
being vague and disconnected with the social actors that are involved in the juvenile 
justice system. The choice of research design yielded the opportunity to view the law 
in action and provided the richness of experience that I felt, was invaluable. The 
challenges of gaining access and negotiating gatekeeper control were, in the context of 
this study, an important part of this narrative. The conversations with the boys yielded 
an insight that was invaluable and rich in context.  These conversations are considered 


























Conversations-Themes and Patterns 
“...and what is the use of a book,’ thought Alice ‘without pictures or 
conversation?”  
















Twenty-three years have lapsed since the ratification of the CRC in Malaysia and 
in that period, Malaysia has ‘made a legal commitment to invest in the wellbeing of its 
children’ (UNICEF, 2015a). There has been some measure of success in that 
investment. Indeed, in relation to children in conflict with the law, the introduction of 
the Child Act 2001, despite shortcomings addressed in preceding Chapters, 
represented a positive step in recognising aspects of child rights. Further owing to 
UNICEF’s ‘upstream programmatic work’, investments in studies, sub-national 
situation analyses and data work, capacity development and building with key 
government agencies, (UNICEF, 2015b:1) there is greater awareness of child rights 
today.   
For example, UNICEF reports that in October 2015, Magistrates and Sessions 
Court judges received training on child justice. Further, capacity building on diversion 
was conducted in collaboration with the Ministry of Women, Family and Community 
Development, with a focus now on the appropriate diversion model for Malaysia and 
with a pilot study planned in 201669 (UNICEF, 2015b). 
The preceding Chapters dealt with the range of documents that included statutory 
enactments, judicial pronouncements in decided cases, treaty and conventions, 
international audit compliance documents that deal with Malaysia’s treaty and 
convention obligations as well as reports published by non-governmental-
organisations and other international agencies. The underlying norms that provide 
meaning and context to these documents were also considered. 
As has been considered, the position is in Malaysia is that while Malaysia has 
ratified the CRC, there are perceivable problems in keeping with these obligations 
given the socio-political-cultural and religious norms that have shaped views on the 
child in conflict with the law. As noted in Chapter 4, 14 stakeholders in the juvenile 
                                                 




justice system, 2 correctional officers and 10 boys from the Henry Gurney School 
were interviewed.  
The previous Chapters establish the underlying norms that represent the foundation 
for the juvenile justice system in Malaysia. Thus, in relying on these concepts raised, 
the interview data was sorted according to the broad themes explored in Chapters 2 
and 3. As suggested in Chapter 4, the study is not context bound but is designed to be 
context sensitive and reflexive. Therefore data collection and analysis proceeded 
together. Coding and analysing data proceeded through data reduction and sense-
making efforts to identify core consistencies and meanings (Patton, 2002).  This was 
followed by a process of reorganising and refining the data. As noted above, 
systematic labelling concepts yielded themes that were subject to an initial coding 
before the final themes were arrived at. 
Five broad themes emerged in the context of issues that impinge on the child in 
conflict with the law. Firstly, penal policies in Malaysia have been strongly influenced 
by her colonial past and the underlying norms that exist. These matters are reflected in 
aspects of the juvenile justice system, for example in corporal punishment, prison 
culture and the age of criminal responsibility. 
A second broad theme that emerged was the manner in which children in conflict 
with the law experience the process of remand, custody and judicial proceedings. 
Much of this experience involves the child’s encounter with the police through these 
processes. Children also encounter varying levels of power differentials in these 
situations. 
A third broad theme that transpired was the issue of detention and incarceration and 
its corresponding impact on the children in conflict with the law. These themes and 
sub-themes explore the philosophical aspirations of the treaty obligations and the 
reality of the experiences that a child in conflict with the law endures. 
The fourth theme explored the issue of rights and how such rights were perceived, 




Lastly, a broad theme explored is the issue of diversion and the development, 
implementation and challenges in introducing diversion in Malaysia. Figure 7 below, 
illustrates the themes and sub-themes explored in this Chapter. 
 
Figure 7: Themes and sub-themes. 
The following sections explore these conversations in keeping with the themes and 
sub-themes that emerged. 
2. Penal policies and cultural embeddedness 
The preceding Chapters established the argument that the Malaysian penal policies 
were rooted in the British penal policies. As the country evolved, Malaysia’s penal 
policy has been defined by its identity as a nation with a predominantly state 
controlled media, a dominant one-party political system, a strong central government 
and a strong socio-cultural and religious sphere of influence.  Thus as noted above, the 
attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments that form the collective history of the Malaysian 
political system and the life histories of the individual actors of the system, set the 
foundation for the culture of politics underlying its existing political system. This in 












custody and in 
courts












Detention as a 
last resort?















to children in conflict with the law as well as the treatment of the rights of the child in 
conflict with the law.   
To what extent has the ‘continued potency of national political culture and 
institutional arrangements’ in the determination of criminal justice policy serve to 
further reinforce the ‘cultural embeddedness’ of penal affairs’ in Malaysia? 
(Hamilton, 2013:165). 
2.1 Corporal punishment  
Jones, a child rights activist dealing with children’s issues for the past thirty-five 
years, is critical of the current system noting that: 
“It is more punitive. It is more about, ‘Oh you’ve done something wrong’ and 
therefore, a child is punished. ‘Oh, you have stolen a chicken,’ and therefore, 
they mete out the punishment as prescribed.”70 
Jones considers the issue of caning as an example of this punitive culture. In 
sharing his experience in various national policy-making bodies, he notes: 
“Every time when we have had workshops on torture and the use of the cane for 
example, you will find a group of people saying, ‘my parents used a cane!’  
Jones feels that in his experience Malaysians are stubbornly clinging on to an 
outdated system believing in the notion that pain is the best form of teaching the child 
a lesson. 
As indicated above, the Child (Amendment) Act 2016, abolished whipping as a 
form of punishment for children found guilty of criminal offences. Thus, as it stands, 
caning carried out in open court has been abolished. However, as noted in preceding 
Chapters, caning of children by parents and teachers remains unaffected. Further, 
corporal punishment remains a lawful sentence under Islamic law for males and 
                                                 
70 UNICEF cites a case described by many stakeholders of a child sentenced to imprisonment for 
stealing a chicken although no specific details of the case were provided (UNICEF, 2013:83). 
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females. Much of this centres on the prevailing socio-cultural position and levels of 
cultural embeddedness which will be explored in Chapter 6.  
Noemi an academic in a law school and a member of the National Advisory and 
Consultative Council for Children describes her experience in engaging with society 
on the issue of corporal punishment through public consultations around the country: 
“In summary, in all the public consultations, which had about 500 to 600 
participants, 90% to 98% of them wanted to retain the use of the cane.” 
These consultation sessions suggest that support for corporal punishment finds 
resonance among parents and teachers. Charles, a senior civil servant in the Ministry 
of Women, Family and Community Development, makes this observation in efforts to 
introduce child rights in schools: 
“When we talk about their rights, about corporal punishment; that it is not good 
for the children, there is a contradiction because it is a common practice in 
schools. How are they going to accept us? How are we going to push them to talk 
about this? We have 40 to 50 students in a class with one teacher. The 
international standard is about 20.” 
The teacher-student ratio aside, the issue highlights that while there are those who 
endeavour to introduce change, they are met with resistance and an argument is put 
forward that the existing practice is necessary given the circumstances in Malaysia. 
The impact of race, religion and culture in relation to child rights is very much 
ingrained. Farida, a human rights advocate and member of the Constitutional Law 
Committee, Bar Council, Malaysia is of the view that child rights are marginalised: 
“...so, when it comes to child rights, in Malaysia, just like any other issue, 
unfortunately, it’s seen through these racial and religious lenses, and often enough 




A similar view is expressed by Noemi. In her engagement with society, the general 
feedback she receives is one in which corporal punishment is seen as socio-culturally 
acceptable: 
“When I give talks on parenting, or talks against corporal punishment, I will get 
feedback from the audience such as "Noemi, you know, I was caned when I was 
younger, and I turned out fine. So, what's so bad about caning?"  
Tabitha, in her second term as an opposition Member of Parliament believes that 
this view is attributable to how children are perceived: 
“Parents are authoritative and culturally, we do not acknowledge child rights. 
How many Malaysians are aware of child rights? So, for example, the caning of a 
child by parents or the school, it is not an issue here as it is accepted.” 
Negotiating this complex mix of culture, religion and race is indeed a challenge 
and stakeholders face these realities head-on in their work. One of the key 
stakeholders involved in this process is UNICEF Malaysia. UNICEF’s comprehensive 
report in 2013 has become a starting point for understanding the juvenile justice 
system and has served as a catalyst in introducing changes in the manner Malaysia 
deals with children in conflict with the law.  
Sylvia, a child protection officer in UNICEF, suggests that the approach taken in 
dealing with child rights was to engage with the government with advocacy rather 
than take a confrontational approach. Thus: 
“I think it is a constant process of negotiation and dialogue. I don’t think it’s 
you go to the government and say, ‘these are all the recommendations, let’s do all 
this.’ It’s not how it is going to work. It’s also about building trust.” 
In dealing with some of these socio-cultural issues, Sylvia suggests that UNICEF 
again negotiates its way through by making sure that conversations on sensitive issues 




This process of negotiating around issues is not the experience that Tabitha 
endured in Parliament. She describes the process in which the Child (Amendment) Bill 
2016 was discussed in Parliament. She notes that the Dewan Rakyat71 debated the bill 
(about 65 pages) in 5 hours and by the 4th of May 2016, it had passed the upper house. 
Tabitha also explains the challenges she faces: 
“It is not easy to discuss issues of child rights in Parliament. Issues like child 
marriages, unilateral conversion or even caning become complicated because we 
have socio-cultural issues. As a non-Muslim opposition MP, I am criticised for 
raising these issues. I am asked, ‘Why am I challenging Islam?’ or ‘How can 1.6 
billion Muslims be wrong’. So, this is a challenge for me. There does not appear to 
be any political will to change some things, whether it is the CRC or CEDAW.72” 
Thus Tabitha feels that there is a disconnect between treaty obligations and actual 
implementation on the ground. However, she acknowledges that in areas of child 
health or education, Malaysia appears to be faring better compared to other issues 
including children in conflict with the law. 
This pattern of relationships between international agencies like UNICEF, NGOs, 
civil society and various government stakeholders and the legislative processes 
represents a key component of the development of child rights in Malaysia. Thus, the 
debate about child rights very often involves questions about religion and culture that 
are deeply entrenched. Advocating child rights is seen as a threat to these entrenched 
values and as seen in Tabitha’s experience, the political divide often dominates 
legislative activity. 
 
2.2 Prison culture 
This pattern of relationships and the often-opposite views on penal policies can be 
seen in for example, the issues surrounding capital punishment. As discussed in 
                                                 
71 The Malaysian Parliament is a bicameral Parliament. The lower house, the Dewan Rakyat 
consists of elected representatives and the Dewan Negara, consists of appointed representatives. 
72 The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) is 
an international treaty adopted in 1979 by the United Nations General Assembly. 
177 
 
preceding Chapters, children found guilty of capital offences (for example murder or 
specific drugs offences) are not sentenced to death but are held for an indefinite period 
at the pleasure of the Ruler. Adults are sentenced to judicial canning which is 
administered with a long, heavy rattan cane, not more than half an inch in diameter 
administered to the bare posterior (Section 288, Criminal Procedure Code) and adults 
are hanged (section 281, Criminal Procedure Code). The discussion on the position in 
Malaysia was discussed in Chapter 2. Stakeholder views yielded diametrically 
opposite positions. 
Jones is of the view that capital punishment is not a deterrent: 
“Is it an answer to deter drug trafficking? No, it is not. Research shows that you 
can have all the death penalty you want, it is never deterrence.” 
The insider perspective as viewed through the lenses of a retired prison officer 
elicited a stark reality. Terry a retired prison officer and presently a child counsellor 
was part of the prison system for 35 years. He expresses this honest view of his lived 
experience in adult prisons:  
“I think that we should continue. Many people might not agree, but that’s their 
opinion. I’ve seen executions.73 I don’t feel any pity. I just see, observe, and he dies. I 
just turn around and go back to work. I don’t pity them. I might feel sad for a while, 
but because I am a custodial officer; I am required to do it. There is nothing anyone 
can do. It’s something normal for me. To me, crime doesn’t pay. Whether they are 
innocent or not, I am not sure.” 
Goffman (1961) notes that in ‘total institutions’ typically, two different social and 
cultural worlds between the inmate and officials develop, ‘tending to jog alongside 
each other, with points of official contact but little mutual penetration’ (1961:9). 
Terry’s views of the prisoner reflect the notion that prison officers will in most cases 
regard the inmate ‘as “criminals” after all’ (Weinberg, 1942:721). 
                                                 
73 Section 281 (e) (i) of the Criminal Procedure Code mandates the presence of prison officers 
among others, during the carrying out of the death sentence. 
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Terry’s sense of detachment in witnessing whipping and hangings is part of his 35-
year experience in the system. The sense of being ‘comfortably numb’74 and 
desensitised within the lived experience of prison officers is a well-documented 
experience in prison culture. Liebling and Price (2001) note that, ‘prison work 
demands of staff that they cope with brutality without becoming brutalised’ 
(2001:160). Crawley in Bennett et al (2008) indicate that most prison officers have 
become ‘desensitised to the distress and suffering of others’ (2008:148). This sense of 
detachment is not limited to prison officers. Genders and Player’s (1995) ethnographic 
study of HMP Grendon note the impact of desensitisation on the researcher 
conducting research within the prison system.  
Correctional officers in the Malaysian Prison system are not assigned permanently 
to the sectors that hold children during their service. They are moved within the 
system and so deal with both adults and children. This is may not be the best way to 
deal with the children especially if the issues of being desensitised with the specific 
issues that impact the child.  
Adiba’s observation as a student visiting the Integrity School (as part of the 
Community Outreach Programme and Continuing Legal Education module) is rather 
stark: 
“To be honest, some of the wardens are very negative and seem to have given 
up on the boys. You must be strict, but that doesn’t mean that you must be cold. So 
those wardens in the prison should also treat them like a child.”  
George has been a correctional officer since April 2007 and currently serves in the 
Henry Gurney School, Puncak Borneo. He was actively involved in the setting up of 
the Integrity School in Kajang (a town about 20km from the capital city Kuala 
Lumpur). He is of the view that dealing with children requires a different approach: 
“I think the choice of correctional officers for children should be a specialised 
role and should be based on their personality. Dealing with children requires us to 
                                                 





understand children so that we can develop a rapport with them and build trust. 
We should not be multi-tasking with other roles within the prison system.” 
Luke has been a correctional officer since 2007. He has served in another prison in 
Sarawak before being transferred to the Puncak Borneo Prison. He works in the 
Integrity School system in Puncak Borneo. Luke expresses his view: 
“I am here to work and I have about 30 more years to go. I have to keep fresh 
so training and gaining knowledge about children would help but a promotion 
could result in an officer moving to the adult facility.” 
George agrees: 
“It is a good idea to have more training because here in Sarawak, our exposure 
is lacking compared to Kuala Lumpur. However, we are always subject to being 
transferred so I am not sure if it will make a difference.” 
Correctional officers in Puncak Borneo appear to recognise that incarcerated 
children are differently positioned to adults but given the current system, there does 
not appear to be plans to separate the career structures or to have a separate set of laws 
to deal with children in the prison system. The danger here is that being exposed to the 
entire prison culture will mean that correctional officers must either adapt to different 
treatment regimens or as is more likely, find themselves progressively desensitised. 
     2.3 The age of criminal responsibility 
As noted in the preceding Chapters, the age of criminal responsibility in Malaysia 
is 10 and Malaysia also maintains the doli incapax presumption, in that children 
between 10 and below 12 who have not shown sufficient maturity may be absolved 
from criminality as well (Section 82 and 83 of the Penal Code). UNICEF Malaysia 
notes that less than 3 percent of children arrested by the police are aged 12 years or 
younger and as such recommended the raising of the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility to 12 noting that this could be done ‘without compromising public 
security’ (UNICEF, 2013:29). This however was not forthcoming in the recent 
amendment to the Child Act. 
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Vivian, an adviser in the Court for Children and a Child Rights NGO representative 
feels that there is no necessity to increase the minimum age of criminal responsibility. 
She notes that in most cases, the children that appear in the court she serves are above 
twelve. In fact, Vivian indicates that the impact of the low age is negligible: 
“It is fine. In any case, there are very few and the numbers are small. There is 
no end to it as well. You can say twelve and some will say fourteen so there is no 
end to it.” 
As a Magistrate, Irene suggests that most children that appear before her are also 
above twelve: 
“The majority would be between 14 and17 years of age. I have only 
encountered one case involving a 12-year-old but that was in a different court.” 
Charles, a senior civil servant within the Ministry of Women, Family and 
Community Development suggests that it is unlikely that a change is forthcoming: 
“When we consider the legal age, it is difficult to decide which point is better. 
However, there is a problem of drawing a line. Whatever line that you draw, there 
will always be an argument. For the moment, the line is still at 10 and 12. So, you 
see, even though it is rather low I think we have that system in place given our 
culture and values. So, I think, for now, I'm still quite comfortable with that kind of 
setting.” 
Thus, in Malaysia, the current position remains unaffected by the global trend. The 
low statistical evidence of very young children who are in conflict with the law draws 
two different views as suggested by the discussion above. Statistically very few 
children at that age are brought into contact with the system. Yet this argument is used 
in support of retaining the low age of criminal responsibility and the UNICEF 
perspective has not as yet found favour. Further, it is to be noted that the minimum 
age of criminal responsibility for breaches of Islamic laws as discussed in the 




3.  Children on remand, in custody and in courts  
In the preceding Chapters, WK, accused of murder in 2002 appeared in court, in a 
sleeveless T-shirt, track bottoms, slippers and handcuffs to answer to the charges 
proffered against him. The Child Act 2001 had just been enacted and understandably, 
at that point in time, the purpose and the intent of the Act in affording child rights had 
not permeated into the actual workings of the juvenile justice system. In the 15 or so 
years since, has the environment changed?  
3.1 The Police and children 
There is evidence to suggest that young people generally have less positive 
attitudes towards the police than adults do (Flexon et al, 2009; Bridenball and Jesilow, 
2008; Hurst and Frank, 2000). Hinds (2007) suggests that, ‘negative contact with 
police during adolescence may have a significant impact on lowering young people’s 
attitudes towards them’ (2007:198). There is also evidence that attitudes towards the 
police may be shaped from an early age (Powell et al, 2008). The intergenerational 
perspective between parents and children also have a bearing on perceptions towards 
the police (Sindall et all, 2016). Murphy’s (2015) study, indicate that procedural 
justice is in fact more important to youth than it is to adults. 
In Malaysia, the National Youth Survey 2012 interviewed 2,105 Malaysian youth 
aged between 17 and 35 years old from all 13 states and the Federal Territory of Kuala 
Lumpur.75 70% of the respondents had either high or moderate levels of confidence in 
the police. The remaining respondents had either low or no confidence in the police. 
The levels of confidence were drawn along ethnic lines with the minority ethnic 
groups having the least confidence in the police and legal system (Leong et al, 
2012:50). No explanation was proffered for this position nor was there an attempt to 
understand why minority youth in Malaysia felt this way.  
                                                 




However, the perception of ethnic minorities towards the police has been 
considered in other jurisdictions particularly the United States. (For example, in 
Sullivan, Dunham and Alpert, 1987; Leiber, Nalla and Farnworth, 1998; Hurst and 
Frank, 2000; Hurst et al., 2000; Taylor et al., 2001, Skogen, 2006, Flexon et al, 2009). 
Although ethnic demographics are very different across jurisdictions, the Malaysian 
ethnic minority view appears to fit the conclusions drawn from existing literature.  
As noted in Chapter 1, Ahmad’s (2013) mixed method study of 164 children in pre-
trial processes in the Malaysian juvenile justice system highlighted that there are 
concerns about procedural justice as applied to children in conflict with the law. 
A similar view emerged in an inquiry in the United Kingdom by the All Party 
Parliamentary Group for Children in 2014, which noted that, ‘there is a lack of trust in 
the police among many children and young people. Some children and young people 
fear the police. Encounters between the two groups are often characterised by poor 
and unconstructive communication and a lack of mutual respect’ (2014:3). 
In some measure of acknowledging this issue in the United Kingdom, a recent 
strategy document published by the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) indicates 
that, ‘it is crucial that in all encounters with the police those below the age of 18 
should be treated as children first’ (2015:4).  
From a Malaysian perspective however, UNICEF reports that Malaysia has ‘yet to 
develop a comprehensive, specialised police response to children in conflict with the 
law’ (UNICEF, 2013:38). In the years that have lapsed since the publication of the 
report, the issue of the police recognizing child rights from an operational perspective, 
has not been measured.  
In most cases where children are taken into custody on remand, the first point of 
contact is the police and detention on remand. Jones finds the present process 
unsatisfactory noting: 
“Right now, the police put the child in a lock up. Are the facilities friendly 
enough? You reduce the boy to his inner clothing, treat him poorly and give him 
horrible food. Most of the boys I interviewed carry a lot of resentment from the 
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intimidation. You have negative things spoken to the boy and nothing 
constructive.” 
Lawrence a lawyer and member of the Child Rights Committee, Bar Council 
Malaysia acknowledges that in his experience in dealing with children on remand: 
 
 “They do not have enough facilities to separate them, so, sometimes they 
actually put them together with the adults, which is not supposed to be as the law says 
that they are to be separated. Sometimes they are even handcuffed together and then 
they are brought together with adults. This is because of lack of knowledge and the 
police treating them the same as adult offenders. There is also a lack of resources for 
example insufficient police officers, police cars or inadequate police lock-ups to keep 
the offenders separate.”  
Of the 10 boys interviewed in the Henry Gurney School in Puncak Borneo, 
Sarawak, 9 indicated that they were handcuffed and 6 of them allege abuse by the 
police while in custody.  Almost all the boys indicated that they were held in the same 
cell as adult offenders while on remand. Some boys were kept separate but still 
encountered police hostility. 
Nicholas is 19 and is serving a 3-year sentence for possession of stolen goods, 
pursuant to section 411of the Penal Code and for possession of methamphetamine 
pursuant to section 15 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. Before this, he had been sent 
to the Tunas Bakti School for assaulting his teacher in his high school following an 
argument. He describes his experience: 
“I was in a separate cell but I was beaten and handcuffed while on remand.” 
Another boy, Lony, 20, is serving a 3-year term for statutory rape pursuant to 
section 375 of the Penal Code. He was 16 at the date of the offence while the victim 
was 15. 
“I was in remand for 7 days. I was kept in a separate cell from adults although 
there were adults around me. I did not feel afraid as I thought I did not do anything 
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wrong. I think I was treated as an adult offender as the police were aggressive and 
spoke to me harshly.” 
The power differentials are apparent. The police assert their authority.  Udin, aged 
17 is serving a 3-year term in the Henry Gurney School for statutory rape pursuant to 
section 375 of the Penal Code. The victim was his girlfriend and was known to him 
since 2013. The victim’s mother found out that they were having a sexual relationship 
and lodged a report.76 He was kept in a juvenile lock-up but alleges abuse by the 
police on the third day of his remand order: 
“I didn’t do anything because in my mind, I do not have any power to defend 
myself.” 
Most of the boys spent 7 to 14 days in remand, but in some cases, there was a 
longer period of remand. David was arrested for possession of a stolen vehicle, 
criminal intimidation and had a previous warrant of arrest for attempted murder. 
(Possession of stolen goods: section 411 Penal Code, Criminal intimidation: section 
506 Penal Code and Attempted murder: section 307 Penal Code). Upon his arrest and 
detention, he was handcuffed and kept in the same cell as adults. He was kept in 
remand for 4 months. 
One boy, felt that his condition upon arrest was his own fault. At the age of 17, 
Angah had a rape charge against him pursuant to section 375 of the Penal Code. He 
was kept in remand together with adults for 14 days and shares his feelings: 
“I did wonder about whether a child should be placed in such a place but I felt 
that I was confined and handcuffed because I was guilty.” 
The conversations with the boys suggest that the police are not complying with the 
child rights agenda. This begs the question of the level of awareness and training of 
                                                 
76 Section 375 (f) of the Penal Code, indicates that individuals under sixteen years of age are not 
legally able to consent to sexual activity, and such activity may result in prosecution for statutory rape. 
Section 376 of the Penal Code provides that the punishment for rape is imprisonment for a term of not 
less than five years and not more than twenty years, and may be subject to whipping. Where the 
offender is a minor and a term of imprisonment is imposed, then section 75 of the Child Act 2001 will 
apply and the child will be sent to the Henry Gurney School. 
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the police. Sylvia acknowledges the challenges that UNICEF face in assessing the 
impact of awareness of the police of child rights, noting that it is difficult to follow-up 
on such training:   
“Ideally, the framework we would like is assessing the impact on the child. Of 
course, impact is not measured instantly, but takes a few years and even then, it is 
difficult to measure that. However, for us, it is important to know but change in 
Malaysia takes a long while.” 
There is not much comfort to be drawn from this view. It appears that there are 
limitations on the impact of training. Noemi is actively involved in the training of 
police officers and expresses what the ideal position ought to be: 
“Training must start from day one when they enter the Pusat Latihan Polis 
(PULAPOL) (the Royal Malaysian Police training centre). It cannot be given as an 
afterthought, when they are already in service. The training should cover all 
aspects of rights. To treat the child as a child first, and after that, the offence that 
he has committed or alleged to have committed.” 
Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) Ona, joined the Malaysian police force in 
1991 undergoing training at PULAPOL (the Royal Malaysian Police training centre). 
At that time, she did not receive any specific training in dealing with children. 
Subsequently, she was posted to serve as a Criminal Investigations Officer in a local 
police district. After serving as an investigating officer, she was eventually posted to a 
specialist unit set up in 2007 for sexual crimes, domestic violence and child abuse 
investigations: 
 “When I was posted to the D11 unit in Bukit Aman77 I attended many 
workshops on child abuse, seminars organised by various NGOs and the Ministry. I 
also attended courses on how to interview a child as we have a Child Interview 
                                                 
77 Sexual, Women and Child Investigation Division (D11) of the Criminal Investigation Department 
at the Royal Malaysia Police HQ, Bukit Aman. “Bukit Aman” is a common descriptor for the 
headquarters of the Royal Malaysian Police and refers to its geographical location in Kuala Lumpur. 
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Centre, CIC, based in Bukit Aman. So basically, we were trained how to handle child 
victims.” 
DSP Ona’s training emphasis appears to be on dealing with child victims, which is 
perhaps understandable given that the D11 unit serves that purpose. DSP Ona’s 
posting to this unit was not one of choice but: 
“...because I was promoted to an Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP), they 
just sent me there.” 
This suggests that transfers are not essentially based on specific skills or 
knowledge but as part of a promotion exercise and movement is based on where there 
appears to be a vacancy. As noted above, much of the training DSP Ona received was 
in essence, on-the-job training.  
DSP Ona believes that one of the reasons this division was established was 
because: 
“They needed a division which is specially trained; most of them are women 
officers perhaps women are believed to have more empathy, to be more sensitive in 
handling these sorts of cases.” 
The D11 division also monitors the more than 800 police stations across the 
country in matters that involve children, with a strong emphasis on child victims. This 
involves having the authority to call on the investigating officer to report to the 
division with the investigation papers of pending cases to monitor developments. The 
D11 division itself organises in-service trainings. DSP Ona explains that officers 
attend training and courses that educate them specifically on how to deal with 
children. 
DSP Ona acknowledges that the training is necessary: 
“…because some officers are not aware and to them, everybody is the same. 
They treat a child just like an adult.”  
Arianne a lawyer and member of the Child Rights Committee, Bar Council 
Malaysia acknowledges that it was only upon completion of a training workshop 
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organised by UNICEF and the Malaysian Bar that she learned about issues involving 
children in remand and custody. She discovered that in a lot of situations there are 
police breaches of the basic rights of the child. 
However, Noemi notes that there are changes: 
“I started 20 years ago and I feel that there is greater awareness among the 
higher ranked officers. Therefore, there has been a significant increase in 
awareness levels, compared to when I started way back in 1995. Of course, it can 
be better but it's improving.” 
After serving close to 10 years in the D11, DSP Ona was promoted again and then 
transferred out of the division. She now teaches in the police-training academy but 
interestingly her current work involves a completely different area of law enforcement 
and it appears that all her experience in dealing with children (and women) is not put 
to use. DSP Ona accepts this: 
“In the police force, no one is indispensable, so we need to adapt. Even though I 
have been dealing with children and women in the D11 division, but to me, I am 
very happy because I can now pursue my studies (a PhD). I am also in a different 
field and appreciate that I can learn a different thing.” 
A number of matters arise in the context of the police and their relationship with 
children. Firstly, of concern here is that while training and specialisation as suggested 
by UNICEF may resolve some of these issues, the perceived lack of awareness of the 
notion of child rights is uncomfortably evident. The conversations with the boys 
suggest that these training efforts have not made any significant impact. There is no 
indication if the manner in which children are treated is a reflection of a lack of 
awareness or training or more worryingly, whether there is a wilful disregard of these 
rights.  
Secondly, the manner in which children are treated may also be a reflection of how 
the child is perceived. Perhaps as considered above, there is evidence that the adult’s 
own perception of childhood and the adult’s own life experience as a child bears some 
consequence as to how this adult then sees childhood. Further, in the context of the 
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police, the view that the detained person is a criminal is evidence of the social distance 
between the two even if the detained person is a child. This obfuscation of how the 
child is seen has an important bearing on the levels of acceptance of child rights. 
A further issue is that given the specialised skills and knowledge acquired in child 
rights issues, DSP Ona finds herself in a different area serving a different purpose. 
The career structure within the police force is often based on filling vacancies as and 
when they arise. This is perhaps a missed opportunity to develop potential trainers. 
Lastly, there does appear to be greater emphasis on acknowledging the child victim 
but less so in terms of the child offender.  
3.2 Children in Court 
Courts for Children are established by section 11 of the Child Act 2001 primarily 
for hearing, determining or disposing of any charge against a child. The court has 
jurisdiction to try all offences except offences punishable with death. The court is 
presided by a Magistrate who is assisted by two advisers one of whom must be a 
woman. The advisers provide the Magistrate with advice and if necessary, to also 
advise the parent or guardian of the child. As noted above, in 2015 4,730 criminal 
cases were brought to the Court for Children since 2011 with 4,021 (85%) 
prosecutions (Hansard, 3 November 2015 col 1040-1050). 
As considered above, Section 62 of the Child (Amendment) Act 2016 in inserting a 
new section 83A, expressly indicates that a child who is arrested will not be 
handcuffed save in exceptional circumstances, namely, if the offence is a grave one or 




Figure 8: Four teenagers (two aged 16 and 17 respectively) charged with murder being taken to the 
Magistrates Court in Penang. Source: Dermawan, A. (2017). Four teenagers charged with the murder of Nhaveen. 
The New Straits Times. 19 June 2017. [Online].  
The Amended Act also now expressly indicates that the child shall have the right to 
be informed of the grounds for arrest as well as the right to be provided by counsel 
and to have family members be informed upon arrest. However, unless a child or his 
parent is aware of such rights, then issues of breach may not be fully understood.  
It is interesting to note that despite the signing of the CRC and the passing of the 
earlier Child Act 2001, the express prohibition of handcuffs was only introduced in 
2016. As noted in this work, the child, WK, aged 12 accused of murder was brought to 
court handcuffed at his first appearance in the Malaysian courts, ratification of the 
CRC notwithstanding. Even if the case were heard today, the position would still be 
the same, as the exception to section 83A would apply (See for example Figure 8 
above).  
As a Magistrate in a Court for Children, Irene explains what occurs in her court: 
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“If they are on remand then they are handcuffed. As remand cases come in 
every day and they can appear in the normal court. This is my experience. They are 
handcuffed together with other adults and they wear the purple remand outfit.”  
Farida, a human rights advocate and a member of the Constitutional Law 
Committee, Bar Council, Malaysia believes that we do not accord children in conflict 
with the law proper consideration: 
“I remember being in court and there were about ten children there. They stood 
in a line, together with adult offenders. It should not be that way. Surely that 
experience would be imprinted in their mind forever. These are young people at an 
impressionable age and you would not want that sort of impression left on them.” 
Lawrence often appears as counsel appointed under the Legal Aid scheme and 
shares his experience in dealing with children who appear in court in cases of remand 
orders being sought by the Police:  
“During the remand process, sometimes the environment is not conducive at all 
and the children will be treated as normal offenders. It is only in the Courts for 
Children, that they will be given certain privileges. So, you have no time to 
interview them, to find out what happened during that remand period. Most of the 
time the investigation officer will just ask for an extension, without giving valid 
reasons. When lawyers are there, sometimes the police officer will quickly remove 
the handcuff and then they will separate them.” 
The boys in Henry Gurney Puncak Borneo were handcuffed when they were 
sentenced and were transported to the prison complex. George a correctional officer in 
the Henry Gurney system explains this: 
“We are governed by the Prison Act and Rules and so we have to abide by them. 
For example, the use of handcuffs. While it is true that children should not be 
handcuffed but we have rules to follow and if we don’t, we will be cited for 
breaching our operating procedures.” 
Vivian’s experience as a court adviser suggests that there is some change in this 
aspect to this. In the specific the Court for Children where she serves children are not 
191 
 
handcuffed. However, in some cases, some aspects of the process have not changed 
and there appears to be a lack of respect for basic levels of dignity as per Article 40: 
“I know, when they walk in maybe they feel intimidated. It is a bit sad. They 
come into the court and nobody has briefed them. Sometimes, they are in slippers78 
and in torn clothes or in a torn t-shirt.”  
Jones notes that in his experience, many of the boys appear in court alone and 
without representation and in some cases struggle to understand proceedings. In his 
view, courts are not friendly to the child. Physical structures also create distance 
between the Magistrate and the child. 
Many of the boys shared their own experience in appearing before Magistrates in 
the Court for Children. 
Wilson aged 20 was sentenced for 3 years when he was 17 for theft of a motorcycle 
pursuant to section 378 of the Penal Code. He was handcuffed when he appeared in 
court and describes his experience: 
“I was not aware of the system at all and I did not understand the sentencing 
process. I found that I could not challenge the judge.” 
Nicholas is 19 and is serving a 3-year sentence for possession of stolen goods, 
pursuant to section 411of the Penal Code and for possession of methamphetamine 
pursuant to section 15 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 acknowledges that he was 
unaware of the process: 
“I have no idea about the system. I was sent to the Sekolah Tunas Bakti because 
I was beyond control and even though I tried to appeal, it was not accepted.” 
Court processes and procedures often leave most people feeling disconnected. This 
is also felt by the child in conflict. Lony is now 20 years of age and is serving a 3-year 
term for statutory rape pursuant to section 375 of the Penal Code. He was 16 when he 
appeared in court and could not understand the legal language used: 
                                                 
78 Colloquialism that refers to rubber flip-flops/sandals commonly used in Malaysia.  
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“In court, I did not understand what was happening because they speak in a 
language that I cannot understand. I did not know what my rights were.” 
Given that 23 years have lapsed since the ratification of the CRC and that an 
amendment to the Child Act has been introduced, these descriptions are of concern. It 
does appear that in most instances, children are treated as offenders first and not as 
children first. Even so, the treatment as an offender leaves much to be desired with 
palpable breaches of the rights of an accused person. There are deficiencies in 
physical support mechanisms (prison facilities, vehicles and courts) as well as in 
acknowledging child rights.   
 A key stakeholder in this process is the Magistrate in the Court for Children and 
the experience and awareness of child rights that they bring (or do not bring) to the 
discussion. UNICEF suggests that ‘magistrates tend to be quite young and have 
limited experience with children’ (UNICEF, 2013:66). 
Jones is again critical of this situation: 
“The problem we have is that most of the magistrates are young. For example, 
they do not know what it means to come from a single-parent family. They do not 
understand the elements involved.” 
The notion of ‘social distance between settlement agents and those they judge’ 
(Horrowitz, 1990:183) is evident in this context. Magistrates are appointed positions79 
and it is common practice for Magistrates and Prosecutors to also deal with adult 
offenders on days when there are no Court for Children hearings. In smaller districts, 
it is likely that the Magistrate is not part of the community he/she serves and this 
suggests a physical distance that is mirrored in their social distance (Terrio, 2007). 
Vivian, on the other hand, has a different experience in the jurisdiction she serves 
noting: 
                                                 




“I have met a lot of these magistrates, they are young and very child-friendly. I 
was impressed. They are better than the High Court judges who deal with custody 
matters. I’m happy with the magistrates.” 
Farida has observed the lack of uniformity in how magistrates treat children: 
“When it comes to court and the magistrate, some of them do try to make sure 
that, whatever required for child offenders are complied with but some are not. It is 
inconsistent in that sense. The same can be said for the investigating officers too.” 
The duality of roles in dealing with adults and children that the Magistrate plays, in 
the same physical space, does not go unnoticed. Vivian’s observation in the court she 
serves is that the Magistrate struggles with the workload: 
“Of course, after she has gone through all these cases involving adults she is 
stressed as there are so many cases!” 
Irene, a Magistrate in a Court for Children describes her day:  
“Normally we start at 9.00 a.m. If the public prosecutor is not there yet, I will 
start with other cases for example, children in need of protection and 
rehabilitation, or children in need of secure protection. Once we are done with that 
part, then we proceed in court together with the advisers and we will start. We only 
allow the children and parents to be in court, counsel if any and the DPP, the 
police that escort child and the interpreter. No other person is allowed. If we have 
20 cases, the rest are all waiting outside together with other adults, for example 
parents. Normally when we sit as a Court for Children, we don't fix other adult 
cases.”  
It is clear that process of dealing with cases is a long-drawn process with the costs 
of maintaining the advisers perhaps being a factor in deciding to allocate all cases on 
the one day. 
Further, there are issues as to the extent to which Magistrates and Prosecutors are 
aware of child rights and the rights of the child in conflict with the law. In 2013, 
UNICEF reports that ‘all legal officers, including Magistrates and DPP (sic), receive 
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both induction and in-service training on a wide variety of topics through the Judicial 
and Legal Training Institute (ILKAP), however there is currently no specialised 
course with respect to children in conflict with the law’ (2013:65). 
On the issue of whether Magistrates are aware of what rights that the child has,80 
Vivian feels: 
“I doubt they are fully aware. Perhaps they get a 2-hour lecture. But how much 
of that really sinks in and then there is also experience that comes on the job.” 
A further problem is that even when training is undertaken, the career mobility of 
Magistrates influence the effectiveness of such training. Arianne, a lawyer and a 
member of the Child Rights Committee of the Malaysian Bar Council also notes: 
“We are discussing the issue of on-going training for judges and the DPP and the 
police. What happens in any government scenario is that you are promoted and you 
move. What happens to that new person that comes in? Let's say for example, you 
happen to take over as a Magistrate in Children Court’s, but you've not been 
trained.” 
Who then is to be responsible for such training? UNICEF conducts capacity 
building through specific training of trainers. In this area too, training is 
acknowledged as a challenge. Sylvia explains: 
“We engage in capacity building through the training of trainers. UNICEF is 
not a training institute. You need to make sure the training is monitored or at least 
maintained. You need to also monitor the outcome and impact of the training as 
well so, all of this is not quite there yet.” 
These matters can and do place constraints on the system. UNICEF does not view 
its role as a provider of training but a facilitator. It is evident that while some training 
                                                 
80 For example, there is no evidence that trial process acknowledges learning disabilities as 
established in the UK for example in R on the application of TP v West London Youth Court [2005] 




occurs, the depth of training and the career structure within the Magistrates, hampers 
the effectiveness of such training. Perhaps more importantly the Magistrates view on 
child rights is a view developed within his/her socialisation as a child. The 
incarcerated boys spoken to, indicate the level of distance they feel in proceedings. 
Court advisers are intended to help bridge this gap.  
Gus, an adviser in a Court for Children, describes his role and work in the court he 
serves: 
“We have close to about 30 court advisers and we go on for two terms. My duty 
is on Thursday every month. We start at about 9.00 a.m. and it may go on, 
depending on the cases, up to 4.30 p.m. Sometimes we have more than 40 cases. 
The allowance is RM150 for the whole day.” 
The advisers sit with the Magistrate and provide advice. Together with the 
Magistrate, they review case reports and are then consulted before a decision is made. 
Gus describes this: 
 “Before he or she delivers the judgement, they will ask us ‘What do you think?’ 
So, I will give my views based on the case. I will be more interested in reading the 
child’s lifestyle, why he is behaving that way.”  
Vivian, a court adviser in another court explains her experience: 
“The whole morning session is dealing with these offenders. They are brought 
to court and you see their parents. The welfare officer would have prepared a 
report. When they have pleaded guilty, or if they are found guilty, we read the 
report, and then we can ask any questions which the Child Act allows us to ask, for 
example, questions to the family, to the child, to the parents or seek clarification if 
something in the report is not clear. After that, we decide together with the 
magistrate, and the other adviser.” 
Gus notes that Magistrates are young in the court he serves in and he has seen 
Magistrates leave upon securing elevation to a higher court. The perception is that 
Magistrates are often keen to stick to the ‘letter of the law’: 
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“You see they go by the book according to the appropriate sections. ‘This is 
what you have done, this is what we are going to tell you to do, this is what you're 
going to face’ but would that be helpful for the person, I don’t know. You are the 
Magistrate, so I suppose what you say goes and maybe no one will dare to question 
you. I would throw in options because I am a social worker and I mix and mingle 
with people. I talk to people. I am in the streets and have been doing that for 17 
or18 years. In court, you fill forms, tick boxes and complete all kinds of protocol. 
But does that really help?”  
Decision-making may seem to be process driven but what is the experience that a 
Magistrates encounters? Irene, a Magistrate in a different court describes her journey. 
As an undergraduate law student, representatives from the Attorney General’s 
Chambers came to her University: 
“Immediately after my convocation I joined the judiciary as a contract officer 
for two years. Initially I was assigned to the High Court as a senior associate 
registrar. After three to four years in that role I became a Magistrate dealing with 
criminal and civil cases.” 
It was in this role that Irene was thrust into dealing with cases involving children 
and she acknowledges the difficulty especially in having access to materials dealing 
with child rights. Irene acknowledges this: 
“At that time, I was not fully aware of the CRC and all those conventions that 
relate to children. However, you have no choice, because when you sit as a 
magistrate, you must decide and before you decide, you have to read!”  
Irene acknowledges that at the start of her role, her reading of materials was very 
limited. It is only when she recently embarked on her doctoral studies, that she began 
exploring other materials. Given that Irene had to decide cases involving children 
without much training or exposure to child rights or issues impacting children, she 
relied heavily on the welfare report submitted in court.  
However, relying entirely on the welfare report itself may not be the best approach 
as Vivian found that most of the reports do not provide adequate information about the 
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child especially if the child is reticent when meeting with the probation officer. 
Another problem that Vivian identifies is that, the probation officers often struggle to 
cope with their workload: 
“The probation officers don’t have time to see the child three or four times. 
They might see him in the most unconducive environment for example, in prison or 
in the lock-up. He is not going to wait to see if the child is able to talk. He is just 
going to ask some questions and records it. Just a formality.” 
In mitigating the over reliance on the reports, Magistrates do work with the 
advisers. In explaining her relationship with the court advisers and the welfare officer, 
Irene describes it thus: 
“They see things from a different perspective, but sometimes the welfare officer, 
the two court advisers and the Magistrate have differing views. However, 
ultimately they are helpful in terms of making an appropriate or suitable order.” 
The advisers are of course limited in their role and Irene explains: 
 “For a finding a fact in full trial, they may not be able to help much because 
their duty is not to find on the issue of fact; when to find guilt or not.”  
As a Magistrate, Irene acknowledges the wider role the advisers play noting: 
“Many of the magistrates, sitting in the Court for Children are young 
magistrates. So, the advisers, when they talk to the children, and to the parents, 
they advise parents and the children like a mother or a father would. This aspect is 
very good.”  
It is clear that a Magistrate has to work with the court advisers to try to come to 
a settlement. There are concerns with ensuring consistency in this relationship as 
Magistrates and court advisers come with differing backgrounds and experiences. 
Irene’s experience may not be the same with other Magistrates. It also does not 
help that a Magistrates experience is developed in the course of working within the 
Court for Children system and when they achieve some measure of fluidity in the 
role, they may be promoted. These matters aside, there are also concerns about the 
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design and physical structure of the court. There are differences in courts 
established for dealing with offences against children and those that deal with child 
offenders. 
By virtue of the Sexual Offences against Children Act 2017, a new special court 
for child sexual crimes was established. The special court would focus on cases 
such as child pornography, child grooming and child sexual assault. It is equipped 
with infrastructure such as court recording transcription facilities; a waiting room 
for child witnesses; live video link; child witness screens and disabled-friendly 
facilities. 
 
Figure 9: The waiting room for child witnesses at the special court. Source: http://www.jpm.gov.my (4 May 
2018). 
This is in stark contrast to the physical and structural set up for most Courts for 
Children that deal with children in conflict with the law. These matters underscore 
the manner in which children are contextualised within the social structure. The 
difference in treatment is stark notwithstanding the fact that in essence, both the 
victim and an offender are children. 
The Court for Children in Kuala Lumpur is a specifically designed court to deal 
with children and this includes cases involving children in conflict with the law. 
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However, in many other jurisdictions, the Court for Children is a normal 
functioning Magistrates court that deals with cases within its jurisdiction but on 
one day (or more) in the week it functions as a Court for Children. The physical 
setting is unchanged.  
 
Figure 10: Inside the Magistrates Court, Petaling Jaya where Gus serves as a Court Adviser. Source: 
https://foursquare.com/v/mahkamah-petaling-jaya (4 May 2018). 
The facilities do not cater for the needs of children as noted by Irene: 
“It is an ordinary court of law. Physically, there is no difference. In fact, it was 
different when I was in Kuala Lumpur as in that court I sat at the interpreter’s 
table, together with the advisers. I didn't sit on the bench. But in my current court, I 
have to sit on the bench together with the advisers as the interpreter’s table is very 
small and cannot accommodate three persons.”  
DSP Ona makes an interesting observation:   
“It is 2017 but you see the court structure is still the same. We still don't have 
that kind of facility. So, facilities are still lacking. To implement this, we need 
logistic support from the government, the Ministry and NGOs. Otherwise you just 
talk the talk and never walk the talk!” 
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The conversations above raise a number of issues. As suggested above there are 
inconsistencies in the level of engagement that a sitting Magistrate has in dealing with 
the children. While some stakeholders feel that the Magistrates are able to understand 
the needs of the children, the children themselves find that they do not understand 
proceedings and the social distance appears amplified. Further, the physical structure 
of courts do not make it any easier for a child to be comfortable in their surroundings. 
These matters raise doubts as to the philosophical aspirations of the CRC particularly 
the notion of a child rights approach to juvenile justice.  
4. Detention and incarceration 
 
Figure 11: Current structure of post-trial detention of children in conflict with the law. 
In the preceding Chapters, reference was made to the Malaysia’s approach to 
children in conflict with the law. It was suggested that it is still primarily grounded in 
formal police and court-based interventions and institution-based rehabilitation based 
on drill, training and education both formal and religious (See Figure 9 above).  
UNICEF in its comprehensive report states that these institutions and schools are, 
‘governed by relatively dated regulations that contain provisions that are not in 
accordance with the CRC and international standards’ particularly in the use of 












 52.7% of children on remand were 
accused of minor property related offences 
and only 20% were charged with serious 
offences involving violence  
(UNICEF, 2013) 
Approximately 2.2% the total prison 
population of 49,200 held in 47 institutions are 
juveniles, minors or young offenders  




‘solitary confinement, corporal punishment, reduction in diet, stress positions, and 
restriction of family visits’ (2013:118). 
The consequence for the child in conflict with the law is the probability of being 
detained in some form of institutional set-up. Sentences of detention are commonly 
given, rather than as ‘a last resort for a child in conflict with the law’ (Child Rights 
Coalition Malaysia, 2012). The UNICEF study in 2013 found that a significant 
number of children are held on remand for very minor offences and that a high 
percentage of children in prisons are those who have not yet been found guilty of a 
crime (UNICEF, 2013). 
4.1 The impact of detention and incarceration 
What then is the impact of detention of children in conflict with the law? Jones 
observes that children are often detained without any real support. Alarmingly he 
notes that prisons and detention centres often do not have dedicated social workers.  
Vivian, a court adviser also expresses her dissatisfaction with these institutions 
noting that: 
 
“All kinds of things happen there. The new entrants are bullied, and that is 
treated as something that they must go through, and that is very sad. Then they 
shave your heads and so you lose your identity there.” 
Jones describes this situation thus: 
“Now, putting them all together in one place, it is just like in ‘The Lord of the 
Flies’. A senior boy now preys on a junior boy. In no time, he will break the boy. 
There exists a hierarchy of boys, and the boy is broken.  He may have committed 
theft but he comes out three times worse off!” 
These observations suggest that the social hierarchy among boys in detention are a 
known occurrence. The aim of the detention process is to rehabilitate the boys but the 




 Rule 55 of the Malaysian Prison Rules 2000, describes the role of prison officers, 
‘[i]t is the duty of all prison officers to treat all prisoners with kindness and humanity, 
to listen patiently to and report their complaints or grievances, at the same time to be 
firm in maintaining order and discipline.’ 
Terry, a retired correctional officer with 35 years of experience in the prison 
service, suggests that he would normally take positive steps to ensure that children are 
not bullied by their own peers: 
“We make sure they are not bullied inside. I will always check with them. In 
most cases, they will say that they are not being bullied. Thus far, there has not 
been any incident for me to take any action.” 
This raises some interesting issues. It does seem rather surprising that in his 35 
years, Terry has not encountered any situation that warrants some form of action. 
Further, it appears that Terry is reliant on asking the children if they have been bullied 
rather than relying on his own observations of behavioural or other changes. Given the 
hierarchical social structure that is known to exist, it does seem unlikely for a victim 
of bullying to lodge a complaint with prison officers for fear of reprisals from other 
children. 
  As suggested in Chapter 2, Article 40(1) urges countries to recognize the right 
(emphasis added) of every child to be treated in a manner consistent with the 
promotion of the child’s sense of dignity and worth. Children in the Henry Gurney 
system or in prison, just as adult prisoners are subject to the same laws. Thus, 
according to the Regulation 3 of the Prison Rules, 2000, the general principle 
underlying the administration of the Malaysian prisons is to provide treatment to all 
the prisoners at all times so as to encourage their self-respect and a sense of personal 
responsibility. The aim is to inculcate habits of good citizenship and hard work and to 
encourage them to lead a good and useful life upon discharge from the system. 
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In the Integrity School System81 for example, child offenders are given 
identification numbers (names are no longer used) and are segregated according to 
categories of offenders, which then determines the colour of the uniforms they wear 
(See Table 7 below). 
Nature/Duration of Sentence Colour of Uniforms Visitation Rights 
Remand Purple Weekly 
Under 6 months Red Monthly 
Over 6 months Green Once in three weeks 
More than year Light Blue Once in two weeks 
Long sentences Dark Blue Weekly 
Table 7: Classification of children in the Integrity School System. 
Jones makes a valuable observation on the physical structure and design of prisons: 
“Most of the prisons are built with adult male prisoners in mind and are 
therefore not child friendly.” 
Jones feels that this does not address the specific needs of children in detention 
noting that the treatment of children appears to follow that of adults: 
“For instance, the right to meet parents. They follow the adult prisoner 
arrangements where visitation rights depend on the type of offence. So, we have a 
system where there is a long absence of the father and mother in the life of the 
child.” 
                                                 
81 Integrity Schools are schools within prisons for juvenile offenders and represents a collaboration 





In the Henry Gurney School system, the boys have their heads shaved and wear 
white uniforms. The system of rigour and discipline is also imposed and visitation 
rights are also restricted. The boys have fortnightly visitation rights but this presents 
problems, as owing to distance and costs, families cannot afford to visit. 
Lony is now 20 years of age and is serving a 3-year term for statutory rape 
pursuant to section 375 of the Penal Code. He was 16 at the date of the offence while 
the victim was 15. 
“My family are allowed to visit me fortnightly but because they are far away 
and it is expensive to come here, they only come about two times a year.” 
Similarly, Aman an 18-year-old boy serving a 3-year term in Henry Gurney. He 
entered the Henry Gurney School at the age of 16 and describes his contact with his 
family: 
“My family visits me only if they can afford to come.” 
The underlying philosophy appears to be that of reform by means of education and 
discipline. Further, the approach appears to be applied without considering the special 
needs of the children. 
Terry offers some insight into the lived experience of the children in the Integrity 
School system within the Kajang Prison: 
“After they wake up, we do a muster or a body count. After the body count, 
those who are in the educational programmes will go for their lessons. Those who 
are not, will do drills, marching and exercises for about an hour or two. After that, 
they take a shower and this is followed by religious classes or civic lessons.” 
In response to the question as to what purpose the marching and drills serve, Terry, 
a correctional officer suggests: 
205 
 
“Well, to induce discipline and inculcate responsibility, so they will not relapse. 
So, we have a programme, called the Human Development Programme82 to 
enhance their personality. Hopefully, negative attitudes and behaviour will 
change.” 
Goffman’s (1961), participant observational study of mental patients describes at 
length the ‘inmate world’ of the total institution. Thus, institutions managed by the 
Prison Department operate on a regime of discipline, religious instruction and 
vocational training very much in the vein of a ‘total institution’. Clearly, the life of the 
child in detention represents this contested arrangement.  
The shaving of heads, the uniforms, the substitution of names with specific 
identification numbers, controls on visitation are therefore processes that are 
deliberately set in motion to diminish the child’s ‘old self’ and attempts to create a 
new self. The child is dispossessed from normal social roles and contact with his 
family is limited in accordance with prescribed methods often used for adult inmates. 
Arguably, the stripping of social roles and mortification of self (Goffman, 1961:14) 
also implies a stripping of child rights as enshrined in the CRC and the notion of 
offender first and child second is further entrenched. 
From the Henry Gurney School perspective therefore, incarceration and the 
rehabilitation programmes are designed to change the child’s behavior in the interests 
of the institution and society. The broad notion of the dangers of incarceration were 
considered in Chapter 3 above. The incarceration experience itself has an impact on 
children. Lyon, Dennison, and Wilson (2000) in their study of the incarceration 
experiences of 84 young offenders across 10 prisons within the United Kingdom 
reported the young offenders being scared, humiliated, and depersonalised on reaching 
prison. The need for post-incarceration support also featured heavily as a concern. 
Ashkar and Kenny’s (2008) study examined the incarceration experiences of 16 
                                                 
82 The Human Development Plan involves four phases: Discipline Development, Personality 
Enhancement, Vocational & Academic skills and Community Reintegration.  The rehabilitation process 
of young people in Henry Gurney Schools is based on the Putra Module which is in essence similar to 
that for children in prisons and ‘is based on the British Borstal model which is no longer in use in the 




adolescent males in a maximum-security detention report that among other 
experiences, adolescents experience a sense of loss through reduced autonomy and 
dislocation from important others.  
Jones, in his dealings with children in conflict in the Integrity School, in the Kajang 
Prison, observed similar experiences: 
“The boys felt that ‘this is our dead end, this is our destiny, and we are done 
for.’ They are kept there and there is no way out. There is literally no way out. So, 
they come into the system and they resolve in their mind ‘this is it, it’s going to take 
survival skills.’  They also felt that they are stigmatized, getting a job, going back 
to school, it is all a problem. The boys have that perception, that this is life. When 
you interview them, they are all filled with resentment, for having gone through 
that system and being treated in that manner.” 
These feelings of resentment were also felt when talking to some of the boys in the 
Henry Gurney School. 
Odeng is 20 years old and is serving a 3-year term for statutory rape pursuant to 
section 375 of the Penal Code. The victim was someone he had been having a 
relationship with since they were 13. He was kept in remand for two weeks. This was 
followed by an extended remand order in the Sibu prison for 1 month and 13 days. He 
alleges that that he had to endure physical beatings by the police while in remand.  
When asked about his experience, he said: 
 “I just accepted my fate. Prison is prison, there are no two ways about it and I 
feel betrayed by the system.” 
Given that Terry has spent 35 years in service, he believes that the current system 
works well and that in his experience, most children do not re-enter the system: 
“I am sure it works as it is. They are not coming to prison to eat and sleep. They 
are all made to do something, like marching. If we are too lenient, then problems 
arise. The public is aware. We have a combination of programmes, under the 
Human Development Plan and everybody benefits. Whether this is totally accepted 
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by the children that is another matter. I know many youngsters who have been 
released, have not been caught for at least two years but I do not know if they are 
re-offending.” 
Terry’s views imply that there is an assumption that the Malaysian public desires 
that the prison system have in place punitive measures to ensure that the child does 
not have an easy life for the crime he has committed. Arguably, given Malaysia’s 
punitive culture, this may be true although there are no local studies that support this 
assumption. There appears to be a belief from an insider perspective, that the present 
system works yet this view is not necessarily shared by human rights or child rights 
advocates. 
The point on re-offending does raise interesting issues. The choice of description is 
deliberate. Terry makes the distinction between re-offending and getting caught 
(emphasis added). Gray’s analysis of youth offending in Hong Kong makes an 
important observation that most youth crime ‘does not justify the incarceration which 
frequently results, thus giving the false merit and credibility to low recidivism rates’ 
(Gray, 199:585). Given that in many instances, children are incarcerated for minor 
property offences and are committing such offences for the first time, it may be 
possible that reoffending is unlikely. Unfortunately, from a Malaysian perspective, 
there has not been any comprehensive analysis on recidivism rates of children in 
conflict with the law. 
In the United Kingdom, the latest Ministry of Justice statistics published in 2015, 
show that ‘around 53,000 juvenile offenders were cautioned, convicted or released 
from custody between April 2012 and March 2013 and around 19,000 of them 
committed a re-offence. This gives a proven re-offending rate of 36.1%, up 0.6 
percentage points from the previous 12 months’ (2015:7). 
Media reports quote the Malaysian Minister of Home Affairs indicating that, the 
recidivism level in Malaysia is among the best in Asia at a rate of 7.6% in 2015 
(Fadzell, 2015) and at 8.59% for 2016 (Othman, 2017). There is no evidence as to 
how this was measured or what methods were used. 
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Samuri et al (2013) in their study observed ‘that many inmates of the Henry 
Gurney School are child offenders who had run away from an approved school 
(Sekolah Tunas Bakti). Their actions were met with a harsher punishment, i.e. being 
sentenced to Henry Gurney School’ (sic) (2013:163). However, the study does not 
provide any empirical evidence of this casual observation. 
From a Malaysian perspective, statistics on juvenile reoffending specifically are not 
available and studies on the progression from juvenile offending to adult offending are 
also not available. Given the lack of empirical data available, it is indeed challenging 
to draw valid conclusions on the present state of affairs in Malaysia. The problems 
associated with availability and accessibility to data have been considered in Chapter 
2. This makes it difficult to assess the impact of incarceration or detention of children. 
In 2013, UNICEF suggested that, Malaysia, should ‘draft new regulations for 
STBs, Henry Gurney Schools and Juvenile Correctional Centres that conform to 
international standards’ (UNICEF, 2013:119). In the intervening years some progress 
has been made especially with the training and education schemes in the Integrity 
School and the Henry Gurney School but even in 2013 UNICEF reports that, ‘there is 
still a significant way to go’ (2013:117). The preceding discussion suggests that there 
appears to be some uncertainty as to whether the principle of detention as a last resort 
is being practiced uniformly. Many areas require change. 
 Terry, however, is sceptical that the system will change: 
“No, it won’t change. So, let it be like that. Maybe it is rough and tough but let 
it be like that.” 
Foucault’s history of the modern penal system acknowledges the unvarying and 
unchanging justifications of incarceration, ‘word for word, from one century to the 
other, the same fundamental propositions are repeated’ (Foucault, 1975:270). The 
Malaysian system has been in place since British colonisation and continues to 
function applying age-old approaches that are deeply embedded. The use of archaic 
terms like “muster” or the iron doors with slide bolts are physical manifestations of 
these approaches to incarceration.  
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Jones suggests that there are deeper issues about change noting: 
“I have interviewed a number of wardens, who are genuinely wanting a change 
but they feel that the system is not going to hear their voice anyway. They also feel 
that they may be penalized. So, they just keep quiet.” 
George a correctional officer in Puncak Borneo, shares his views on the limits of 
what he can achieve in the system: 
“In Kajang, we received a lot of support for what was planned and I think it 
works well. Here in Sarawak, we have not been able to implement the same thing. 
So, the system is not standardised. However, we cannot push for change. The 
change must come from the headquarters for senior officers to implement.” 
As considered above, the different perspectives, one from someone within the 
prison system and an NGO-practitioner perspective represents much of the discourse 
on children in conflict with the law. Clearly, this often results in defensive posturing 
by the various stakeholders, yet paradoxically, each perspective appears to be thinking 
of what works best for the child in conflict. There is a pattern to this theme and this 
typifies challenges in establishing a rights-based argument for children in conflict. 
Once again, adults argue about what is essentially rights afforded to the child for the 
child’s well-being and the oft-cited view of child rights being a top-down activity 
managed and controlled by adults where children are treated as objects of concern. 
Children are then part of ‘carceral system’ of disciplinary control in which ‘penal 
detention has never seriously been questioned’ because the carceral system is ‘deeply 
rooted’ (Foucault, 1975:287). 
4.2 Cognitive, emotional and psychological assessments 
The Integrity School System and the Henry Gurney School in Puncak Borneo, 
Sarawak, are schools within the prison settings and allow children to continue their 
formal academic activities. This approach is in accordance with the United Nations 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Offenders 1954 and the CRC. The 
approach in recognising the right of the child to education has achieved some measure 
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of success with a number of children securing good grades but there are challenges 
particularly those who are in the prison system, yet cannot even read or write.  
Adiba, who manages a Community Outreach Programme in a state university, 
acknowledges her own experience in conducting outreach programmes noting that: 
“You will be surprised how many kids are unable to read. As early as eight 
years old they are forced to help their mum with her work.” 
Wilson who is aged 20 and entered the Henry Gurney system was sentenced for 3 
years for theft of a motorcycle section 378 of the Penal Code. He is unable to 
undertake the national high school examinations, as he has not been able to complete 
his education: 
“I cannot meet the minimum level for higher education so I am just attending 
reading, writing and arithmetic classes.” 
This certainly presents problems with the system currently in place. It suggests that 
although children who are unable to read or write do receive some basic education, 
they cannot be part of the complete range of programmes available.  Male youth (15-
24 years) literacy rates for 2008-2012 are reported to be at 98%.  However, the net 
enrolment ratio for males in secondary school participation for 2008-2012 is only 
66.1% (UNICEF, 2016). This suggests that a significant proportion of male children 
do not continue with secondary school education. However, there is no indication as 
to why this is so and more importantly where these children end up, be it employment 
or vocational training. There is no data as to the prevailing rates of literacy among 
children in conflict with the law.  
Further, from a Malaysian perspective, there has not been a comprehensive analysis 
on mental health issues of children in the juvenile justice system and its correlation to 
the propensity to commit crime nor has there been any analysis on how these children 
cope in the present system. UNICEF (2013) notes that ‘many students have 
behavioural or self-development problems that were not addressed in the standard 
academic curriculum, and that a greater focus on life skills and cognitive development 
would be beneficial’ (2013:115).  
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This suggests that detention of such a child without appreciating the deeper 
psychosocial issues may only exacerbate the situation.  
Jones is again critical of the lack of assessment of these children: 
“How do you assess if a child is doing well? In most cases it is assessed by the 
child’s participation in religious classes or how well they did in examinations but 
there is an absence of psychological assessments.” 
An interesting study in 2014 of male juvenile delinquents and ‘normal male 
adolescents’ in Malaysia suggests ‘the need for individualized approach to treatment 
or rehabilitation’ (Nadiah Syariani et al, 2014:105). However, as this involved a study 
of one correctional institution, the authors note that the ‘research findings should not 
be generalized to the whole juvenile population.’ However, clearly there is evidence 
of this need within the present system. 
A further imputation made is the lack of psychological assessments made on the 
impact of detention (emphasis added) on the child. A child in the present system may 
attend classes and take the requisite examinations and may even do well, but how the 
child fares from a mental health perspective is another matter.  
Fazel et al’s (2008) meta-analysis83 of the research literature on the prevalence of 
mental disorders in adolescents in juvenile detention and correctional facilities in 
United States found that adolescents in detention and correctional facilities were about 
10 times more likely to suffer from psychosis than the general adolescent population 
(2008:1016). A smaller study in the United Kingdom found that ‘boys in secure care 
have many needs and a high rate of psychiatric morbidity’ (Kroll et al, 2009: 1975). 
The young boy, WK, whose case is referred to several times in this thesis, has now 
been released after spending close to 16 years in detention at the pleasure of the Ruler. 
Jones describes this child’s exit from the Integrity School system: 
                                                 
83 Twenty-five surveys involving 13,778 boys and 2,972 girls (mean age 15.6 years, range 10-19 
years) met the inclusion criteria. 
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“I know in all his fifteen years he has never been for a psychological 
assessment. Only now, when he has come out many people have asked him to go 
for either a psychiatric or a psychological assessment. Only now, it dawns on the 
authorities to consider how he is going to cope. So, time will tell in terms of his 
rate of adjustment after fifteen years.” 
As an undergraduate law student, Adiba participated in Community Outreach 
Programmes in the Integrity School in Kajang and had the opportunity to meet the 
young boy, WK, and developed a friendship with him. She notes:  
“[Y]ou can see that when he was just released, he had a lot of fear and 
uncertainty especially about how to react to people. He chose to work outside of 
Malaysia as he was afraid people would know about him and his past.” 
The experience in speaking to the boys in the Henry Gurney School revealed 
similar issues. Although boys have visitation rights, as noted above this is not a 
regular occurrence, as families cannot afford the cost of travel. This distance from the 
family can have serious implications. 
Aman is an 18-year-old boy serving a 3-year term in Henry Gurney. He entered the 
Henry Gurney School at the age of 16. In March 2017, his mother passed away but 
owing to his detention, he could not attend her funeral. Aman spoke of this incident in 
an almost indifferent manner and seemed to accept this as part of the consequence of 
his incarceration.  
Another boy, Odeng who is serving a 3-year term for statutory rape is not able to 
provide for his partner and child while incarcerated. His partner and child have now 
returned to live with her parents and he has lost contact with them. His parental rights 
appear to have been subrogated by the law and he was clearly emotionally troubled 
and frustrated with this development in his life. Odeng’s incarceration is not the best 
solution to his perceived criminal behaviour. This echoes with what has been raised in 
the preceding Chapters about the complexities in espousing the international standards 
and expectations of the law and applying them to the actual operational aspects of the 
law with the actual child in conflict with the law. 
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As a correctional officer in the Henry Gurney School, Luke acknowledges the 
impact of family problems: 
“We understand the differences between adults and children. Most of the time 
these children are here because of family issues, divorce for example. They lack 
attention so they end up taking drugs without realising the consequences of their 
actions and you can see the effects of taking drugs. The slowing down of the brain 
for example.” 
Some of these boys have been involved in self-administration of drugs from as 
early as 13 and there are long-lasting effects that may well last beyond the period of 
incarceration. 
 The boys are provided counselling and guidance but Luke explains the challenges: 
“Our success in helping the kids actually depends on the environment. We try to 
build trust with them. The boys do have opportunities to meet with counsellors and 
welfare officers. They normally choose those they are comfortable with. Of course, 
some boys will never reveal everything and they keep things inside them. Some are 
not interested and seem to be wasting their time in here and I am sure some will get 
worse once they are released.” 
A child enters the system of incarceration with pre-existing psychosocial 
challenges and in some cases, does not receive the appropriate support, as a child 
should.  Clearly, plans to introduce diversionary approaches require consideration of 
multiple issues of capacity building, statutory amendments, policy and procedural 
adjustments but perhaps more importantly is the need to address the support 
mechanisms to deal with the psychosocial issues that affect the child. These issues 
will be considered in Chapter 6. 
4.3 Detention as a last resort? 
UNICEF suggests that detention should ideally be used only in where ‘the child has 
committed a serious crime involving violence or persists in committing other serious 
offences and there is no other appropriate alternative’ (2013:88). It also notes that 
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stakeholder understanding and application of the principle was often not in accordance 
with existing international standards.  
Jones suggests that stakeholders should think about their own children as a basis 
for evaluating standards of detention. 
As a court advisor, Gus notes that placing children in detention has consequences: 
“You put them into places where they should not be, and they train themselves 
to be tough. Self-preservation is key.”  
However, in the court he serves in Gus notes that detention is normally used as a 
last resort: 
“But of course there are cases of those incorrigible kids and I suppose as a last 
resort you need to put them in. However, you need to know what you are doing and 
where you are sending them. You have to do your homework.”  
As a Magistrate, Irene has visited the Prison Complex in Kajang and visited a 
Henry Gurney School and a Tunas Bakti School. Irene notes the level of discipline 
differs between the institutions: 
“If you ask me about discipline and if we are looking at these institutions as a 
rehabilitation centre, then the Henry Gurney School is much more disciplined and 
better even though the training is very harsh. Another thing that is good about the 
Henry Gurney system is the opportunity for the child to obtain some level of 
certification. This is only a matter of perspective because each place is under a 
different administration with different environments. To what extent each impacts 
the child’s psychology, I don’t know.”  
In her own experience, Irene notes that she rarely sends a child to the Henry 
Gurney School system: 
“Having said that it is very rare. Throughout my service I have sent only 2 or 3 
children to the Henry Gurney School.” 
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Irene is firm in her views as to her approach in dealing with children in conflict 
with the law treating them as: 
“Children first. It is always as children first.” 
Data on sentencing trends are not available and as cases in the Court for Children 
are not reported, there is very little guidance afforded to Magistrates in deciding cases. 
Irene is not aware of how other Magistrates treat the children in their courts but 
explains her approach: 
 “Probably if we have access to sentencing data that will provide us with a 
better view of sentencing trends and that will suggest the mind-set of the 
magistrate. Normally, when we make an order, we will first consider the family, the 
resources available and what kind of support is there.” 
In one case, Irene and her advisers deliberated about a child who was charged with 
handling stolen property. He had a single mother who was also disabled and a brother 
aged 18 who had to work to support the family. The welfare officer’s report suggested 
that the boy be sent to the Henry Gurney School: 
“How are you going to put this child back in the family, when you know that the 
support is not there? Even the mother cannot take care of herself, what more if we ask 
her to look after this child. So, it is a very difficult situation. In the end, we still put 
this child back with the family. We hope that the brother and the mother will work 
together. So, in deciding we considered every aspect of their lives.” 
Given the challenges in implementing the detention of the child as a last resort, the 
rights of the child to diversion appears critical as the implications of detention on 
mental health are well documented. Further, the lack of assessments before the child is 
presented to court is also of concern.  
There are concerns that there is a lack of suitably trained personnel to deal with 
specific issues that impact children. Malaysia has not introduced specific laws on 
social workers. A proposed Social Workers Bill to legislate social work as a 
profession, mooted in 2010, has been shelved for now, as there were criticisms that 
legislating social work would kill volunteerism.   
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UNICEF views the direction Malaysia is taking in terms detention of children 
conflict with the law as a last resort, as a pragmatic one. Progress though slow, is still 
being made. Sylvia feels that: 
“I think the idea of detention as a measure is slowly changing for minor 
offences. Most countries start with minor offences. I think we are trying to open 
that up a little bit.” 
This highlights the fact that making child rights as an agenda for change can be 
painstakingly slow as entrenched values and systems require chipping away at small 
parts of the larger systemic structure. Detention as the last resort although espoused as 
an ideal is only just making its presence felt in the juvenile justice system.  
      5. Views on child rights in Malaysia 
The operation of the youth justice system indicates the impact of the underlying 
norms on how child rights are viewed and defended. The preceding sections aim to 
explore how stakeholders within the system view child rights. Of particular 
importance are the views of the very children in conflict with the law themselves. 
5.1 Awareness of child rights 
Jones is of the view that children appear to have some awareness of their own 
rights but do not have an appreciation of child rights as indicated in the treaty, within 
the broader human rights framework: 
“They only know that this is probably how the society deals with them. They 
know something is wrong, but they do not know that this is about their rights.” 
William is 19 years old and was sentenced to 3 years in Henry Gurney for 
housebreaking and possession of stolen goods pursuant to sections 457& 411 of the 
Penal Code. He was handcuffed and alleged that he was beaten by the police while in 
custody. His parents did not visit him. In court, he did not understand the process 
although after his third visit (in relation to the same offence) he began to understand 
more. He was not aware of his rights.  
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“Nobody advised me of my rights. Not even my welfare officer. I learned from 
fellow inmates to ask for a lesser sentence but it was not accepted.” 
Another boy, Udin was 13 when he started having relationship with a girl of the 
same age. They soon became sexually active. The victim’s mother found out that they 
were having a sexual relationship and lodged a report.  He was charged with statutory 
rape pursuant to section 375 of the Penal Code. He was handcuffed and taken to court 
where he describes his experience: 
“My parents trusted the investigating officer too much and they asked me to 
plead guilty because the investigating officer said that it would help my case. I 
don’t think I had any rights because they did not allow me to speak. In my case 
they should have asked me if I wanted to marry her or given me community work. I 
was willing to marry her. My parents did not get a lawyer and in the end, my father 
tried to appeal but it was too late.” 
In most instances, it does appear that children learn very quickly from peers who 
are detained with them including from other more seasoned children or in some cases 
from adult prisoners.  
Lawrence describes a case involving statutory rape where a child aged 16 was 
charged for statutory rape. Lawrence suggested to the child to plead guilty to avoid 
being sent to the Henry Gurney School. However, the boy was keen to know what two 
other boys charged in the same case were going to plead. When he found out that they 
were not going to plead guilty, he wanted to do the same. His friends overheard this 
discussion and advised him not to do so: 
Lawrence explains: 
 “After listening to his friends, he then changed his mind. So, they are very 
influenced by what their friends say and they are also worried about peer 
perception. My client was just a follower. He had no idea what to expect.” 
Angah is serving a 3-year sentence in Henry Gurney for multiple offences. He was 
kept in the police lock-up together with adults and explains: 
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“I had friends in the lock-up with me and I just followed their advice, what to 
say and even how to behave.” 
However, in some instances, particularly when children appear in court, Vivian, a 
court adviser, notices that some children are aware of how the system works and 
implied that they are aware of their rights: 
“Some of them are very aware. They will ask to be sent to the Sekolah Tunas 
Bakti and not to Henry Gurney because they feel that Tunas Bakti is not so harsh.” 
Thus most of the boys interviewed, did not have prior understanding or awareness 
of their rights. Very often, the learning takes place while in remand or custody. In 
some cases, awareness comes when they are finally incarcerated. UNICEF Malaysia 
reports that law students from one of the universities make regular, fortnightly visits to 
the Kajang Prison and also make occasional visits to selected secure homes where 
there is some guidance on ‘legal information, basic rights, extra tuition for young 
prisoners involved in tertiary programmes’ (UNICEF, 2013:116). 
Adiba was among the law students involved in the Community Outreach 
Programme (she now manages the programme) and undertook a Community Legal 
Education module in a state university.84 As part of this programme (mentioned in the 
UNICEF report above), students would visit the Kajang Prison and other secure 
homes fortnightly.  
Adiba describes the purpose thus: 
“The purpose is firstly, to educate them on law and about child rights. We also 
taught them the rights of a prisoner. Secondly, we taught them how to prepare for 
interviews, for working life. Another thing is that with all that security, six gates 
and high security, the environment is very, tense, so these activities help break that 
tension. We also motivate them.”  
                                                 
84 The Module was developed together with the Bridges Across Borders Southeast Asia Community 




There are a number of issues here. Firstly, the attempts to educate children about 
their rights comes at a point when the children are already in the system. Secondly, 
there are concerns about the effectiveness of the modules as Adiba explains: 
“It is a bit difficult for me to evaluate whether they have accepted or embraced 
whatever I have taught them. It's because we usually get different sets of students. 
They don't send the same people. We rarely get the same people.” 
Terry as a former correctional officer is of the view that the children are not aware 
of their rights before they enter the system: 
“I don’t think children understand rights of the child. No one talks to them of 
their rights. Neither parents, nor teachers, no one educates them. Only when they 
have committed a crime, they learn about their rights. Even then, we are not sure if 
they really understand it. I don’t think they really understand it.” 
Vivian suggests that even in secure homes, children are unaware of their rights: 
“They can’t do anything. You have no rights there. Of course, they are given 
food and shelter. They are supposed to have a counsellor to talk to. The counsellor 
goes in with a lot of hope, but after some time I find that they cannot do a great 
job.” 
Beyond the confines of detained children, it does appear that children in general are 
not aware of their rights. Farida is of the view that much of this is attributed to the 
experience of children in the Malaysian socio-cultural ecosystem: 
“I do not think they are aware of their rights, under the international treaties, or 
under national laws. As far as I know, I do not think that education on child rights 
is made a component in schools. I don’t think there are enough initiatives, by other 
parties, including the government or non-governmental organisations. I don’t think 
we have done enough to educate children that they do have rights.” 
Arguably, it is perhaps the case that in Malaysia, children are not seen as individual 
rights-bearers, but as objects of concern, yet this identification of being objects of 
concern is fraught with paradoxes. Therefore, within the youth juvenile justice 
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framework, children are treated as an offender first. These approaches strip away 
aspects of childhood and child rights.  
As noted in preceding Chapters, children have been handcuffed, children have been 
caned, children are placed in adult detention facilities or even where separate facilities 
are in place, children are subject to similar rules applied to adult offenders. A 
magistrate’s cognizance of the rights of the child are highly dependent on the 
individual magistrate’s understanding and acceptance of the broader notion of child 
rights. These issues are also apparent in relation to the police, prosecutors or even 
correctional officers and other stakeholders. Issues of culture and conceptions of 
childhood often determine the treatment of children and this will be considered below. 
5.2 Advocating child rights: Cultural norms versus Western hegemony 
As indicated above, children in conflict are often subject to various child rights 
infringements at the arrest, investigation and bail stage including for example the 
failure of the police to inform the child’s parents or guardians of the arrest, the lack of 
access to legal representation and the use of force by police officers during arrest and 
questioning. Children are held in remand or pre-trial detention for long periods of time 
and in poor conditions of detention.  
As noted above, Malaysia is yet to lift its reservations towards the five core articles 
particularly Article 37 (regarding torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment and unlawful or arbitrary deprivation of liberty). The need to 
expressly state the rights of the child arrested including the right to counsel or the 
right to have family members informed for example in the Child (Amendment) Act 
2016 is perhaps an indication that clearly there were breaches notwithstanding the 
ratification of the CRC or the enactment of the Child Act of 2001. 
This leads to the consideration as to whether children should be taught their rights. 
There is a view that teaching a child of his/her rights would be contrary to existing 
cultural norms and values or perceived to be a dangerous thing. Jones views this as a 
clash of cultures: 
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“First, there is the perception that this is a Western-driven idea. When you have 
that kind of perception then it appears to clash with religious and moral values. 
They view it as an attempt to get a child to be defiant, when teaching them their 
rights.” 
Vivian’s own dealings with parents appears to find similar views but she takes the 
effort to educate the parents about rights and responsibilities and that with every right 
comes with a corresponding responsibility. 
Sylvia agrees and acknowledges the challenges in considering child rights and the 
CRC in Malaysia: 
 “I think that the education system also plays a role. Children are not 
encouraged to voice out their opinions. It is more of a spoon-feeding culture and 
critical thinking is not encouraged. When children can speak up and are given 
space to speak up, then perhaps their views might be taken a bit more seriously?” 
Adiba views the education system as flawed as it expects a child to never ask 
challenging questions in school but to accept everything the teacher says. This docile 
attitude impacts the awareness of their rights.  However, there is a suggestion that 
today, many children, particularly in urban settings are more aware of issues of rights 
and this sometimes is seen in cross-generational relationships where the younger 
generation challenge social norms.  
Noemi, is also an academic in a law school and notes some changes among the 
students she teaches: 
“Because they are young you can see the differences. For instance, when I talk 
to this younger generation, maybe because of their upbringing, they seem more 
open and they do not really see the issue of rights as Western norms. They do feel 
that they are entitled to all these rights.”  
It is widely accepted that children in Malaysia have limited rights to express their 
opinions in issues that affect them. In a recent poll, youth perceive themselves as less 
empowered to act with only 41% of youth today believing they could influence how 
the government works (Leong et al, 2012). 
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The voting age in Malaysia is 21.  Interestingly one of the arguments to keep the 
age at 21 is to suggest that lowering it to 18 would interfere with a young person’s 
tertiary education and that 18 is too young. Yet paradoxically, an 18-year-old in 
Malaysia can make many adult decisions with adult consequences as noted above. 
Following the Government’s first Report to the Committee in 2006, reservations to 
CRC Articles 1 (age of the child); 13 (freedom of expression) and 15 (freedom of 
assembly and participation) were withdrawn in 2010 but a number of limitations 
remain in respect of children. For example, there are other limitations on the right to 
express opinions. The Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 indicates that children under the 
age of 15 cannot participate in protests and those under 21 are barred from organising 
one. Section 15 of the Universities and University Colleges Act 1971, while allowing 
students the right to become members of any political party, does not be allow them to 
stand for election or hold any posts in student societies, organisations, bodies or 
groups on campus.85 As noted in preceding chapters, there are broad statutory 
enactments that limit other freedoms.86 
There is a noticeable lack of statutory provisions mandating child participation, and 
arguably, little has been done to formally encourage child participation in practice. In 
judicial proceedings involving child custody matters for example, it was only in 2011 
that the Court of Appeal granted the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia 
(SUHAKAM) permission to hold a watching brief in a child-custody case, and to 
address the court on the obligations of Malaysia under the CRC in this regard. In its 
decision, the Court of Appeal took notice that the child concerned was capable of 
forming and making known her own wishes on matters.87 
Jones recalls the issue of lack awareness among the judiciary on the CRC and the 
rights of the child it affords in that particular case (Jones was then a Commissioner 
with the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia) noting: 
                                                 
85 These amendments were only introduced in 2012. 
86 For example, the Internal Security Act 1960, Sedition Act 1948, the Printing Presses and 
Publication Act 1984 among others. 
87 Low Swee Siong v Tan Siew Siew [2011] 2 MLJ 501   
223 
 
“There was a custody case involving a girl and we had to make representations 
to advise the court of our obligations in the treaty and the court took account of 
this but this suggests that many agencies themselves are not aware of the rights of 
the child.” 
The challenge of advocating child rights transcends the judiciary and the 
government but also includes the lawyers in practice. Arianne explains the broader 
aims of the Child Rights Committee of the Malaysian Bar: 
“The committee was set up to train lawyers. We must equip the lawyers first. So, 
our bigger goal is that if we have enough lawyers who can represent children as 
witnesses, victims or as child offenders, I think that's a big achievement.” 
The Child Rights Committee of the Malaysian Bar was formed in 2016 and 
Arianne acknowledges that although Malaysia had ratified the CRC some years ago, 
the level of awareness among lawyers and judges is still rather low: 
“A lot of lawyers do not realise that we need to push boundaries with judges. 
Every time we go to court, for example, we should take the principal articles and 
use them. While we are doing that, we are also educating the judiciary and the 
DPPs88 about it, because sometimes they forget. There is a tendency to treat this as 
a Western thing but, it's not so.” 
There is also a further issue of child participation in this process. The 2016 
amendment to the Child Act 2001 introduces a National Council for Children with 
overarching duties and responsibilities on all matters including among others to 
‘develop programmes and strategies’ educating society of the ‘rights and dignity of a 
child’. The proposed council includes the participation of two89 ‘representatives from 
amongst children who shall be appointed by the Minister on the recommendation of 
the Director of the Social Welfare.’90 The concern here of course is that the inclusion 
of children on the committee should not be viewed as tokenism. 
                                                 
88 Deputy Public Prosecutors 
89 Excluding the two children, there are 23 adults on the Council. 
90 Section 4(1) (r) as inserted by section 6 of the Child (Amendment) Act 2016.  
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Sylvia makes the point of how children are viewed, noting: 
“Children are not seen as voters; therefore, they may be less on the scale of 
importance. Children are not being placed in the centre of the work that everyone 
does. Therefore, all these things play a role on the implementation and 
enforcement of the CRC. How are children seen and viewed?” 
Charles, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Women Family and Community 
Development suggests that there are underlying issues particularly:   
“In our region, as an Asian society, we don’t question authority and parents 
have so-called “full rights”. However, things are changing.  When we ratified the 
CRC, we needed to do advocacy programmes where the people, especially the 
children, would know what their rights are. That is the ideal situation but the 
reality is different. There are challenges for example, resources. Dealing with 
other agencies is another issue. To get into schools, we need to go through the 
Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Education have their own reservations, for 
instance, about corporal punishment.” 
In her work in the Child Rights Committee, Arianne sees the same issues:   
“I would say what happens here, is that in Asian society, we tend to think that 
we know what is best for the child. The attitude is, ‘We know what's better for you 
and you just keep quiet. I know what I am doing.’ Even among lawyers. To be 
honest, it is very difficult for a lawyer to comprehend the fact that the child has his 
or her rights and they know what they want.” 
Given the embedded nature of childhood and its cultural construction in Malaysia, 
clearly there are challenges in introducing concepts that are different. Again, there is a 
measure of careful engagement. UNICEF Malaysia takes a consultative approach, 
using advocacy as Sylvia explains: 
“The work generally in this country office is on advocacy, lobbying, towards 
changing policy, changing legislation. How can we address the social norms? How 
we can improve services? Again, it’s through advocacy.” 
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Farida shares her experience in engaging with the State: 
“You want the government to be committed when it comes to ratifying 
international conventions but at the same time we also need to work with people on 
the ground to understand why we ratify that international convention or why do 
they see their Asian values and culture being under threat?” 
Tabitha, an opposition Member of Parliament shares her experience in working 
with the government on issues of child rights: 
“Of course, in some areas, the government and the opposition find common 
ground. For example, in areas of child abuse or child grooming the political divide 
was not an issue. We have a Bill being considered now and we are working 
together. However, even in this case we were reactive rather than proactive. We 
did this only after Richard Huckle’s case.91 We did not even know that he abused 
so many children in our own country. However, we still have many unresolved 
issues. Child marriages and stateless children are just some of the child rights 
issues that have not been resolved.” 
James and Prout (2015) suggest that rather than seeing children as an aspect of 
something else (the family, the school, social work and social policy, the market etc.), 
the better approach is to advocate placing children’s roles, experiences and activities 
central to the pursuit of childhood studies (2015:x). The childhood experience in 
Malaysia shaped by its values imbibed, views children through adult lenses. Clearly, 
given the adult hegemony in relation to child rights, advocating child rights, 
particularly through educating children of their rights, presents challenges. 
Farida describes the challenges in trying to engage with the government to 
institutionalise constitutionalism as part of the education policy in schools through the 
Constitutional Law Committee. The Committee faced resistance from the Ministry. 
Farida’s frustration was evident: 
                                                 
91 In 2016, Huckle was convicted in the United Kingdom of 71 counts of serious sexual assault 
against children ranging from 6 months to 12 years old in Malaysia and Cambodia (The Star, 2016). 
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“I think it is very unfortunate that everything in Malaysia seems to be politicised 
and it is even more unfortunate that our education system is politicised. If you ask 
me, if the Federal Constitution and constitutionalism were to be made a subject in 
school, it would benefit the Malaysian citizen.  However, it wouldn’t be so for the 
politicians. So, there is this tussle between what would be in the public interest and 
what would be in the political interests.” 
However, there are attempts to engage with those marginalised communities. 
Adiba manages a Community Outreach Programme in the same university where she 
completed her undergraduate programme: 
“We do programmes such as Street Law where we go out to the community, 
especially urban poor kids who are at high risk. So, we go out there and we give 
them some sort of legal lesson through interactive activities. We teach them in a 
language they can understand.” 
The notion of educating children of the constitution and their rights may not be in 
the best interest of those in political power as arguably an informed population may be 
a challenge to political authority. Much of this debate is framed around the broader 
issue of how human rights are perceived in Malaysia. There is a view that the broad 
notion of rights is incongruous with Asian/Malaysian values and thus the rights 
argument is no more than Western hegemony. This view has certainly impacted the 
rights of the child in conflict with the law as there is some measure of resistance to 
accept that a child has the capacity to be rights-bearing. These matters will be 
considered in further detail in Chapter 6. 
6. Diversion 
As noted above, most of the children coming before the Court for Children have 
committed minor, property- related offences and that most of these cases could have 
been handled more efficiently by referring the child directly to a diversion programme 
at the outset, rather than going through the expense and stigmatising process of 
numerous Court appearances (UNICEF, 2013). 
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However, the recent amendments to the Child Act did not include diversion 
programmes. Based on a request by the Ministry of Women, Family and Community 
Development, UNICEF supported the mission of two representatives from the 
England and Wales Youth Justice Board to share lessons learned in the United 
Kingdom. An informal task force was established to develop an appropriate diversion 
model for Malaysia. Additionally, UNICEF provided technical advice in relation to 
the drafting of an enabling provision on diversion for the proposed Child Bill. While 
the diversion provision was not included in the Child (Amendment) Act 2016, 
UNICEF’s Annual Report (2015) is of the view that, ‘there is still political will to 
proceed with the diversion pilot’ (UNICEF, 2015b:22). 
6.1 Development and implementation 
Noemi notes that the process has taken time and is still an on-going activity. After 
the initial discussions some 5 years ago, there were concerns about whether diversion 
would be perceived to be an abdication of ensuring crime is punished. Following 
further concerns about the actual mechanism of diversion, the Ministry responded 
proactively: 
“Because of all these debates, I think the Ministry responded in a proactive way 
by having detailed workshops and UNICEF was of course providing financial 
support. It takes foreign authorities to convince you!” 
Charles a senior civil servant in the Ministry explains the development of 
introducing diversion: 
“During that time, we were considering two concepts. We were talking about 
restorative justice and diversion.” 
Given the ethnic make-up of the country92 there were concerns about whether the 
concept of restorative justice would work especially if a person from one ethnic group 
committed a crime with the victim coming from another ethnic group.  These 
                                                 
92 Malaysia’s major ethnic groups are Bumiputra (68.8%), Chinese (23.2%), Indians (7%) and 
others (1%) (2017, Department of Statistics Malaysia). 
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situations could heighten ethnic tensions and as such, it was felt that diversion could 
be a better approach to take. Charles explains: 
“So maybe it was a better idea of introducing diversion where the basic 
principle is that we should not punish children in the same way we punish adults. 
Another thing is to give a second opportunity, to the children because they are 
immature and that the government should give them that kind of an opportunity. 
The third is that putting them in the jail or the legal system itself would not 
necessarily bring good to society. You put all the “bad” kids together; it is going to 
be maybe a disaster, rather than bring any good.” 
As a Magistrate in the Court for Children, Irene feels she cannot change matters: 
 “In fact, in cases like statutory rape, especially if it's consensual, diversion may 
be better as they are in a relationship with sexual activity. However, it is very 
difficult because when the parents find out the boy gets charged. It is very unfair 
and in that situation, I think in fact diversion can take place depending on the facts 
of the case.”  
Problems associated with the issues of statutory rape in Malaysia have elicited 
some concerns. The provisions of the law are designed to deal with the capacity to 
consent where the victim is a minor and the perpetrator is an adult. These provisions 
however run into complications when dealing with situations like Odeng and David 
considered above.  
Luke, a correctional officer acknowledges that the boys incarcerated in cases of 
statutory rape between consenting teens are perhaps situations where diversion might 
work: 
“Diversion is good especially if it is section 375 where the prosecution is 
normally because of the victim’s family.” 
George, a correctional officer, acknowledges that diversion requires the system to 
be sensitive to victims too: 
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“Diversion is a good idea because children do not think of the consequences 
when they commit a crime but it is hard to balance between the victim’s needs and 
the offenders.” 
As a lawyer and member of the Child Rights Committee, Arianne suggests that 
sending a child through an institutionalised system of reform and rehabilitation may 
not be the best option: 
“If you are going to put a child in an environment, where they are going to have 
the opportunity to mix with seasoned offenders, one of two things will happen. 
Either the child will say, ‘okay listen, I'm not going get involved in this anymore’ 
or you know what, ‘that guy looks cool and he is popular’ and I will follow him, 
and that’s what will happen.” 
 
As a police officer, DSP Ona views diversion as an opportunity for second 
chances:   
“Our criminal justice system in Malaysia is punitive, so I think it is high time we 
should give them a second chance. Like for example, in cases of shoplifting or 
maybe for begging or for the theft of motorcycles. Therefore, we should give them a 
second chance for them to learn from their mistakes. To me diversion is a very 
good programme.”  
As a lawyer who is often involved in cases involving children, Lawrence agrees 
with the implementation of diversion noting that these children are not mature enough 
to think rationally. However, Lawrence acknowledges that there are challenges:   
“However, there are many stakeholders involved and they will have to work 
together to make it happen. Because right now in Malaysia we do not have proper 
legislation for all the processes and procedures for diversion. When a crime is 
committed, the victim lodges a police report and the police will investigate. It is 
then up to the police to send it to the DPP, or the AG, and they will commence with 
charges against the offender.” 
Arianne, a fellow lawyer, adds: 
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“The police do not have that discretion. So, if you have a parent who is 
aggressive, and saying, “why haven't you taken any action!” and they start sending 
letters to all the different agencies, the police are duty bound investigate and 
forward the investigation papers.”  
This view is certainly prevalent among the stakeholders. Clearly, the issue of 
diversion requires formal implementation through legislation without which it appears 
that the police will not act.  DSP Ona believes that the police force will support 
diversion but defines the caveat: 
“The officers on the ground will support it if the law provides for it. If it is, then 
we need to enforce and just follow it. However, because the AG’s Chambers has 
the prerogative whether to charge or not, so, they must lay out what sort of 
offences are subject to diversion. Definitely not for serious crimes like rape, 
murder or drug trafficking. They must draw a line.” 
This is an interesting view. Clearly, the underlying culture in the police force is one 
that appears to respond to orders. Without clear lines, it appears that there is 
uncertainty as to how to operate. More importantly, support for diversion is based on 
following a mandate and not on appreciating the actual broader issue of child rights. 
This is despite the overall agreement that diversion is a good thing. 
Noemi acknowledges the consensus among stakeholders: 
“Obviously most of the stakeholders are already in agreement that children do 
have rights, and therefore the agreement for diversion. However, it is limited to the 
extent that diversion, is only in the form of a caution. At this stage, there is no 
consideration for the Family Group Conference or Committee Group Conference 
like in Thailand for example.” 
Interestingly, when the incarcerated boys were asked about diversion, only one had 
some idea of what diversion entails. The other nine had not heard about it but 
expressed mixed responses. 
Wilson was sentenced for 3 years for theft of a motorcycle and had heard about 
diversion as an alternative: 
231 
 
“I have heard of diversion but I am not sure it will work. Maybe the boys would 
not change?” 
Dom is 20 years of age and is serving a three -year term for methamphetamine 
abuse pursuant to section 15 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 and suggests that peer 
influence may be a factor: 
“Well I suppose diversion might work because some kids might change but if 
they follow their friends around, then it will not work.” 
Given the fact that some boys have disrupted lives outside the system (for example 
broken families, lack of education or addiction) there is support for being in the Henry 
Gurney School. 
Lony is serving a 3-year term for statutory rape pursuant to section 375 of the Penal 
Code. He was 16 at the date of the offence and shares his views: 
“I am grateful to be here because I think if I was outside, I am not sure how I 
would be. In here I get a chance to study.” 
Angah is 20 years of age serving a 3-year sentence in Henry Gurney for multiple 
offences. At the age of 17, he had a rape charge against him pursuant to section 375 of 
the Penal Code. He was kept in remand for 14 days. The victim was 17 and was 
known to him. They had been having sex and her mother found out about it and made 
a report. At the same time, he was also charged for theft and failed a drug test. He 
views detention negatively but necessary given his prior conduct: 
“I have not heard about diversion. I don’t like confinement but I accept that I 
need it because I need to be controlled. I am thankful that I get an education both 
formal and religious. I am not sure I would change for the better outside.” 
The two boys who have children, David and Odeng are supportive of diversion as 
an alternative. Odeng as considered above, is frustrated that he is incarcerated and so 
has lost contact with his wife and child. In one sense, these boys have taken on adult 
responsibilities but are unable to fulfil these roles. David says: 
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“In Henry Gurney, I feel I am treated like a child. I certainly would support 
something like diversion as it would give me a chance to be with my wife and 
child.” 
The unfortunate consequence in these cases is that in the State’s desire to 
rehabilitate and reform the child in conflict with the law, another child is left without 
support and there is always the danger of repeating this cycle of family breakdown 
and disrupted lives leading to other consequences. 
6.2 Challenges in implementation 
While there is evidence of a commitment to introduce diversion, there are 
challenges in the actual implementation. Noemi explains: 
“Number one, training for primarily the police officers. The other challenge is 
probably backlash from society; the portion of society who I believe may not 
understand the concept of diversion. So, awareness is not limited to the 
stakeholders, but also includes people who are potentially affected.” 
In pursuing the commitment to introduce diversion, a pilot study was planned with 
a view to include it in the recent amendments to the Child (Amendment) Act 2016. 
Noemi describes the outcome: 
“A pilot diversion programme was crafted. The next stage was to decide 
whether it should be put on statutory footing but, as you know, at the last minute, 
before it went to Parliament in October 2015, the two provisions on diversion were 
not there. Having said that, the Ministry is still determined to have the pilot 
project, quite soon; but how soon is soon? I'm not sure because at the moment, 
their priority is actually to revise the National Child Policy.” 
A pilot study on diversion was planned for Sentul, a district in Kuala Lumpur. 
According to Charles, Sentul was chosen as it was thought to have a higher level of 




“There were stumbling blocks, for example the police would say that they don't 
have the authority to divert because the law does not allow them to do that. So, we 
have problems about authority and about procedures. Another problem we faced 
was deciding the type of offences that we're going to apply. It is not easy to get a 
consensus.  We need to know what we need to do and we need to do advocacy as 
well to tell the whole community that we are going to have that pilot project.” 
Implementation of diversion as an approach requires engagement with society and 
as suggested by Noemi: 
 “We really need to educate our society, you know, in understanding that 
because children have rights, primarily they've got a right to be given a second 
chance.” 
Negotiating with the various agencies and Ministries also present challenges. There 
are issues of bureaucracy common in the civil service. Charles acknowledges this: 
 “We do have some problems with our colleagues in other ministries, especially 
in communication. It's very sad that bureaucracy in the system slows down 
efficiency.” 
This appears to be one of the reasons that Malaysia is yet to submit its second 
report and there are challenges in finding an agreeable consensus:  
“That is why people always question the government, especially my Ministry, 
why the CRC report is yet to be submitted. Until now, we have not submitted the 
second report. It is not easy to get all the information from the different ministries. 
I think this is about communication. Sometimes we are asked why we signed in the 
first place. I can understand the predicament where they're coming from and we 
have some limitations there.” 
The suggestion here is that the signing of the treaty may not necessarily be readily 
embraced by all relevant agencies, as submission of periodic reviews require multi-
agency cooperation especially in managing information.   
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Issues of child rights and locating that within the complex structure of government 
presents other challenges. The multiple government agencies that are involved include 
among others the Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development, the 
Police, the Attorney General’s Chambers, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the 
Education Ministry.  
Stakeholders acknowledge that they need to work together. Arianne shares her 
experience in working together with other stakeholders: 
“We are saying that we cannot work in silos. We have to work together as a 
team and it is only then that you can push for reform.” 
However, sometimes, there are challenges in dealing with inter-government 
Ministries. Charles shares his views: 
“Making decisions in a government agency can be slow because we need to 
consider a lot of interests from various stakeholders. Sometimes that whole process 
can be painstaking. It is not unilaterally decided by one ministry and we are not the 
authority that can make decisions. We can only propose to the government and if 
the rest of them do not agree with this, it is just a no-go.”  
As an opposition Member of Parliament, Tabitha finds changes in government 
personnel a further challenge: 
“It is also difficult to work together sometimes as there are frequent changes in 
Ministers. Maybe they need some system of performance indicators to ensure there 
is consistency.” 
Charles acknowledges that as a civil servant, transfers and movement within 
Ministries is commonplace. However, he does not think that the movement of civil 
servants will affect the issues of implementing diversion in Malaysia: 
“Yes, in the government we move. All these things have been reflected in our 
management and our management is aware about this. This project is not just 
about me. I have my officers and I have my bosses. With or without me, this is the 
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Ministry’s commitment. So, I don't think even if I or even my officers leave, it will 
really affect matters much.” 
Successful implementation of diversion certainly requires the political will to do so 
as well as a consistency in stakeholder involvement. Given that all key stakeholders 
involved are subject to mobility and career changes, this can be a factor in the delays 
in moving these plans further. There are also concerns that in this multi-agency 
relationship, there are those that may not support the ratification of the treaty. As 
noted above, the ratification of the treaty may be driven by government rhetoric in the 
international arena. 
7. Reflections 
Conversations with stakeholders and the boys provided depth and context to the 
various documents considered in Chapters 2 and 3. This added a human dimension to 
the understanding of issues that are relevant in the lives of children in conflict with the 
law. In analysing the various treaties and international documents, it appears that 
Malaysia desires to meet some of her international obligations but there are multiple 
layers of contradictions in meeting those obligations. The lived experience of the child 
in conflict with the law in Malaysia does not meet many of the aspirational goals of 
the various treaty obligations. Understanding diversion therefore goes beyond the 
mere theoretical pronouncements that treaty obligations create.   
A further matter that appeared in the context of these conversations was the 
blurring of the concepts of diversion. As noted in Chapter 3, the concept of diversion 
that this study sought to explore was diverting children away from the juvenile justice 
system and diversion operating in post-trial circumstances. However, stakeholders do 
not make this distinction and reference to diversion is on the basis of a rather broad 
view of the concept. While there is broad support for the notion of diversion, there are 
uncertainties as to how such a notion is to be implemented. Applying the concept of 
diversion in practice can thus be difficult. 
These conversations also suggest that contextual issues of politics, culture and 
conceptions of childhood are deeply embedded in Malaysian society. These 
entrenched values and norms are difficult to breakdown and this indicates a level of 
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complexity in the implementation of a rights-based approach in the juvenile justice 
system even if the child is considered by stakeholders as a central figure in this 
dialogue. Figure 12, below, is a visual representation of this. Chapter 6 seeks to 























Chapter 6  
 Conclusion 
People, don’t you understand 
The child needs a helping hand 
Or he’ll grow to be an angry young man some day? 
Take a look at you and me 
Are we too blind to see 
Do we simply turn our heads, and look the other way? 











In 1989, just a few weeks after the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, 71 Heads of State and Government and 88 other senior 
delegates (Malaysia was represented by a State observer) gathered for the 1990 World 
Summit for Children. At the Summit, delegates expressed a commitment to protect 
children and to diminish their suffering; to promote the fullest development of their 
human potential; and to make them aware of their needs, their rights and their 
opportunities (UNICEF, 1990). 
A decade later, the United Nations General Assembly held a Special Session on 
Children, to serve as an opportunity for world leaders to renew their commitment to 
children. In the ten years or so that passed since the World Summit and the adoption 
of the CRC, it was apparent that it takes time to translate political consensus into 
effective action. In spite of State commitment, a gap remained between promises and 
action and ‘that it is not enough for leaders to promise something, even when the 
resources are available to back it up, unless the whole of society is mobilized to 
achieve the goal’ (UNICEF, 2001: 95). 
At the 2001 Special Session, the General Assembly put forth its vision for priority 
actions for the future on children in conflict with the law. This included the need for 
the enhancement of national child-friendly systems of juvenile justice where the 
child’s dignity and worth are promoted, and the child’s social reintegration pursued. 
To achieve this, State parties were encouraged to ensure that children are only 
deprived of their liberty as a last resort and for the shortest period possible, to 
establish a minimum age of criminal responsibility and to ensure due process for all 
children involved with the justice system.93 
States were also encouraged to establish alternative structures to deal with children 
without resorting to judicial proceedings. Further, States were to ensure that the norms 
                                                 
93 Malaysia had not submitted its reports as a follow-up to the World Summit for Children 1990 
although three other observer States had done so by May 2001 (UNICEF, 2001:140). 
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in the CRC should be publicised and made known through campaigns and the training 
of law-enforcement officials, prosecutors, judges, lawyers and social workers. 
The complexities of achieving treaty obligations are not peculiar to the CRC. At 
the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (the Vienna Conference of 1993), 
representatives of 171 States met to review and debate the status of human rights in 
the world. Forty-five years after the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 1948, 
there were many challenges and obstacles that impeded progress. The content, scope 
and priorities of the implementation of a Universal Human Rights paradigm, 
particularly the interconnected issues of development, democracy and economic, 
social, cultural, civil and political rights were the fundamental challenges in successful 
promotion and enforcement of these rights.  
The CRC is a constituent part of the global human rights agenda and in evaluating 
its implementation in Malaysia a number of observations arise. These observations are 
drawn from the context of the norms and philosophical underpinnings of the 
Malaysian journey as seen through the matters raised in the preceding Chapters.  
This Chapter seeks to weave together the various aspects that constitute Malaysia’s 
ratification and implementation of the CRC. The purpose is to evaluate the themes and 
patterns that have been explored to establish whether a rights-based argument for the 
introduction of diversion in the juvenile justice system in Malaysia is possible. In 
keeping with a reflexive inductive approach, appropriate responses will be drawn from 
the fundamental research questions of this work to develop appropriate conclusions 
about a rights-based perspective in the juvenile justice system. 
2. Translating treaty obligations into effective action in Malaysia 
Malaysia’s journey through the process of ratification and implementation of the 
CRC has been explored in the preceding sections of this work. Six years after 
ratification of the treaty, the Child Act 2001 was enacted introducing elements of the 
CRC into Malaysian law. This was done in accordance with the expectations 
expressed in Article 4, which requires States parties to take ‘all appropriate legislative, 
administrative and other measures’ for implementation of the rights contained in the 
Convention.  While it is the State, which takes on obligations under the Convention, 
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the task of translating this into the actual manifestation of child rights, requires 
engagement from various stakeholders, from the wider society and, of course, from 
children themselves. 
As noted above, incorporation of the Convention in Malaysia follows the dualist 
model in which an Act of Parliament is required to bring into effect provisions of the 
Convention. The Malaysian Constitution makes no direct reference to specific child 
rights and as noted above, does not have wide-ranging political, economic or social 
rights.  Further, as observed, judicial interpretation of the dualist position on child 
rights is clear and courts appear to apply a very narrow interpretation of rights and are 
reluctant to expand the scope and application of rights.  
The preceding Chapters traced the historical development of child rights and 
explored the text and subtext of how these rights manifest themselves in dealing with 
children in conflict with the law in Malaysia. Malaysia’s colonial past and the laws 
and policies introduced at that time appear to have been seamlessly absorbed into the 
post-colonial evolution of the juvenile justice system of the country.  
The empirical analysis of international conventions, standards, treaties, rules, 
legislative provisions, judicial pronouncements and conversations with principal 
stakeholders and boys suggest that in many ways, Malaysia’s experience is reflected 
in the conclusions arrived at the World Summit in 2001. Thus, it takes time to put into 
action political commitment to the treaty and there are gaps between promises made 
by the government and the actual implementation of the CRC. It is also pertinent to 
note that the issues influencing child rights are intertwined with the notion of 
Malaysia’s own obligations to the broader global human rights agenda. 
It has now been 23 years since Malaysia ratified the Convention and in the 
intervening years since, there have been efforts to understand the juvenile justice 
system, to learn from other jurisdictions, to seek to amend the law, to train various 
stakeholders and to create greater awareness of the fundamental aspects of the CRC.  
Amendments in 2016 through the Child (Amendment) Act 2016, introduce further 
efforts in dealing with children in conflict with the law. Yet these changes took a few 
years to come to fruition. Further, these changes notwithstanding, a number of 
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fundamental inconsistencies that impinge on the rights of the child in conflict with the 
law remain. 
As noted above, Malaysia has entered reservations to CRC Articles 2, 7,14, 
28(1)(a) and 37 on the basis that these do not conform with the Constitution, Syariah 
laws, national laws and policies of the government of Malaysia (UNICEF, 2014). 
Malaysia has yet to ratify other treaties that deal with cruel and inhumane punishment. 
Given its culture of politics and levels of punitiveness that are high, there are 
difficulties in fulfilling aspects of the CRC and so the overarching juvenile justice 
system struggles in meeting the philosophical aspirations of the treaty.  
The minimum age of criminal responsibility remains at the lower end of the 
threshold. Stakeholders like Vivian and Charles are of the view that because there are 
very few young children impacted, it is acceptable to retain this position, although 
UNICEF and NGO representatives argue a contrary view. Children are kept in remand 
in poor conditions and are often placed with adults. Children are subject to harsh 
treatments while in custody. Children can be incarcerated for indefinite periods and 
there are problems with how children are dealt with in courts and in places of 
detention. There are problems in applying adult regimes to children in custody 
particularly in the Henry Gurney/Integrity School system. This in spite of the fact that 
such children ‘are not hardened criminals but have had exceedingly short criminal 
careers’ (Gray, 1996:314). As was considered in the preceding Chapter, there are 
inconsistencies in the treatment of children in conflict with the law. Diversion as an 
option, although keenly argued, has not yet become a reality. 
Often, stakeholders involved are dealing with children and adults in the same 
system simultaneously. The police and magistrates for example are forced to cope 
with this duality of roles. There are also concerns expressed on the level of awareness 
and training that stakeholders have been exposed to and the challenges of ensuring 
that trained personnel remain in their roles. Stakeholders acknowledge that capacity 
building is a challenge and the existing infrastructure support is lacking. Separate 




In considering the views of the stakeholders, the suggestion is that there are 
pockets of change drawn from some level of political commitment in reviewing the 
juvenile justice system and introducing for example, diversion as an alternative 
mechanism but the process is “slow”. 
After two decades, a common theme that emerges is that change in Malaysia takes 
a long while and that the endeavour to bring about change requires a process of 
engagement and negotiation. There are attempts to work together but often 
bureaucracy within the system hampers effective and efficient progress. The juvenile 
justice system is deeply embedded and rooted with entrenched political and socio-
cultural structures and stakeholders suggest that these are difficult to break down. 
Conversations with stakeholders suggest that diversion as a broad philosophical 
approach is still an aspirational goal and there is a level of commitment to make it a 
reality. 
Two broad themes emerge from this discussion, namely the culture of childhood 
and the issue of cultural relativism versus universalism. 
3. The culture of childhood in Malaysia 
As noted in Chapter 2, the consequence of ratification is that Malaysia is subject to 
an international doctrine that endeavours to create minimum standards with which it is 
hoped a shared model of justice will exist (Junger-Tas 1994; Doek 1994; Muncie 
2004). As noted above, notions of culture, politics, ideology and discourse have a 
significant bearing on how a child in conflict with the law is treated in Malaysia. The 
notion of universality and universal application of the CRC encounters obvious 
difficulties particularly where concepts of childhood vary across cultures. 
This phenomenon is not peculiar to Malaysia. For example, Burr’s (2002) 
ethnographic fieldwork among children in Vietnam reveals that despite the almost 
universal ratification of the CRC, children’s rights are not universal; they are played 
out differently in different cultural contexts with inevitable points of divergence. Of 
particular concern to Burr is the communal perspective of rights in Vietnamese society 
where, ‘Vietnamese children are expected to show deferential respect towards their 
elders’ (2002:51).  
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Thus, different societies have different conceptions of childhood, a concept first 
suggested by Ariès’ (1973) histories of childhood. Although heavily criticised for his 
notions of the “discovery” of childhood, the argument that childhood is historically 
and culturally contingent is relevant when considering the value systems in Malaysia. 
Malaysia appears to share a similar value system with that of Burr’s experience in 
Vietnam. Malaysian children are culturally expected to defer to adults and this 
includes parents and teachers. Conversations with stakeholders indicate that there is a 
strong sense of adults being in control and that children are placid in their acceptance 
of this.  
Thus, childhood is not necessarily measured in terms of age but based on the 
cultural understanding of relationships between children with those in authority, 
whether they are parents, teachers or the police. The boys in the Henry Gurney School 
appear to accept their fate in the juvenile justice system and power differentials with 
those in authority were also experienced. This was particularly evident even among 
boys like Odeng, who had become fathers themselves. 
There is evidence to suggest that this cultural understanding is not limited to an 
Asian culture but for example, is also reported to be the experience in Africa. Ncube 
(cited in Freeman, 2011) suggests that the traditional African family ‘expects 
‘childhood’…. to be a continuous period of self-effacing obedience to traditional 
authority’ (2011:23). As noted above, there is also evidence of how contrasting 
cultural value systems have led to the creation of the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) 1999 or The Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004. 
The notion of obedience to traditional authority has resonance in Malaysian culture 
too. As considered above, corporal punishment is culturally accepted by parents, 
teachers and even by young people themselves. Religious views also greatly influence 
attitudes towards corporal punishment. Religious obligations on the child particularly 
from the Islamic perspective is not a discourse that can be easily questioned as the 
principles of Islamic edicts are argued to be drawn from divine legitimacy and 
questioning these values are inferred as a challenge to the religious dogma and more 
importantly, a challenge to the very authority of God. Reservations to the Convention 
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on the basis of Islam are not peculiar to Malaysia and include other countries where 
Islam is the dominant faith for example reservations observed by Afghanistan, 
Algeria, Brunei, Iran, Iraq, Syria and others (United Nations, 1999).  
It is also pertinent to note that such a caveat is not limited to Islam as evidenced by 
the response by the Holy See, that in acceding to the Convention, it does not intend to 
“prescind” in any way from its specific mission, which is of a religious and moral 
character. For example, in interpreting the phrase “family planning” in Article 24.2, 
The Holy See interprets this to mean only those methods of family planning, which it 
considers morally acceptable, that is, the natural methods of family planning (United 
Nations, 1999). 
From a Malaysian perspective, reservations to some of the provisions of the CRC 
arise primarily from areas of incongruence with views on Islam. Hence, freedom of 
religion pursuant to Article 14 is problematic, as Islam does not recognise the right of 
a Muslim to abandon his /her faith. As considered above, Syariah law interprets the 
age of criminal responsibility differently. Children can be subject to whipping under 
provisions of the Syariah law and this infringes Article 37. Conversations with 
stakeholders reveal other areas of friction; child marriages or female genital mutilation 
elicit debate that often result in confrontational posturing where universalism meets 
cultural relativism. 
Given that Islam is the predominant religion in country (about 60% of the 
population), it is firmly rooted in the belief system of the Muslim population. Owing 
to its divine origin, it is obligatory on government and Muslim society to implement 
Syariah laws and principles. This results in great difficulty in arguing some aspects of 
child rights as the culture of childhood is part of this belief system. 
A government that is reliant on the support of the majority would be very cautious 
in treading the fine line between espousing international obligations and breaching 
fundamental precepts of Islam at the peril of losing this support. This element of 
political power and civil society engagement then has a bearing on the child rights 
discourse.   
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As noted above, civil society in Malaysia has long functioned with a strong central 
government with a mix of paternalistic benevolence and a culture of punitiveness that 
ensures compliance to political power. A child born and raised in this environment 
will certainly have a lived experience that is different from children in some other 
jurisdictions. It is also conceivable that jurisdictions that share similar patterns of 
socialisation may yield similar cultures of childhood. 
Adults managing the juvenile justice system were themselves once children, raised 
in this environment. This yields a level of cultural embeddedness of beliefs as seen in 
conversations with stakeholders. This offers some measure of understanding of the 
challenges in implementing obligations under the CRC. It also offers some 
understanding why change takes a long time. 
There is increased recognition among scholars to acknowledge the multiple 
childhoods within local cultural constructs. Niewenhuys suggests that the notion that 
‘all societies would recognize the meaning of the word child to designate both boys 
and girls up to eighteen years of age highlights the sociological emptiness of the 
categories used in the language of the convention’ (1998:271). James and Prout 
propose that ‘the immaturity of children is a biological fact of life but the ways in 
which it is understood and made meaningful is a fact of culture’ (James and Prout 
1997:7). As noted above, the language of rights is often criticised for being vague 
when construing concrete aspects of rights. Thus, the definition of child as espoused 
in the CRC and how child rights are perceived and understood in Malaysia indicate 
the complexities in the language of rights when applied to intricate issues that impinge 
on culture and society and on the existence of deeper underlying norms. 
Conversations with stakeholders suggest that there are differences in how children 
themselves view rights today. Yet this may also suggest that understanding the culture 
of childhood in Malaysia involves distinctions between children in urban settings who 
are aware of their rights, (for example law students in a University in Kuala Lumpur) 
and those in rural settings who are not, (for example the boys in the Henry Gurney 
School in Pinack Borneo, Sarawak). There are also underlying issue of distinctions 
between the relevance of civil and political rights to children in rural settings in 
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Malaysia where the realities of economic development are perhaps more important 
than abstract notions of civil and political rights. Defining culture is therefore 
complex. Stephens (1995: 7), notes, ‘[t]he culturalization of childhood should not be 
bought at the cost of an awareness of the complexities of cultural definition in a 
postmodern world’ (1995:7). 
Thus, the construction of the adult-child relationship in Malaysia is shaped by the 
norms that determine the rituals and manner in which children are socialised. These 
constructions are deeply rooted and have become woven in the way the rights of the 
child in conflict with the law are treated. The individual social actors who make up the 
policy determinants in the system have long held beliefs many of which draw from 
their own culturalisation and understanding of childhood. This level of embeddedness 
in the juvenile justice system has been influenced by policies introduced by the British 
at a time when views on children were different, yet these views have become the 
norm. Levels of punitiveness are high even when they involve children.  
The position in Malaysia (as in many other countries) therefore does not 
necessarily represent the universalism proposed by the CRC. As argued by James and 
Prout this creates ‘different childhoods’ all of which are equally ‘real’ (1997:27). As 
noted above, Clause 1.3 of the Tokyo Rules 1990 appear to accept this allowing 
member States to take into account ‘the political, economic, social and cultural 
conditions of each country and the aims and objectives of its criminal justice system.’  
Clause 1.3 and the reservations expressed by Malaysia appear to acknowledge that 
children in conflict with the law in Malaysia are trapped in a ‘rights gap’ between the 
expectations of the CRC and the actual workings of the juvenile justice system. It also 
means that advocating child rights can be a challenge as evidenced through the 
conversations with some stakeholders. There are situations where competing 
normative values exist and this often results in a stalemate with stakeholders working 
through negotiations to break the impasse. The discussion on the culture of childhood 





4. Cultural relativism versus universalism and the rights discourse in Malaysia 
Conversations with stakeholders reveal evidence of a paradox of values. Often 
stakeholders refer to an Asian culture/value or a Malaysian value system that views 
the rights discourse as being Western hegemony. So, the universal application of the 
CRC is argued to be not all-encompassing and cultural practices that are in breach of 
treaty provisions are couched under the cultural relativism argument. Global 
perspectives indicate a range of arguments in which State parties argue their positions 
reflecting a complex array of circumstances perhaps best viewed as ‘multidimensional 
space of different forms and mixtures of different types of universality and relativity’ 
(Donnelly, 2013:104). 
This argument suggests that recognition of the duality of Islamic laws and secular 
laws or other cultural practices like child marriages or female genital mutilation or 
levels of parental control or levels of punitiveness are abstractions of an accepted 
standard of norms. Malaysia’s reservations to the CRC again reflect this argument. 
Yet within this perceived “Malaysian” value system, the child is treated with some 
level of disregard. Parents fear the notion of an empowered child and stakeholders 
refer to the need to placate these fears by re-enforcing the parallel aspect of 
responsibility; that a right is accompanied by a corresponding responsibility. As 
suggested, the paradox of Asian or Malaysian values is also evidenced in the treatment 
of children in conflict with the law. The preamble to the Child Act 2001 reflects the 
values Malaysia places on children yet this is not the reality, especially of children 
within the juvenile justice system. 
Convery et al (2008) suggest that, ‘a rights-based agenda must build on the 
baseline established by civil-political and economic-social standards and target the 
structural determinants that inhibit children’s meaningful and effective participation’ 
(2008:261).  A major structural determinant that inhibits the rights-based argument 
and child participation in this process in Malaysia is the broader rights discourse in 
Malaysia. There are challenges in embracing a broad universal perspective on human 
rights in Malaysia and this places a strain on how child rights are viewed.  
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As noted above, the Tokyo Rules allows states to apply broad caveats yet do not 
provide guidance as to how states are to negotiate this complex relationship between 
universal rights and local contexts. The preamble to the CRC itself represents the 
paradox of cultural plurality and universalism. As noted above, childhood is a social 
construction in which its meaning is negotiated between the different stakeholders in 
Malaysia, often with conflicting interests. Thus, childhood is argued to be relative. 
Given the historical and cultural diversity across the globe, cultural relativism is said 
to be ‘an undeniable fact’ (Donnelly, 1984:400).  
The anthropological and normative debate between universalism and cultural 
plurality features heavily in the broader rights discourse in Malaysia and negotiating 
perceived Western liberal democracy vis-à-vis the “Asian values” debate presents 
challenges to those that strive to bridge the gap. For example, in issues of sexual or 
gender identity/orientation, Malaysia takes the view that a liberal interpretation of 
gender or sexual orientation is contrary to its values and in some instances argued to 
be detrimental to society. The position with regards to the CRC reflect the broader 
universal human rights debate, where the concept of universalism is challenged by 
some member states on the basis that the concept cannot be viewed in isolation of the 
historical and socio-political contexts of societies.  
From a political perspective, Malaysia and other ASEAN member States through 
the Bangkok Declaration of 1993 challenged the universal aspect of the human rights 
paradigm. Thus, member States affirmed the view that while accepting that human 
rights were universal in nature, ‘they must be considered in the context of a dynamic 
and evolving process of international norm-setting’, taking into account the 
significance of ‘national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural 
and religious backgrounds’ (The Bangkok Declaration, 1993: Clause 8). This view is 
also reflected in Malaysia’s reservations to the CRC and the non-ratification of several 
other treaties and optional protocols. 
Thio (1999) argues that the limited ratification, and the extensive use of 
reservations ‘framed in terms of non-acceptance of obligations beyond constitutional 
limits’, among ASEAN countries cast doubts on the level of State commitment to 
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human rights instruments (1999: 29). For example, Thio (1990) notes, only six of the 
ten ASEAN countries have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).94 Mohamad (2002) suggests that the lack of commitment is evidence 
of a ‘wariness of the human rights agenda’ stemming from a ‘[m]istrust of the human 
rights agenda’ (2002:245-246) particularly since ASEAN member states view human 
rights mechanisms ‘as a threat to national sovereignty’ (2002: 247).  
Linton notes that only six ASEAN have accepted the CRC without reservations to 
its obligations95 and the remaining members have entered a range of reservations. 
Linton argues that ‘the effect of these catch-all reservations is to allow each of these 
states a fall-back whenever they do not wish to comply with a CRC obligation to 
amend laws or practices that are incompatible’ (2008:474). 
The uses of reservations are in most cases based on the inconsistencies with 
domestic law or existing norms. References to the Asian heritage at a geo-political 
level is seen in conversations with stakeholders at a micro-level. Stakeholders refer to 
the complexity in negotiating entrenched cultural norms where the centrality of 
argument is that some features of the rights-based agenda is at odds with Malaysia’s 
cultural heritage.  
The suggested view is that individualism as espoused in the rights argument is 
being at variance with communal values commonly associated with Asian 
communities where obligations to the state, religion, community, and family are a 
priority (Whiting, 2003). The perceived need to ensure the greater good of the 
community over individual rights is evidenced in the measure of punitiveness in 
Malaysia. As considered in Chapters 2 and 3, capital punishment, whipping, caning 
and various other laws that restrict the freedom of speech, freedom of association or 
freedom of expression are illustrations of the measure of punitiveness. 
Whiting (2003) argues that the Malaysian position, particularly in the 1990’s, was 
that ‘civil and political rights, such as freedom of speech and assembly, as well as due 
                                                 
94 Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar and Singapore are neither parties nor signatories to the treaty. 
95 Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Philippines, and Vietnam. 
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process rights concerning arrest, detention, and a fair trial, are luxuries that Asian 
states cannot afford’ and that the focus should be on basic economic and social rights 
(2003: 63-64). Such a view is still relevant in the Malaysia of today. 
In Malaysia, the resistance in embracing the broader liberal interpretation of civil 
and political rights rests on the basis that punitive measures are necessary to maintain 
social order and stability. Concerns about religious and ethnic tensions are argued to 
be justified communal values that are to be protected. Stakeholders refer to the fear of 
communal strife as the reasons for the failure to introduce restorative justice as 
alternatives even where children are involved.  Thus, the need to maintain social order 
appears to take precedence over individual rights. 
Applying the cultural relativity argument to the Malaysian context, particularly in 
relation to children’s rights, reveals a range of paradoxes. If the notion of community 
and family were treated as a valued commodity, one would expect children in 
Malaysia to enjoy a vast range of rights especially in relation to protection and care. 
Nevertheless, the reality is not quite the case, as seen in the various issues discussed in 
the preceding Chapters.  
Arguably, had it not been for the ratification of the CRC, the impetus to introduce 
the Child Act and the subsequent amendments and other policy decisions may not 
have been forthcoming. It took a catastrophic sexual abuse case to introduce 
legislation dealing with sexual grooming offences through the Sexual Offences 
Against Children Act 2017 yet a proposal to include ban on child marriages as a 
sexual offence within the Act was voted out in Parliament by the majority with 
concerns that it would be contrary to Islamic laws.  
The Child (Amendment) Act 2016 also did not address the issue of child marriages 
although an attempt was made to engage with the issues of religion and the CRC when 
the Bill was debated particularly in considering the position in other Islamic states. It 
was also clear in the debates that other issues that impinge on broader child rights 
matters including corporal punishment or the unilateral conversion of a child were left 
untouched. There was a sense that members of Parliament wanted more evidence 
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drawn from research to understand the issues before making any legislative or policy 
changes (Hansard, 6 April 2016, col 1650-1810).  
The juvenile justice system and the views of the stakeholders in Malaysia suggest 
that children are treated as objects of concern rather than rights bearing subjects. 
Arguably, this suggests that cultural relativism as applied to children in Malaysia, in 
truth represents a failure to protect children’s rights. Further, if this approach persists, 
then there is a continued exclusion of children from universal protection of their 
rights.  
Therefore, abiding to an uncompromising cultural relativist argument may lead to a 
sense of apathy in dealing with children in conflict with the law. Freeman (2011) 
argues that if ‘a culture can only be judged by endogenous value judgments, and that 
moral principles which derive from outside that culture have no validity, morality has 
become a slave to custom (2011:17). Conversations with stakeholders suggest that 
there is growing awareness of the points of convergence and divergence between 
national laws and policies with those of the CRC but as it stands, the existing 
reservations to the CRC remain. 
Of concern is the perceived position of the State in relation to these issues. Higgins 
(1994) suggests that relativism ‘is a point mostly advanced by states…It is rarely 
advanced by the oppressed, who are only too anxious to benefit from perceived 
universal standards’ (1994:96).  Arguably, children in Malaysia are subject to the 
State’s interpretation of cultural relativism at the expense of the advancement of 
children’s rights. 
Malaysia’s obligations to the broader human rights framework is also to be viewed 
with its regional relationships with countries in the ASEAN fraternity. Within the 
context of ASEAN itself, the emphasis is on principles that include peaceful 
settlement of dispute, the renunciation of the use of force, non-interference, and 
consensus-based decision-making (The ASEAN Charter, 2007).  
This principle of non-interference has been criticised, with Thio (1999) arguing 
that, the ‘ASEAN policy (or lack thereof) towards human rights has been one of 
reticence and nonengagement’ (1999:2). Thus, there is a lack of a regional human 
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rights mechanism responsible for the oversight of these legal instruments including 
those that involve children. Perusing recommendations of the various ASEAN 
member states in response to Malaysia’s second Periodic Review reflect this stance of 
non-interference (United Nations, 2013).  
The underlying issue of the broader civil and political rights as viewed in Malaysia 
certainly has an impact on the lives of the child in conflict with the law. There are 
deep socio-political insecurities and fears that need to be overcome; that greater 
awareness of rights might empower citizens to recognise breaches and seek 
accountability or that rights are a Western idea that promotes unchecked wide liberal 
notions contrary to Malaysian values. From a Malaysian perspective, as suggested 
above, the issue of child rights and the reservations entered into appear to draw from 
deeply entrenched socio-religious conceptions of childhood and the adult-child 
relationships that arise from these norms.  
Children themselves do not have a voice to raise issues of breaches. Most children 
are not aware of their rights and certainly, the boys in the Henry Gurney who were 
interviewed had no knowledge of their rights. Conversations with stakeholders and the 
boys suggest that awareness of rights, particularly in relation to dealing with the 
processes, are acquired from others within the criminal justice system. Further, such 
knowledge is limited to the specific issues that the child in conflict faces. 
Opportunities to engage with teaching children broader concepts of constitutionalism 
and human rights mooted by the Malaysian Bar, have not been pursued by the 
government. Child participation (as per Article 12 of the CRC) is said to be weak with 
attempts of including child participation appearing only very recently in legislation.  
For example, Section 4(1) (r) as inserted by section 6 of the Child (Amendment) Act 
2016 includes the involvement of two children in the National Council for Children. 
Yet there are uncertainties as to how these children are to be chosen and the extent to 
which they would represent the socio-economic and ethno-religious diversity among 
children in Malaysia. Further, given the prevailing culture of childhood in Malaysia, 
there are uncertainties if these two children would truly be independent or would 
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voice their opinions or even if they did, whether the 23 adults in the Council would 
pay heed to their views.  
All other appointees are representatives from the government agencies. There is a 
danger that child participation in the Council would thus amount to no more than mere 
tokenism and this is echoed in conversations with stakeholders. The leader of the 
opposition bloc (Hansard, 6 April 2016, col 1640-1650) raised these issues in 
Parliament at the second reading of the Bill but the Bill was passed without 
amendment.  
It is also to be noted that Section 4A (1) includes a wide discretionary power in the 
hands of the Minister to revoke the membership of the child representatives. These 
powers are not defined and it does present an interesting proposition as to available 
recourse should a child be aggrieved because of his/her revocation of membership. 
In the Child (Amendment) Act 2016, due recognition is also given to issues of 
culture and religion in the formation of the National Council for Children. By virtue of 
section 4(1) (s) Membership of the Council includes inter alia representation of not 
more than five persons with appropriate experience, knowledge and expertise on 
matters relating to the welfare and development of children including any person 
qualified to advise on relevant indigenous, ethnic, cultural or religious factors. At this 
point, it is uncertain as to the weight to be given to such advice but clearly; such views 
are deemed important given that they are explicitly provided for in the legislation. 
However, like the children in the council, such membership is also subject to 
unilateral revocation. Therefore, the government position in the Council remains 
secured. 
In Malaysia, non-governmental organisations, international human rights agencies 
like UNICEF, the Malaysian Bar Council and other agencies tread the divide between 
universalism and cultural relativism with caution. Negotiating issues of child 
marriages, female genital mutilation, capital punishment, corporal punishment, and 
the rights of the child in conflict with the law espoused by the CRC often involves 
sustained efforts in awareness, education and advocacy. These broader aspects of 
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negotiation are also seen in the process of introducing the right to diversion as 
expressed in the CRC. 
Owing to this process of negotiation and compromise, progress is said to be slow 
and there are levels of uncertainty about what the future holds. A positive element is 
that for the moment, there is evidence of a willingness in some areas to engage even 
with difficult issues of culture and religion. Conversations with stakeholders suggest 
that this the level of engagement is also seen in plans to introduce diversion. 
5. Implementing diversion in Malaysia 
As noted in the preceding Chapters, although concepts of diversion feature 
prominently in the CRC and various other ancillary treaties and obligations, diversion 
was not introduced in the Child Act 2001. In 2006, Malaysia submitted its first (and as 
it stands, only) periodic review. In its concluding observations, the UN Committee on 
the Rights of the Child acknowledged the positive measures that the country has taken 
to promote children’s rights but also expressed some areas of concern with respect to 
children in conflict with the law including the lack of non-custodial alternatives. 
These concerns were explored in preceding Chapters. 
Plans to introduce diversion were introduced following the comprehensive report 
published by UNICEF in 2013. In the report, it was recommended that a high-level, 
inter-agency Child Justice Working Group be formed to develop an integrated 
national Juvenile Justice Reform Strategy and Plan of Action. The inter-agency body 
is to ‘introduce diversion and regulate the types of offences for which diversion may 
be used, the criteria and procedures for decision-making and the types of diversionary 
programs that should be available’ (UNICEF, 2013:11). 
An inter-agency task force began work in 2013 itself and as noted above, 
awareness building and training have been organized with the Ministry of Women, 
Family and Community Development and UNICEF working with NGO 
representatives, the police, the Attorney General’s Chambers and other stakeholders. 
However, as noted in the preceding Chapters, diversion as a measure failed to gain 
statutory footing, as several issues remain unresolved.  
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Conversations with stakeholders suggest that identifying the key stakeholders 
involved and establishing inter-agency partnerships appear to have been easily 
established. However, there were challenges in developing the legal basis for diverting 
children, and the jurisdictional issues of the authority to decide whether a child will be 
diverted or processed through the juvenile justice system. This uncertainty in 
implementing diversionary practices were reflected in conversations with stakeholders 
as the distinction between pre-trial and post-trial diversion were treated as the same by 
stakeholders. 
Clearly, there is a need to amend existing legislative provisions that govern police 
and prosecution powers as well as provisions within the broader criminal justice 
system. As noted above, stakeholders are supportive of diversion as a measure but are 
unable to act without the legislative authority. These legislative structures have yet to 
be implemented. 
Awareness and acceptance of diversion among the police, prosecutors and 
magistrates are part of an on-going activity but as suggested by stakeholders, this 
requires time and sustained effort beyond one-off training activities.  Once again, 
stakeholders speak of entrenched values and perceptions of children and childhood 
permeating the police, the prosecution, magistrates and others in the juvenile justice 
system. 
From a Malaysian perspective, it appears that in deciding on the most appropriate 
model for diversion, consideration was given to the broader national contexts, cultural 
issues and availability of resources. As noted above, the restorative justice model was 
deemed unsuitable given concerns of the complex ethnic relationships and the absence 
of a tradition of community dispute resolution mechanisms. 
A pilot study, though planned, has not yet been executed. Certainly, there is a need 
to ensure the degree of agreement and commitment from local authorities and service 
providers. Stakeholders suggest that there are challenges in implementation in the 
initial local setting selected, citing community “buy in” as a challenge. Thus, societal 
awareness and acceptance (or resistance) of diversion is identified as a challenge. 
Societal attitudes and norms are, as suggested above, deeply entrenched and it is 
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therefore not surprising to find stakeholders working towards ameliorating these 
attitudes even if success does not appear to be forthcoming. 
Further, programmes and services for diverted children and their families need to 
be operational. The relevance of the support services is on the basis that, for diversion 
to work effectively, diversion requires an appropriate destination that the child is 
diverted to and not merely diversion away from, devoid of alternatives (Abramson, 
2004). Thus, one of the most urgent reforms is the creation of a diversion system that 
will provide ‘actual alternatives’ (Abramson, 2004:3). 
Presently from a Malaysian context, the position is less than satisfactory. All ten 
boys from the Henry Gurney School came from broken homes or endured the 
pressures of poverty. Owing in part to a lack of existing adequate care and protection 
systems, they have been exposed to the juvenile justice system. So again, there is a 
paradox of how children are dealt within the criminal justice system, as 
institutionalised criminal detention in cold and unfriendly environments have become 
a substitute (arguably a poor one) for adequate care and protection systems. These are 
perhaps reflective of the view that incarceration of children often result in 
‘institutional child abuse’ (Goldson, 2006:463). 
In conversations with the boys in the Henry Gurney School, there appears to be a 
disconnect in pursuing a rehabilitative route to care when for example, Aman is 
unable to attend his mother’s funeral or where someone like Odeng, already a father, 
is detained with rehabilitation in mind, yet detention, deprives his own child of a 
father. These matters merely create the potential for generational cycles of neglect and 
offending. 
The appropriate levels of support needed appear to have been addressed by section 
13 of the Child (Amendment) Act 2016. Pursuant to a newly inserted Section 7A in the 
Child Act 2001, Child Welfare Teams are to be established throughout Malaysia for 
the purpose of co-ordinating locally-based services to families and children if children 
are or are suspected of being in need of protection and rehabilitation; or are found 
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guilty of any offence.96 This is similar to the multi-agency Youth Offending Teams 
established through the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 in the United Kingdom. 
By virtue of section 7A (2)-(4), the Child Welfare Team shall consist seven persons 
with appropriate experience, knowledge and expertise on matters relating to the 
protection and rehabilitation of children, to be appointed by the Minister, an education 
officer and a senior police officer. Co-opted members could include any person 
qualified to advice on relevant indigenous, ethnic, cultural or religious factors.  
Establishing the Child Welfare Teams requires political will and adequate state 
resources to support it. At the time of writing, the specific details of this mechanism 
have not yet been made known. While there are similarities with the Youth Offending 
Teams in the United Kingdom, there is no indication if lessons learned from that 
experience have been fully understood. Of concern is whether the ‘tensions and 
compromises’ that arise in the multi-agency partnerships as it tries to balance issues of 
‘welfare, correctionalism and public protection’ have been adequately appreciated 
(Gray, 2016:62).  
Given the embeddedness of culture and existing norms, arguably the capacity 
building process must also endeavor to break down entrenched views that potential 
members of these teams may have towards children and the issue of child rights. Thus, 
there will be a need for such persons to not only be aware of broader child rights 
issues, but to accept them as being part of the broader human rights context. 
(Emphasis added). Further, potential members of these teams need to recognise and 
embrace the notion of the ‘foundational’ rights of the child (Hollingsworth, 
2013:1046). Thus, a rights-based approach to children in conflict with the law is 
ideally an approach that is applicable at ‘every stage of the youth justice process’ 
(Gray, 2016:70) and not limited to fragmented provisions of the system. 
As evidenced through conversations with stakeholders, there are challenges in 
creating awareness and conducting training. The inclusion of co-opted members to 
advice on indigenous, ethnic, cultural or religious factors in these Youth Teams, 
                                                 
96 This replaces “Child Protection Teams” established under the Child Act 2001. 
258 
 
suggest that issues of cultural relativism are once again implicitly evident. The 
government’s position vis-à-vis the various treaty obligations and the CRC indicate an 
insistence on preserving the cultural relativism viewpoint. Thus, it is likely that the 
government’s position on cultural relativism will filter down to the micro level of 
those managing and implementing the system.  
 As noted above, Malaysia has yet to introduce legislative provisions governing 
social work and stakeholders suggest that probation officers struggle with workloads. 
A further aspect on workloads and capacity building is the introduction of community 
service orders (CSO) within the specific provisions of the Child (Amendment) Act 
2016. Prior to this, CSO were exercised through Section 293 (1) (e) of the Malaysian 
Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) which was an amendment introduced in 2007. CSO 
do not divert children away from the juvenile justice system, as in its present form, it 
serves as an alternative to custodial sentences and therefore is imposed by the Court 
for Children.  
Recent media reports suggest that in applying CSO97 to young offenders aged 18-
21, a total of 17,647 young offenders’ social reports were prepared. 4,911 of them 
were ordered to undergo community service while 3,550 completed the order (Kili, 
2017). Given that plans to introduce diversion will have an impact on the additional 
support services, there are further workload and corresponding cost implications as 
well. The issue of net-widening has been considered in Chapter 3 and this is a matter 
that will require a measured response as to how children are to be diverted in 
Malaysia. Such a response must accept and acknowledge the broader aspects of child 
rights in order to avoid making the diversion process one that serves as a further 
mechanism for controlling children. 
The effective implementation of diversion is also dependant on the successful 
partnerships of the various stakeholders involved. Conversations with stakeholders 
                                                 
97 These figures represent CSO as applied under the Criminal Procedure Code which includes 
youthful offenders aged 18-21. The CSO provisions as indicated in the Child (Amendment) Act 2016 





suggest that this has not been easy. Stakeholders speak of difficulties in working with 
the various government agencies with concerns of agencies working in silos.  
Abramson suggests that the juvenile justice system is not a singular system but a 
‘multiple inter-connected’ system where each agency is an ‘autonomous bureaucratic 
unit within the government, with its own objectives, performance standards, ethos, 
and command structure, and each system is in competition with all the others for its 
share of the national budget’ (2004: 5). These reflections are also apparent in Malaysia 
as conversations with stakeholders indicate the problems working with the various 
ministries involved in the juvenile justice system each managing different aspects of 
the overall juvenile justice system. Stakeholders also describe the lack of resources in 
allocating separate facilities (detention, custody and courts for example) for the child 
in conflict with the law. 
Thus, although Malaysia has introduced legislation in keeping with some of its 
obligations under the CRC and other international standards, the application, 
implementation and enforcement of these norms lag as we struggle with deeper issues 
of culture and conceptions of childhood and the broader context of how human rights 
are perceived in Malaysia. There are challenges in capacity building, funding and 
resources that impact the successful implementation of diversion strategies. 
6. Whither the rights-based argument for diversion in Malaysia? 
The claim for a rights-based argument for diversion is premised on several 
considerations. Firstly, treaty obligations place upon member States imperatives to 
acknowledge and accept the philosophical aspirations of the rights bearing capacity of 
the child.  
Secondly, a rights-based approach is derived from principles that are foundational 
aspects of the CRC and other human rights treaties and protocols, namely notions of 
accountability, universality and non-discrimination, indivisibility and participation. 
This implies that an underlying aim of all UN-led initiatives are to advance the 
realisation of human rights as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and other major human rights instruments.  
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Finally, therefore, the issue of child rights and specific child-related policies and 
development goals including issues of diversion, are best pursued within the broader 
human rights framework. This places on governments, the need to be transparent and 
accountable in securing the rights and development of children.  
However, as noted above these aspirational goals are not entirely met in Malaysia. 
Arguments about culture and cultural relativity are real and live issues that 
stakeholders engage with daily. How adults in Malaysia view children have a bearing 
on the response to treaty obligations. Children themselves are not aware of their rights 
and even if they are, they have no means to enforce breaches and as noted above the 
child in conflict is trapped in a rights gap. It is pertinent to note that Malaysia has yet 
to ratify Optional Protocol 3, which sets out an international complaints procedure for 
child rights violations. 
It appears that plans for diversion are being put in place as a response to treaty 
obligations as expressed through suggestions following Malaysia’s first report and 
through UNICEF’s report of 2013. Perhaps it is a measured response to demonstrate a 
willingness to engage with some issues involving children in conflict with the law yet 
at the same time choosing to disengage from other broader issues. Therefore, 
diversion is seen more as an act of benevolence on the part of the State or merely as a 
measure fulfilling treaty obligations and not pursued explicitly from a rights 
perspective. 
Some stakeholders agree that diversion is a good and desirable measure, but these 
views do not appear to acknowledge the broader argument that the child has rights. 
(Emphasis added). The notion of the child having rights has not been adequately 
acknowledged and this is part due to the manner in which children are socialised. In 
fact, in many instances there are explicit breaches of child rights where a child in 
conflict with the law is concerned as illustrated above.  
The CRC is premised upon notions of the respect for the dignity of all human 
beings and thus, every child is the bearer of his or her own human rights. This 
framework suggests that children do not derive their rights from their parents or are 
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dependent on adult proxies. The philosophical aspiration of the CRC is therefore to 
acknowledge the emancipation and empowerment of the child.  
This foundational concept is argued by some of the social actors in Malaysia, to be 
contrary to the existing cultural norms in Malaysia. More importantly, the prevailing 
culture of childhood is laden with paradoxes. On the one hand, it is not one that 
readily acknowledges the notion of a child with rights yet, at the same time is willing 
to recognise that a child can get married or be subject to adult experiences in the 
juvenile justice system. 
An oft-cited argument also suggests that the autonomy perspective of child rights 
would destroy families as an empowered child it is argued, would favour individual 
rights over the community interests. The perception this argument creates therefore is 
that the best interest of the child is served in this communal safe-space. However, the 
reality is that as far as the child in conflict with the law is concerned, children 
encounter adult realities that ignore the foundational rights of the child and amplifies 
the fallacy of this argument. 
The plans for the implementation of diversion in Malaysia is premised on fulfilling 
treaty obligations and on ensuring that government rhetoric of being seen to meet 
international standards is the accepted discourse. There are however, gaps between the 
rhetoric and the reality. Based on the evaluation of the existing state of the juvenile 
justice system, children in conflict with the law are not ranked high on the 
government’s priority. There are broader failures in implementing international 
standards for upholding the rights of children in the Malaysian juvenile justice system 
even after ratification of the treaty and the subsequent legislative changes made in 
2001 and 2016. 
The juvenile justice system is part of the broader political ethos of Malaysia. A 
rights-based argument to diversion is inseparably contingent on being acknowledged 
within this existing political ethos. A rights-based argument is built on empowering 
children, which arguably is a paradigm shift in dealing with children based on their 
recognition as subjects and bearers of rights in Malaysia. A rights-based argument, as 
far as child rights are concerned, suggests that their status in law and in society will 
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recognise the child as rights bearing individuals. Such an approach does not sit well 
with the existing political hegemony in viewing human rights in Malaysia. 
The Universal concepts of human rights and Malaysia’s specific social, cultural, 
and political contexts reveal gaps in applying international norms. A rights-based 
approach requires a holistic and integrated framework for addressing disparities in the 
realisation of child rights. Beyond that, child rights need to be viewed within the 
overall human rights contexts in Malaysia.  
These contexts require a commitment to human rights, including the rule of law, 
transparency of governance, the recognition of civil and political rights and an 
impartial judiciary. Arguably, these are not universal values viewed through Western-
centric lenses but purely necessary fundamental human values. Such a view may not 
find support from the existing political system in Malaysia. An empowered and child 
will become an empowered adult. An adult with awareness of his/her rights may not 
be something that the established political elite values, given the present culture of 
politics in Malaysia. 
Thus, plans to introduce diversion will take time as the existing norms are firmly 
entrenched. While legislative enactments and policy commitments have been 
instituted, these piecemeal changes appear to be reactionary in nature. Some treaty 
obligations are being complied with in part while there are breaches not just of the 
CRC but also other treaty obligations.  
Abramson refers to this as a ‘salami approach’ to juvenile justice where the broad 
range of rights in the convention are sliced into individual segments of rights 
encompassing a range of themes. This approach as argued by Abramson ignores the 
more appropriate and all-encompassing holistic approach of the Convention 
(Abramson, 2006:26-27). As considered in this work, violations of the treaty are 
apparent in the Malaysian juvenile justice system where there are contradictions in 
applying the broader child rights framework.  It therefore comes as no surprise that as 
suggested by Muncie, the CRC ‘may be the most ratified of all international human 
rights instruments but it is also the most violated’ (Muncie, 2008: 111).  
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Many of the signatories of the treaty include State parties not particularly renowned 
for their compliance of the broader human rights framework, for example, the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The United Nations Commission of Inquiry 
on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (COI), in its 2014 
report, documents a range of human rights violations noting that the ‘gravity, scale 
and nature of these violations reveal a State that does not have any parallel in the 
contemporary world’ (United Nations, 2014b:15). Nonetheless, the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea has legislation98 that provides for ‘principles and issues on 
fully ensuring the rights and best interest of the child in their social life, education, 
health, family and justice’ (UNICEF, 2016: 24). 
Thus, these contested arrangements are not peculiar to Malaysia. As Muncie 
suggests, ‘in many countries it is abundantly clear that it is possible to lay claim to 
upholding rights whilst simultaneously pursuing policies which exacerbate children’s 
marginalization and criminalization and increase the punitiveness of institutional 
regimes’ (Muncie, 2009b:209).  
7. Conclusion 
The overarching aim of the study was to contribute to the body of knowledge in the 
area of juvenile justice in Malaysia particularly where a child is in conflict with the 
law. The analysis of the existing literature, international conventions, standards, 
treaties, rules, legislative provisions and judicial pronouncements provided the 
framework to contextualise these elements with conversations with stakeholders and 
incarcerated boys in the Henry Gurney School system. These elements afforded an 
opportunity to develop new perspectives about the role that politics, culture and the 
socialisation of children play in understanding how the rights of the child in conflict 
with the law is perceived, understood and realised in Malaysia. The approach taken 
has been to develop critical academic discourse to influence policy makers in the area 
of children in conflict with the law to shape a ‘principled youth justice informed by 
international human rights instruments’ (Goldson and Muncie, 2006:203). 
                                                 
98 DPRK Law on the Protection of the Rights of Children 2010. 
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At the outset of this thesis, it was suggested that this research sought to explore 
three fundamental research questions. Firstly, this thesis explored the underlying 
philosophical approaches in Malaysia in dealing with rights of children in conflict 
with the law. The norms that underlie the philosophical approaches in Malaysia in 
dealing with rights of children in conflict with the law indicate a multiplicity of issues 
of culture, politics, religion, conceptions of childhood and rights. These norms are 
intricately interconnected and so each cannot be viewed in isolation.  
As argued, Malaysia has in place a juvenile justice system that has a stronger 
emphasis on punitiveness, incapacitation, and offender accountability and these norms 
have attained a high degree of political legitimacy. This is unique to Malaysia given 
her specific historical and socio-political context. This also represents the manner in 
which children are culturally socialised. The challenges in introducing universal 
concepts of rights in a culturally diverse world are not peculiar to the Malaysian story. 
This is a global challenge and the consequence is that achieving a consensus takes 
time and much effort and, in some cases, consensus appears impossible to achieve. 
Secondly, this thesis sought to discover the manner in which the rights of the child 
are perceived and realised. The analysis of the literature and the conversations with 
stakeholders suggest that there appears to be an obfuscation of the rights of the child 
and that children are merely treated as objects of concern. Children are not seen as 
rights-bearing subjects. This is reflected in the formal institutional-based structures 
and the statutory provisions that govern juvenile justice. Conversation with 
stakeholders and the boys in the Henry Gurney School indicate that formal police and 
court-based interventions further amplify the obfuscation of rights. The sense of 
disenfranchisement was manifest in the boys’ experiences as the encountered the 
various stages of the juvenile justice system. Given the peculiarities of the culture of 
childhood in Malaysia and how children are socialised, this is not surprising. Children 
in conflict with the law are seen as offenders first, which in itself is once again a 
reflection of how children are socially constructed (Goldson et al, 2002). However, 
this is too not a phenomenon peculiar to Malaysia. As suggested in this study, the 
manner in which children in conflict are treated in the Malaysian juvenile justice 
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system is seen with varying degrees of similarity, in other jurisdictions considered in 
this work. 
Thirdly, this thesis explored the points of convergence and divergence in these 
policies with that of other jurisdictions and its impact on diversion strategies. As noted 
in this study, there is a blurring of these strategies as stakeholders merge pre-trial and 
post-trial approaches. The lack of specific diversion strategies are reflective of the 
complexities in applying the concept of diversion in practice. Further, the underlying 
norms and the manner in which child rights are construed has certainly impacted 
diversion strategies in Malaysia.  
As evidenced in this thesis, progress has been slow and there is a constant need to 
take into account the difficulties of entrenched positions. Yet once again, the 
complexities of applying universal rights in a diverse world are a reality. Malaysia’s 
struggles with the implementation of the CRC are not unique and many signatories to 
the CRC face similar challenges and encounter varying levels of compliance, for 
example, in issues of the minimum age of criminal responsibility or in the institutional 
interventions when a child is in conflict with the law. 
The claim to a rights-based argument for the introduction of diversion in Malaysia 
as explored in this thesis suggests that there are deeper fundamental abstractions in the 
notion of rights. It is undeniably clear that the ratification of the CRC in Malaysia has 
yielded a level of impact on child rights. The CRC has clearly become catalyst for 
change ‘stimulating activism in all aspects of society’ (Abramson, 2006:17). The level 
of activism is seen in conversations with stakeholders interviewed in this study who 
are involved in engaging with issues of child rights. The levels of engagement reveal a 
constant need to negotiate, to discuss, to build awareness and to avoid being 
confrontational or in some cases, to be confrontational. (Emphasis added). 
Stakeholders speak about building trust and about developing relationships in order to 
achieve the objectives of the CRC.  Arguably, had it not been for the CRC, many of 
the changes introduced in Malaysia, weaknesses notwithstanding, would not have 
found their way into the juvenile justice system.  
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However, it is evident from the preceding Chapters; there are problems in dealing 
with the broader context of rights and the corresponding specific issue of child rights. 
There are problems in meeting the philosophical aspirations of treaty provisions and 
there are gaps in achieving the promises and assurances made by the government in 
meeting these obligations. Some of these gaps arise from direct political rejection of 
notions of civil and political rights on the basis that it represents an antithesis of the 
existing political culture. These matters have a direct bearing on the manner a rights-
based argument is put forward. Such an argument requires serious commitment from 
political leaders and policy makers. Stakeholders and the general society are obliged 
to ensure that the best interests of children will guide their actions, plans and 
programmes.  
The reality is that given the embeddedness of issues considered in this study, a 
rights-based argument to diversion, while certainly ideal, is not likely to be the 
manner in which it is implemented. (Emphasis added). Thus, it does appear that plans 
for diversion will proceed albeit premised on fulfilling obligations arising from the 
CRC in form but perhaps not in substance. (Emphasis added). This obligation is 
drawn from policies that best serve the state’s reputational value in the international 
arena.  Fulfilling all aspects of rights of the child in conflict with the law therefore will 
continue to be slow as there are unresolved issues that are deeply rooted. These issues 
as identified in this study reflect the point that, ‘the Convention is far more complex 
and multi-dimensional’ and not merely a ‘single, unified philosophy of children’s 
rights’ (Alston, 1994:2-3). 
UNICEF suggests that ‘dramatic progress is possible within one generation if we 
summon the political will to redirect resources towards addressing the basic needs of 
children’ (UNICEF, 2001:102). Evidence drawn from this study suggest that the 
nuances and complexities of translating the aspirational goals of a rights-based 
argument are evident in Malaysia’s journey in implementing diversion in the juvenile 
justice system. Thus, this study establishes the argument that the rights of the child 
and how it is contextualised in Malaysia is a condition precedent to the successful 
implementation of any plans for diversion. As noted above, a child has a right to 
diversion. Acknowledging this philosophical positioning of the rights of the child 
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therefore takes on a greater level of importance and hence as noted above, the concept 
of diversion as explored in this study, fades out of focus. 
Since the ratification of the CRC, a generation of children have become adults, 
many of whom are likely to have children of their own, but progress in acknowledging 
child rights has been pedestrian, at best. Thus, achieving the full measure of treaty 
obligations to recognise the foundational rights of the Malaysian child to develop as 
fully autonomous individuals will be slow. Progress in achieving a rights-based 
argument for diversion will remain protracted unless there is sufficient political will to 
support this. 
8. Postscript 
Much of this study refers to the embeddedness of political culture, a consequence 
arising from having a single political party in power since Malaysia’s independence 
from the British in 1957. As suggested in the preceding Chapters, Malaysia’s political 
history has left its mark on the norms that underlie the juvenile justice system. The 
results of the election in May 2018 saw the ruling coalition lose their 61-year hold on 
government. The ramifications of this are still being felt in the country. Riding on the 
back of voter dissatisfaction about a multiplicity of issues, the newly elected 
government has indicated a strong reform-based agenda.  
This includes plans to repeal laws deemed harsh, restrictive and oppressive, some 
of which were explored in this study (Tan, 2018). There is an expression of a 
commitment to human rights, including the rule of law, transparency of governance, 
the recognition of civil and political rights and an impartial judiciary (Nijar, 2018). 
There are plans to introduce constitutionalism and human rights as part of the 
curriculum for children in schools (Joseph, 2018). There also plans to reform the 
prison system which the current government views as ‘archaic’ and ‘punitive’ (The 
Star, 2018). These values feature in the foundations of a rights-based agenda and 
represent a growing movement to redefine the narrative of the culture of politics in 
Malaysia.  
Arguably, it may be premature to predict the outcome of this endeavour as the 
newly minted government has only been in place for over a month and many of the 
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norms considered in this study are deeply nestled in the political and socio-cultural 
ethos.  However, the potential to effect change in culture and norms cannot be 
ignored. The present government will remain in power for at least another five years 
and will need to garner support from two-thirds of the lower house to secure 
amendments to the provisions that deal with fundamental liberties in the constitution. 
It remains to be seen what changes lie ahead in promoting broader rights-based 
viewpoints as part of the reform agenda but there is a growing sense of optimism that 
a rights-based agenda will be pursued and that such an agenda will include greater 
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APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE PARTICIPATION SHEET - STAKEHOLDERS 
 
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: EXPLORING CHILDREN’S RIGHTS TO DIVERSION 
(2016/2017) 
My name is Paul Linus Andrews and I am a research student with Lancaster University, 
United Kingdom. This information sheet tells you about my research and I hope you find the 
information useful. If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me at: 
p.andrews1@lancaster.ac.uk 
Why is the research being done? 
I am exploring how you view the rights of the child with a particular focus on understanding 
your views on the rights of the child to diversion out of the criminal justice system in 
Malaysia. You are being invited to take part in this research project as your experience can 
help contribute to our understanding and knowledge in these areas. Before you give consent, it 
is important for you to understand why this research is being done and what it will involve. 
Please take time to read the following information carefully. Ask questions if anything you 
read is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not to 
take part.   
 
Who will be involved? 
Children in schools and/or in institutional detention schools/centres/juvenile prisons and 
individuals involved/connected with the juvenile justice system.  
  
What will happen during the research? 
I would like to speak to you individually for up to 45 minutes. If you agree, I will tape record 
the sessions and type them up later. I am not looking for right or wrong answers, only for 
what your views are about the issue. 
 
What are the kind of questions will you be asked? 
 We will look at some documents on the rights of the child. 
 We will talk about your understanding of these issues. 
 We will talk about your experiences (if any) in relation to a child in conflict with the law. 
 We will explore your views on diversion and child rights. 
 
Are there any disadvantages in participating in this research? 
There should be no foreseeable disadvantages to your participation. I hope you will enjoy 
talking with me. If you are unhappy or have further questions at any stage in the process, 
please address your concerns initially to the researcher if this is appropriate. Alternatively, 
please contact the person/s listed at the end of this sheet. 
 
Do you have to give consent to participate in this study? 
Participation on this study is entirely voluntary, so please do not feel obliged to give consent. 
Refusal will involve no penalty whatsoever and you may decide to withdraw from the study 





When can you withdraw your consent? 
If you withdraw your consent within two weeks after your interview/participation in this 
research, we will destroy all data obtained. However, if consent is withdrawn beyond this time 
frame, the data will be used as part of the research. 
 
Will all my details be kept confidential? 
All information which is collected and stored electronically will be stored on a secure, 
password-protected server and any mobile device (a laptop or memory stick) used will be 
encrypted and password-protected and anonymised before the data is presented in the 
research, in compliance with the Malaysian Personal Data Protection Act 2010 and ethical 
research guidelines and principles.  
 
Deliberate disclosure 
However confidential information will be disclosed if there is evidence that a crime has been 
committed or about to be committed. 
 
Will you know the research results? 
I will send you a brief report by December 2017. 
 
Concerns:  
If you are not satisfied with the manner in which this study is being conducted or if you have 
any concerns regarding your participation, you may contact (anonymously if you so choose) 
either:  
 
Dr. Ian Paylor 
Department of Sociology 
Bowland North  













The project has been reviewed by the University Research Ethics Committee [Ref: RS2015-66]. 
 











I am seeking your consent if you would like to take part in a research project on Exploring 
Children’s Rights to Diversion in Malaysia (2017). Before you consent to participating in the 
study I ask that you read the participant information sheet and mark each box below if you 
agree.  If you have any questions or queries before signing the consent form, contact Paul Linus 




1. I confirm that I have read the information sheet and fully  
understand what is expected of me within this study  
2. I confirm that I have had the opportunity to ask any 
questions and to have them answered.  
3. I understand that my interview will be audio recorded and 
then made into an anonymised written transcript. 
4. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I 
am free to withdraw but I am aware that data may still be 
used in certain circumstances  
5. I consent to information and quotations from the interview 
being used in the study.  
6. I understand that any information given will remain 
strictly confidential and anonymous unless there is a need 
for information to be revealed.  









Paul Linus Andrews  
Signed: ______________________ 
Date: ________________________





APPENDIX 3: AMENDED PARTICIPATION INFORMATION SHEET HENRY 
GURNEY: JULY 2017 
 
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: EXPLORING CHILDREN’S RIGHTS TO DIVERSION 
(2017) 
My name is Paul Linus Andrews and I am a research student with Lancaster University, 
United Kingdom. This information sheet tells you about my research and I hope you find the 
information useful. If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me at 
p.andrews1@lancaster.ac.uk 
Why is the research being done? 
I am trying to find out how you view your rights. I am also keen to know what you think 
about what should happen when children commit crimes. I am going to give you information 
and invite you to be part of a research study. You can choose whether or not you want to 
participate. You may discuss anything in this form with your parents or friends or anyone else 
you feel comfortable talking to. You can decide whether to participate or not after you have 
talked it over. You do not have to decide immediately. There may be some words you don’t 
understand or things that you want me to explain more about because you are interested or 
concerned. Please ask me and I will take the time to explain. 
 
Who will be involved? 
Children who are in schools and in institutional detention schools/centres/juvenile prisons and 
adults involved/connected with the juvenile justice system.  
  
What will happen during the research? 
I would like to speak to you individually for up to 45 minutes. If you agree, I will record the 
sessions and type them up later. I am not looking for right or wrong answers, only for what 
you think about these issues. 
 
What will you be asked? 
 We will look at some documents on the rights of the child. 
 We will talk about your understanding of these issues. 
 We will talk about your experiences (if any) in relation to these issues and what you 
think. 
 We will explore your views on what should happen if children commit crimes. 
 
Are there any disadvantages in participating in this research? 
It is normal for you to feel worried about being asked questions but there are no expected 
disadvantages to your participation. I hope you will enjoy talking with me. If you are unhappy 
or have further questions at any stage in the process, please let me know or if you are not 







Do you have to take part in this research? 
You do not have to be in this research. No one will be upset or disappointed with you if you 
say “No”. It’s your choice. You can think about it and tell me later if you want. You can say 
“Yes” now and change your mind later and it will still be okay. 
 
Can I change my mind? 
Well, if you say “Yes” now, you can still say “No” later.  If you let me know within two 
weeks of us talking, I will destroy all the data. But if you decide to say “No” after that, the 
data will still be used as part of the research. 
Can you choose not to answer questions? 
If you are uncomfortable during the interview and wish to stop talking, I will stop and you can 
say you do not want to be part of the interview at that point. It is okay if you choose to do so. 
 
Will anyone know I have been involved? 
I will not tell other people that you are in this research and I won’t share information about 
you to anyone who does not work in this research study. However, I may have to share the 
transcript of our conversations with the Malaysian Prison Department if they ask me to do so. 
 
All information which is collected and stored electronically will be encrypted and password-
protected. I will not use your name or other personal details when the data is presented in the 
research. The research is in compliance with the Malaysian Personal Data Protection Act 
2010 and ethical research guidelines and principles.  
 
When might information be revealed? 
If what is said in the interview makes me think that you, or someone else, is at significant risk 
of harm, I will have to inform someone about this.  If possible, I will tell you if I have to do 
this. 
 
Will you know the research results? 
I will send you a brief report by December 2017. 
 
Concerns:  
If you are not happy with how this study is being conducted or if you have any worries 
regarding your participation, you may also contact (you do not need to write your name or 
details) either:  
 
Dr. Ian Paylor 
Department of Sociology 
Bowland North  













The project has been reviewed by the University Research Ethics Committee [Ref: RS2015-66]. 
 




APPENDIX 4: AMENDED CONSENT FORM HENRY GURNEY 
 
I am seeking your consent if would like to take part in a research project on Exploring 
Children’s Rights to Diversion in Malaysia (2017). Before you consent to participating in the 
study I ask that you read the participant information sheet and mark each box below if you 
agree.  If you have any questions or queries before signing the consent form, contact Paul Linus 




1. I confirm that I have read the information sheet and fully understand what is 
expected of me within this study.  
 
2. I confirm that I have had the opportunity to ask any questions and to have 
them answered.  
 
3. I understand that my interview will be audio recorded and then made into 
written transcript without my name. 
 
4. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I can say ‘No’ but I 
am aware that data may still be used in certain circumstances  
 
5. I consent to information and quotations from the interview being used in the 
study.  
 
6. I understand that any information given will remain strictly confidential and 
anonymous for purposes of this research. 
 
7. I understand that transcripts of my conversation may be handed to the 
Malaysian Prison Department if requested by them. 
 
8. I consent to taking part in the above study. 
 
 










APPENDIX 5: REJECTION LETTER FROM THE PRISON DEPARTMENT 
MALAYSIA (AS TRANSLATED). 
HEADER: 
Malaysian Prison Department 
Ministry of Home Affairs 
Malaysian Prison Headquarters 
Bukit Wira Kajang 
 
      Our Ref: JP/BDK/Rd//96/1 Jld. 6 (61) 
       Date:    24 November 2016 
 
Paul Linus Andrews, 
28 Faber Indah Condominium 
Jalan Desa Cantik 
Taman Desa 




Re: Application to conduct research on child rights to alternative sentencing 
approaches. 
Your letter refers. 
2. The Malaysian Prison Department wishes to thank you for selecting our Department 
to conduct your research entitled, ‘Children in Conflict with the Law: Is There a Basis 
for a Rights Based Argument for Diversion in Malaysia?’  
3. However, regretfully, we are unable to accommodate this request. This is primarily 




“In service of the nation” 
SUPRI BIN HASHIM 
Deputy Commissioner General (Policy) 
Malaysian Prison Department 
c.c 






APPENDIX 6: APPROVAL LETTER AND CORRESPONDING APPENDICES FROM 
THE PRISON DEPARTMENT MALAYSIA (AS TRANSLATED) 
 
HEADER: 
Malaysian Prison Department 
Ministry of Home Affairs 
Malaysian Prison Headquarters 
Bukit Wira Kajang 
 
      Our Ref: JP/BDK/Rd//96/1 Jld. 13 (22) 
       Date:    21 June 2017 
 





Re: Your appeal against our decision to reject your earlier application to conduct 
research on child rights to alternative sentencing approaches. 
Your email refers. 
2. Your appeal to conduct research on ‘Children in Conflict with the Law: Is There a Basis 
for a Rights Based Argument for Diversion in Malaysia?’ has been approved. The 
approved research is to be conducted at the Henry Gurney School, Puncak Borneo, 
Sarawak on 19th July 2017 from 9.30am to 3.30pm. The respondents are 10 juveniles 
(Malaysian citizens) and 2 senior officers. 
 
3. The approved researchers are: 
3.1.1. Paul Linus Andrews    Principal Researcher 
3.1.2. Fam Jia Yuin     Research Assistant 
(trained in psychology as required by the Prison Department) 
 
3. This approval is subject to the conditions listed in Appendix A. You are to ensure that 
the respondents consent to the research as per Appendix B. This approval is strictly for 
research purposes only. At no time must the identity of the respondents be revealed 
(Taking photographs, audio recording or any attempt to reveal the identity of the 
respondent is prohibited).  
 
4. All further inquiries should be addressed to: 
                                                 





Henry Gurney School 





5. Enclosed, please find documents that require your attention. Please read the information 
carefully as they contain conditions by which you are obliged to abide by. If you agree to 




“In service of the nation” 
SUPRI BIN HASHIM 
Deputy Commissioner General (Policy) 
Malaysian Prison Department 
 
c.c 
1. Deputy Commissioner General (Management). 
2. Director of Prisons, State of Sarawak. 
3. Director, Henry Gurney School, Sarawak. 
 
- Please provide support to the researcher and ensure that security is maintained 
throughout the research period 
- Please also ensure that the researcher submits two copies of his research findings to the 
Institution as well as the Policy Division, Malaysian Prison Dept. 
- Please ensure that all duly completed consent forms (Appendix B), are kept in the 
juvenile’s personal file. Remand prisoners are not subject to this research. 









CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO THE CONDUCT OF 
RESEARCH/PRACTICUM/PROGRAMMES IN THE MALAYSIAN PRISON 
DEPARTMENT  
 
1. The approved number of researchers are to be observed. Any increase in the number of 
researchers requires prior approval from the Department or the Ministry. 
2. Any equipment to be used is subject to inspection. Researchers are not permitted to bring 
in/remove any prohibited item/equipment. 
3. Researchers are to list all items used in conjunction with the research before any research 
is conducted and seek approval beforehand.  
3. In order to maintain safety and security, researchers are to abide by all rules/directions 
imposed by the prison authorities as per the Prison Act 1995 and the Prions Rules 2000. 
4. In the interest of personal safety, researchers are advised to remain in approved locations 
within the prison. 
5. Researchers are prohibited from recording by any means, conversations with inmates or 
from taking photographs of the inmates or the physical structure of the prison. 
6. Research findings are not to be shared with any third party without prior written approval 
of the Department. 
7. Researchers are not allowed to use any part of the coverage/interview/article for purposes 
of broadcast or publication without the prior written consent of the Prison Department. 
8. Any information obtained in relation to the prison itself, officers or inmates cannot be 
published unless written consent is obtained from the Prison Department. 
9. The Prison Department reserves the right to withdraw the approval granted or the results 
of the research carried out in the event of non-compliance with any prescribed procedure. 
A decision once arrived at, is final. 
10. A copy of the research results shall be handed over to the Prison Management Division of 
the Prison Department Headquarters and the Director of the relevant prison. 
 
Policy Division  














                                                 
 The duplication of number 3 appears in the original. 
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LETTER OF UNDERTAKING 
 
I _____________________________________ID_______________________ residing at 
_________________________________agree to abide by all laws, rules, instructions and 
conditions presently in force in relation to this research. Further, I hereby agree to undertake 
that: - 
 
i. I will only use information obtained specifically for this research and not for purposes of 
broadcast or publication; 
ii. I will not use information obtained for purposes of publicity or use such information in 
any seminar, forum, conference, symposium or academic journal or any other medium 
that would facilitate other parties obtaining such information; 
iii. I will not use information obtained for my own self-interest or in the interests of third 
parties; 
iv. I will not take photographs by any means/device of the prisoners or of the physical 
structure of the prison or of any part of the prison. 
v. I will not publish, receive, obtain, copy, keep, collect, record or broadcast wholly or partly 
any item, document or information so obtained without the written permission of the 
Commissioner General of the Prisons Department; 
vi. I will not adversely affect the image of the Prisons Department, the Ministry of Home 
Affairs and the Government of Malaysia; 
vii. I will abide by all conditions as stipulated in Appendix A. 
 
I am fully aware that if I breach this Letter of Undertaking, I am liable to be subject to the full 




Applicant’s Signature       Witness’ Signature 
 
 
__________________      __________________ 
Name:         Name: 
ID:         ID 
Telephone:        Telephone: 
Date:         Date: 






















My attention has been drawn to the provisions of the Official Secrets Act 1972, which are set 
out here. I am fully aware of the serious consequences that may follow any breach of those 
provisions.  
 
I understand that the sections of the Act cover material published in a speech, lecture, or radio 
or television broadcast, or in the Press or in book form. I am aware that I should not divulge 
any information obtained by me as a result of my appointment to any unauthorised person, 
either orally or in writing, without the previous official sanction in writing of the Department 
appointing me, to whom two copies of the proposed publication be forwarded for scrutiny.  
 
I also understand that I am liable to be prosecuted if I publish without official sanction any 
information I may acquire in the course of my tenure of an official appointment (unless it has 
already officially been made public). I am aware that I am liable to be prosecuted if I retain 
without official sanction any sketch, plan, model, article, note or official documents no longer 
needed for my official duties. I am aware that these provisions apply not only during the period 
of my appointment but also after my appointment has ceased. I also understand that I must 
surrender any documents etc., if I am no longer in service, save such as have been issued to me 









































voluntarily agree to be a participant in the research entitled 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
conducted by___________________________________(ID_________________ )  
from ________________________________________________ 
 
2. I am aware that I am involved in the following method of data collection: 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
3. I am aware that all information that I provide will be subject to confidentiality and 





Yours sincerely,       Witnessed by; 
 
 
______________       ____________ 
(Signed/Thumbprint)       Name & Post: 























APPENDIX 7: ORIGINAL LETTERS FROM THE PRISON DEPARTMENT 































APPENDIX 8: SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR THE BOYS IN 
THE HENRY GURNEY SCHOOL, PUNCAK BORNEO, SARAWAK. 
 
1. Would you like to share some information about yourself? Perhaps where you are 
from? How long have you been here? 
2. Would you like to share the reasons for your detention?  
3. Tell me about your daily routine. 
4. Which aspect of the routine do you like the best and which do you not like at all? 
5. What do you think is the purpose of these activities? 
6. If it is okay, I would like to ask you about children and crime. 
a) If a child commits a crime, should they be treated differently from adults? 
Why? What was your experience? 
b) What was your experience when dealing with the police? How did you feel? 
c) What happened when you were detained on remand?   
d) Tell me about your experience in court? 
e) Do you discuss how you feel with anyone? 
f) How do you feel about your detention here in Henry Gurney? 
7. What do understand from the notion of diversion? (Explain if necessary) 
8. Do you think that a child should have a right to diversion? 
9. Under what circumstances would you suggest that it be used? 
10. Is there anything else you would like to add? 
11. What are your plans for the future? 
